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Abstract
The Grid computing paradigm is becoming a well established method for high per-
formance computing. While the first generation of Grid computing solutions imple-
mented their own proprietary interfaces, the introduction of the service-oriented com-
puting paradigm and the corresponding web service standards into the field of Grid
computing through the Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) increased the inter-
operability of the Grid. This paved the way for a number of national and international
Grid projects, which now host a large number of academic and a growing number of
business applications requiring on-demand provisioning and use of Grid resources. In
an on-demand Grid environment, Grid users and applications change frequently, and
the value of software and data is much higher than in traditional Grid environments
with academic open source applications. To facilitate on-demand Grid computing, it
is essential that users are able to install and use their applications autonomously in
a timely and secure fashion, even though the software may contain third party com-
ponents and requires root privileges to install. This would also enable the Grid to
act as a base technology for the new Cloud computing paradigm, in which similar
on-demand business constraints are present. Consequently, there are much higher de-
mands for both administrative measures and security mechanisms to enable on-demand
Grid computing.
Like most complex IT systems, Grid middlewares exhibit a number of security
problems which are further compounded by the new on-demand Grid usage scenario.
Not only do these security problems expose the heterogeneous Grid resources to a
homogeneous attack vector, but they also threaten existing cluster resources and their
users, who up till now have worked in a local and secure environment. Furthermore, in
an on-demand Grid scenario, cluster administrators are exposed to a large number of
unknown users with a great variety of usage patterns. This makes the detection of ma-
licious behavior an extremely complex task. As a consequence, Grids are increasingly
becoming an attractive target for attackers, since they offer standardised access to a
large number of machines storing potentially valuable data which can be misused in
various ways. For example, the considerable computing power of clusters exposed via
the Grid could be misused to break passwords, and their large storage capacity could be
misappropriated to store and share illegal software and data. The generous bandwidth
of the Internet connection can be used for launching Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks
or for hosting file-sharing services. However, far more critical than these resource
attacks are attacks against customer data: crash test model data of a new prototype
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car, a custom fluid simulation suite or customer billing data all represent intellectual
property of considerable monetary value and need to be protected. If a Grid resource
provider cannot ensure the end-to-end integrity and safety of customer software and
data, an industrial adoption of Grid technology will not be possible. However, at the
same time, easy to use administration capabilities must exist to enable on-demand in-
stallation and usage of custom applications. These are usually diametrically opposite
requirements, and careful balancing is required to satisfy both requirements.
This thesis presents novel security and usability approaches for service-oriented
on-demand Grid computing. They enable users to install and use custom software
autonomously (both service-oriented and traditional) on shared computer systems on
demand, while at the same time they protect software, data and business process infor-
mation from other Grid users and external attackers.
The core solution proposed in this thesis is based on operating system virtualisation
to offer dynamic virtual image creation and deployment in a secure environment. An
automated dynamic firewall mechanism provides a user based network security setup
and creates secure user network regions on demand. In addition, the Grid environment
is separated into several zones to protect local cluster resources from illegal access of
Grid users. The Grid headnode and the image creation station are both confined to
separate compartments in a Grid demilitarised zone.
To enable the secure integration of this Grid environment into existing business
workflows, an extension to the Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) and
workflow execution engine is presented which allows the execution of secure Grid ser-
vices in combination with existing business web services. The workflow engine han-
dles the issues of proxy certificate creation transparently and, in the case of long run-
ning applications, certificate renewal. The approach allows both fine-grained service-
oriented applications and legacy Grid applications to run in the same environment by
integrating the Grid sandboxing system into existing cluster scheduling solutions.
Furthermore, a novel server rotation mechanism is introduced to protect the Grid
headnode from unknown stealth attacks by refreshing the headnode transparently using
virtualised images. This reduces the time an attacker can operate in the system to no
more than a few minutes. In addition to these attack prevention mechanisms, a novel
intrusion detection system using a streaming database system is presented to detect
attacks, which could not be prevented. Since developing service-oriented applications
for a Grid environment is a complex and error prone task, the final contribution of this
thesis is a design for an automated, model driven development process for secure Grid
services.
An implementation of the new Grid environment based on the Globus Toolkit 4,
the Sun Grid Engine and the ActiveBPEL Engine is presented. The model driven
development concepts are implemented in Eclipse for the Globus Tookit 4. Experi-
mental results and an evaluation of the critical components of the new Grid setup are
presented. The proposed security mechanisms are intended to promote the next phase
in the evolution of Grid computing and to enable the Grid to act as a secure basis for
the business-oriented Cloud computing endeavor.
Zusammenfassung
Grid Computing ist mittlerweile zu einem etablierten Standard für das verteilte Höchst-
leistungsrechnen geworden. Während die erste Generation von Grid Middleware-
Systemen noch mit proprietären Schnittstellen gearbeitet hat, wurde durch die Ein-
führung von service-orientierten Standards wie WSDL und SOAP durch die Open Grid
Services Architecture (OGSA) die Interoperabilität von Grids signifikant erhöht. Dies
hat den Weg für mehrere nationale und internationale Grid-Projekten bereitet, in denen
eine große Anzahl von akademischen und eine wachsende Anzahl von industriellen
Anwendungen im Grid ausgeführt werden, die die bedarfsgesteuerte (on-demand) Pro-
visionierung und Nutzung von Ressourcen erfordern. Bedarfsgesteuerte Grids zeich-
nen sich dadurch aus, dass sowohl die Software, als auch die Benutzer einer starken
Fluktuation unterliegen. Weiterhin sind sowohl die Software, als auch die Daten,
auf denen operiert wird, meist proprietär und haben einen hohen finanziellen Wert.
Dies steht in starkem Kontrast zu den heutigen Grid-Anwendungen im akademischen
Umfeld, die meist offen im Quellcode vorliegen bzw. frei verfügbar sind. Um den
Ansprüchen einer bedarfsgesteuerten Grid-Nutzung gerecht zu werden, muss das Grid
administrative Komponenten anbieten, mit denen Anwender autonom Software instal-
lieren können, selbst wenn diese Root-Rechte benötigen. Zur gleichen Zeit muss die
Sicherheit des Grids erhöht werden, um Software, Daten und Meta-Daten der kom-
merziellen Anwender zu schützen. Dies würde es dem Grid auch erlauben als Basis-
technologie für das gerade entstehende Gebiet des Cloud Computings zu dienen, wo
ähnliche Anforderungen existieren.
Wie es bei den meisten komplexen IT-Systemen der Fall ist, sind auch in tradi-
tionellen Grid Middlewares Schwachstellen zu finden, die durch die geforderten Er-
weiterungen der administrativen Möglichkeiten potentiell zu einem noch größerem
Problem werden. Die Schwachstellen in der Grid Middleware öffnen einen homoge-
nen Angriffsvektor auf die ansonsten heterogenen und meist privaten Cluster-Umge-
bungen. Hinzu kommt, dass anders als bei den privaten Cluster-Umgebungen und
kleinen akademischen Grid-Projekten die angestrebten großen und offenen Grid-Land-
schaften die Administratoren mit gänzlich unbekannten Benutzern und Verhaltenstruk-
turen konfrontieren. Dies macht das Erkennen von böswilligem Verhalten um ein
Vielfaches schwerer. Als Konsequenz werden Grid-Systeme ein immer attraktivere
Ziele für Angreifer, da standardisierte Zugriffsmöglichkeiten Angriffe auf eine große
Anzahl von Maschinen und Daten von potentiell hohem finanziellen Wert ermöglichen.
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Während die Rechenkapazität, die Bandbreite und der Speicherplatz an sich schon at-
traktive Ziele darstellen können, sind die im Grid enthaltene Software und die gespe-
icherten Daten viel kritischere Ressourcen. Modelldaten für die neuesten Crash-Test
Simulationen, eine industrielle Fluid-Simulation, oder Rechnungsdaten von Kunden
haben einen beträchtlichen Wert und müssen geschützt werden. Wenn ein Grid-Anbieter
nicht für die Sicherheit von Software, Daten und Meta-Daten sorgen kann, wird die in-
dustrielle Verbreitung der offenen Grid-Technologie nicht stattfinden. Die Notwendig-
keit von strikten Sicherheitsmechanismen muss mit der diametral entgegengesetzten
Forderung nach einfacher und schneller Integration von neuer Software und neuen
Kunden in Einklang gebracht werden.
In dieser Arbeit werden neue Ansätze zur Verbesserung der Sicherheit und Nutz-
barkeit von service-orientiertem bedarfsgesteuertem Grid Computing vorgestellt. Sie
ermöglichen eine autonome und sichere Installation und Nutzung von komplexer, ser-
vice-orientierter und traditioneller Software auf gemeinsam genutzen Ressourcen.
Neue Sicherheitsmechanismen schützen Software, Daten und Meta-Daten der Anwen-
der vor anderen Anwendern und vor externen Angreifern. Das System basiert auf
Betriebssystemvirtualisierungstechnologien und bietet dynamische Erstellungs- und
Installationsfunktionalitäten für virtuelle Images in einer sicheren Umgebung, in der
automatisierte Mechanismen anwenderspezifische Firewall-Regeln setzen, um anwen-
derbezogene Netzwerkpartitionen zu erschaffen. Die Grid-Umgebung wird selbst in
mehrere Bereiche unterteilt, damit die Kompromittierung von einzelnen Komponen-
ten nicht so leicht zu einer Gefährdung des gesamten Systems führen kann. Die Grid-
Headnode und der Image-Erzeugungsserver werden jeweils in einzelne Bereiche dieser
demilitarisierten Zone positioniert.
Um die sichere Anbindung von existierenden Geschäftsanwendungen zu ermög-
lichen, werden der BPEL-Standard (Business Process Execution Language) und eine
Workflow-Ausführungseinheit um Grid-Sicherheitskonzepte erweitert. Die Erweiter-
ung erlaubt eine nahtlose Integration von geschützten Grid Services mit existieren-
den Web Services. Die Workflow-Ausführungseinheit bietet die Erzeugung und die
Erneuerung (im Falle von lange laufenden Anwendungen) von Proxy-Zertifikaten. Der
Ansatz ermöglicht die sichere gemeinsame Ausführung von neuen, fein-granularen,
service-orientierten Grid Anwendungen zusammen mit traditionellen Batch- und Job-
Farming Anwendungen. Dies wird durch die Integration des vorgestellten Grid Sand-
boxing-Systems in existierende Cluster Scheduling Systeme erreicht. Eine innovative
Server-Rotationsstrategie sorgt für weitere Sicherheit für den Grid Headnode Server,
in dem transparent das virtuelle Server Image erneuert wird und damit auch unbekan-
nte und unentdeckte Angriffe neutralisiert werden. Um die Angriffe, die nicht ver-
hindert werden konnten, zu erkennen, wird ein neuartiges Intrusion Detection System
vorgestellt, das auf Basis von Datenstrom-Datenbanksystemen funktioniert. Als letzte
Neuerung dieser Arbeit wird eine Erweiterung des modellgetriebenen Softwareent-
wicklungsprozesses eingeführt, die eine automatisierte Generierung von sicheren Grid
Services ermöglicht, um die komplexe und damit unsichere manuelle Erstellung von
Grid Services zu ersetzen.
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Eine prototypische Implementierung der Konzepte wird auf Basis des Globus Toolk-
its 4, der Sun Grid Engine und der ActiveBPEL Engine vorgestellt. Die modell-
getriebene Entwicklungsumgebung wurde in Eclipse für das Globus Toolkit 4 real-
isiert. Experimentelle Resultate und eine Evaluation der kritischen Komponenten des
vorgestellten neuen Grids werden präsentiert. Die vorgestellten Sicherheitsmechanis-
mem sollen die nächste Phase der Evolution des Grid Computing in einer sicheren
Umgebung ermöglichen.
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1
Introduction
Grid Computing [71] has the potential to solve bigger and more complex computa-
tional problems than ever before, while at the same time reducing the cost of com-
putational resources through multi-organisational resource sharing. The adoption of
the Grid computing paradigm outside of the open academic environment is, however,
currently hindered by two main factors. Firstly, strong security mechanisms to pro-
tect intellectual property contained in both the software, data and business processes
deployed into the Grid are lacking. Secondly, traditional Grid environments are cum-
bersome and do not fulfill the requirements of on-demand business processes. The pur-
pose of this thesis is to introduce new security and administrative mechanisms which
will make the Grid more suited to the fast moving world of on-demand business for
both Grid development and administration. The aim is to increase the capabilities of
the users and thus counteract the bottlenecks currently created by traditional adminis-
trative structures. This will also enable the Grid to be used as an enabling technology
for the Cloud computing paradigm [200]. However, the increased administrative rights
of the users create a number of new security issues, which represent the main focus
of this thesis. Before discussing the security issues which are the main motivation
of this work, the terms On-demand Computing, Grid Computing, Service-Orientation
and Cloud Computing will be briefly introduced.
1.1 On-Demand Computing
On-demand Computing is a term coined by IBM as the enabling IT infrastructure for
a more flexible business environment. IBM introduced the on-demand business as
follows: On-Demand Business is a model, complete with all the necessary tools, for
developing enterprise-scale software. It provides an open standards-based blueprint
that allows you to integrate software components from business partners and other en-
terprises, efficiently manage your available technology resources, and take advantage
of responsive autonomic capabilities. ... In a networked world, on-demand delivery is
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essential for business survival. You have to do more than simply integrate everything
inside your enterprise. You have to connect your enterprise with other enterprises,
other business processes, other applications, and myriad pervasive computing devices.
This is why the On-Demand Business model is relevant. It’s based on open standards
and provides a comprehensive, yet flexible environment in which to build these types
of solutions. Developers can ultimately deliver on the promises that executives began
making in the previous decade – delivering real business solutions through intelligent
uses of technology. [98]
In the area of high performance computing, on-demand computing is aimed at
tackling the trade-off between coping with peak performance requirements and budget
constrained buying capabilities. More is usually better when it comes to computing
power, since this enables projects to be finished in shorter time or allows more cus-
tomers to served concurrently. However, like most business resources, the demand for
computing resources is limited by real-world budgets. With inadequate computing ca-
pacity, the entire business could end up waiting for the computers to complete critical
operations. On the other hand, the acquisition of too much capacity leads to computing
power lying idle - an expensive inefficiency which ties up capital and resources that
might have been applied to other business-critical areas. The purpose of on-demand
computing is to allow organisations the flexibility of configuring their own infrastruc-
ture to deal with current demand while at the same time transparently adding rented
resources when needed.
1.2 Grid Computing
The Grid computing paradigm is fast becoming a well established method of high
performance computing and is aimed at providing resources (such as compute power,
data, access to special appliances and even people) as easily as electricity is provided
through the national electrical Grid. The initial vision of the Grid encompassed the
collection of different compute clusters under a common infrastructure that allowed
uniform access to those heterogeneous systems. This goal bears some similarity to the
goals of on-demand computing, albeit with an academic rather than a business focus.
The current mainstay of Grid computing is in the area of open academic Grids in which
a number of universities and research institutes combine their computing power on a
fair share basis. Unlike traditional cluster computing and the early Grid initiatives in
which only a small number of users work in a closed system, current Grid systems
expose the local compute resources (mostly clusters) to a larger number of users via
the Internet, using open Grid middlewares such as Globus [178], gLite [61] or Unicore
[189]. Like most complex IT systems, these middleware solutions exhibit a number
security problems [86, 85, 181, 94] opening the entire system to attack. Not only do
these security holes expose the heterogeneous Grid resources to homogeneous attack
vectors, but they also threaten existing cluster resources and their users who up until
now have worked in a local and secure environment.
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When the Grid computing paradigm is combined with the on-demand business
model proposed by IBM, several new problems are created. Unlike traditional clus-
ter systems and academic Grid initiatives, where local administrators usually know
their users’ software and usage habits and the Grid users know and trust each other,
the commercial on-demand Grid exposes cluster administrators to a large number of
unknown users with a great variety of usage patterns. The proposed paradigm shift
also exposes the Grid users to possible malicious behaviour from other unknown Grid
users working on the same Grid. Although the protection of this kind of Grid and the
detection of malicious behavior is an extremely complex task in such an environment
due to the large number of unkown users and behavior patterns, businesses are slowly
becoming interested in Grid computing both to save money through better resource
utilisation and out-sourcing as well as to open up new business possibilities by en-
abling open standards access to and from other organisations. As a consequence of
the increased interest of businesses in Grid computing, Grids are becoming an attrac-
tive target for attackers, since the Grid offers standardised access to a large number
of machines storing potentially valuable data, which can be misused in various ways.
The considerable computing power of clusters exposed via the Grid can, for instance,
be used to break passwords and the large storage capacity can be used for storing and
sharing illegal software and data. The generous bandwidth of the Internet connection
is ideal for launching Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks or for hosting file sharing ser-
vices, to name just a few attacks. However, far more critical than these resource attacks
are the attacks against customer data. Crash test model data of a new prototype car or
a custom fluid simulation suite both represent intellectual property worth substantial
amounts of money and must be protected. If a Grid resource provider cannot ensure the
end-to-end integrity and safety of customer software and data, an industrial adoption
of Grid technology will be difficult.
1.3 Service-Orientation
A side effect of the industrial push into Grid computing is the growing standardisation
of the Grid middlewares. The service-oriented architecture (SOA) approach and the
corresponding web service standards such as WSDL [35] and SOAP [185] are cur-
rently adopted in various fields of distributed application development (e.g. enterprise
application integration, web application development, inter-organisational workflow
collaboration). The Open Grid services Architecture (OGSA) [71, 69] incorporates
the web service paradigm in the field of Grid computing as an approach towards defin-
ing the service-oriented Grid. The OGSA effort to add stateful interaction to the web
service environment has also been recognised by other web service users not focused
on Grid computing. As a result, the specifications of the Web service Resource Frame-
work (WSRF) [127] have emerged.
Service-oriented Grid computing offers the potential to provide fine grained ac-
cess to the available resources which can significantly increase the versatility of a
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Grid. Service-oriented applications consist of a number of fine grained services which
are coupled together into more complex services through a workflow. The Business
Process Execution Language for Web services (BPEL4WS or WS-BPEL [11]) has
emerged from the earlier proposed XLANG [117] and Web service Flow Language
(WSFL) [112]. It enables the construction of complex web services composed of
other web services that act as the basic activities in the process model of the newly
constructed service. Access to a process is exposed by the execution engine through a
web service interface (Web services Description Language, WSDL [35]), allowing the
process to be accessed by web service clients or to be used as a basic activity in other
process specifications. This allows complex applications to be modeled using basic
reusable services.
While the introduction of these service-oriented standards helps the integration
of Grid resources into existing business environments, a first step towards enabling
on-demand Grid computing, it also adds further complexity to an already complex en-
vironment. With the added complexity, the potential for security problems is increased
still further, in particular since business oriented Grid computing has very different
security requirements to those of the academic Grid initiatives.
While a cursory examination suggests the adoption of the service-oriented comput-
ing paradigm has been wide-spread, with most major Grid solutions offering service-
oriented capabilities, an actual paradigm shift in the applications has not yet been
realised on any significant scale. Most Grid applications are still the monolithic job
farming or massively parallel number crunching applications previously deployed as
standalone cluster applications. The extent of service-oriented design is often reduced
to the execution of a legacy shell script through the WS-GRAM (Grid Resource Allo-
cation Manager) [180] interface, thus combining the security problems of both worlds.
1.4 Cloud Computing
The term Cloud computing [200] entered the scene in 2007, when several notable
companies like Amazon, IBM, Google, Apple and Microsoft, inspired by the Grid
paradigm, started offering compute and storage resources to customers on demand.
The term was derived from the common depiction of transparent networks of resources
as a cloud. Cloud resources such as clusters and storage servers are typically operated
by third-party providers and are rented on an on-demand basis. Consumers should per-
ceive the cloud as a service and should not have to be concerned with the underlying
technology used to meet computational and storage demands. As such, Cloud comput-
ing can be seen as a combination of Grid, on-demand and service-oriented computing
with added business-oriented pricing and billing mechanisms, but without some of the
advanced Grid features such as delegation and virtual organisation based authorisation.
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1.5 Motivation
The motivation of this thesis is the exploration of the issues involved in enabling on-
demand Grid computing for both academic and business scenarios and will focus par-
ticularly on the security issues.
1.5.1 On-Demand Infrastructure
To explore the security issues of on-demand Grid computing, a number of administra-
tive issues need to be dealt with as well, since the administrative changes to the current
Grid computing paradigm required to enable an on-demand use create some significant
new threats. The most significant change to the standard Grid computing model pro-
posed in this thesis concerns the deployment of software. To enable the transparent and
on-demand inclusion of Grid resources into a business workflow, it is argued that Grid
users should be able to configure Grid resources (which are shared with other users)
with the same level of privileges as they have on their own local resources. This also
allows far more complex applications containing both native code and services to be
installed efficiently due to the distribution of administrative rights. This entails grant-
ing root privileges to Grid users which in a traditional Grid environment is unthinkable
both for security and management reasons. Apart from this deployment feature some
resource discovery and usability issues need to be handled as well.
1.5.2 Grid Security
The main focus of this thesis are the security issues created through the extension
of the Grid computing paradigm by the facilities needed to enable on-demand usage.
In the course of this thesis, the security issues for on-demand Grid computing are
analysed based on a number of academic and commercial Grid applications, includ-
ing applications from BMW1, Deutsche Bank2, Access3 and Wasy4 that have strict
confidentiality requirements for both their software and data. Based on the require-
ments gathered from these applications, new security measures were designed and
implemented leading to a novel Grid setup to further facilitate commercial adoption of
the Grid computing paradigm while at the same time increasing the versatility of the
Grid for academic projects. Issues dealt with include the virtualisation of the compute
resources, dynamic sandboxing of both Grid services and native application compo-
nents, network separation and stream-based network intrusion detection. Furthermore,
to protect Grid headnodes, a novel pro-active intrusion tolerance mechanism is intro-
duced based on rotating virtual servers which can cleanse WSRF based Grid servers
on a periodic basis.
1www.bmw.de
2www.deutsche-bank.de
3www.access.rwth-aachen.de
4www.wasy.de
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1.5.3 Secure Model Driven Development
The inclusion of the Service-Oriented Architectures paradigm [62] into the Grid in-
creased the complexity of Grid applications significantly. Since development and
configuration complexity is one of the main problems in creating secure software,
this thesis also explores Model Driven Development [118, 25] extensions to ease the
creation, configuration and deployment of secure Grid services. Due to the complex
nature of Grid service development, an annotation based development process is in-
troduced which allows application developers to bring their applications into the Grid
without writing a sinlge line of Grid code. The application developers simply mark
the appropriate classes and methods with the introduced Grid annotations and specify
the security requirements, and a Grid service generator automatically creates all the
necessary Grid classes and configurations files. An Eclipse based integrated develop-
ment environment is introduced which implements this approach also offering secure
service-oriented workflow creation based on the Business Process Execution Language
(BPEL).
1.6 Project Framework
The proposals introduced in this thesis were developed in the framework of several
projects as part of the German national Grid initiative the D-Grid. The projects include:
InGrid. InGrid aims to enable small and medium sized engineering businesses to use
the Grid for their computational needs they cannot meet in-house. InGrid is
based on six prototypical applications in the fields of coupled multiscale prob-
lems, coupled multidisciplinary simulations and distributed simulation based op-
timisation. Adaptive and scalable process models and runtime environments are
to be developed. The flexible use of Grid technologies will combine the com-
petences in modeling, simulation and optimisation and allow for the common,
efficient use of distributed resources. The partners of the project are: The High
Performance Computing Center HLRS Stuttgart, ACCESS e.V., WASY GmbH,
Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft SCAI, T-Systems Solutions for Research GmbH, Uni-
versity of Siegen - Institute of Business Information Technology, University of
Stuttgart - Institute of Fluid Mechanics and Hydraulic Machinery and the Uni-
versity of Marburg - Department of Mathematics and Computer Science. [46]
Biz2Grid. The main objective of Biz2Grid is to provide foundations for an effective
application of Grid technologies in enterprises. In order to achieve this goal,
business and economically driven questions have to be answered and technical
challenges have to be solved. Business-models have to be developed that are
adequate for an application in the Grid. In addition, Biz2Grid addresses tech-
nical research questions. Currently, the seamless adaptation of applications to
Grid technologies is hardly realisable. As a consequence, it is a challenge of the
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project (i) to distribute and parallelise real world applications and (ii) to concep-
tualise and implement economic business models at the same time. The appli-
cation case study used in Biz2Grid research is supplied by BMW. The partners
of the project are: IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH, University Karlsruhe
- Institut Informationswirtschaft und -management, FZI Forschungszentrum In-
formatik Karlsruhe - Information Process Engineering, BMW München (asso-
ciated partner) and the University Marburg - Department of Mathematics and
Computer Science. [44]
FinGrid. Increasing competition in the German banking sector is leading to a high
pressure for restructuring and further automation in IT-related business pro-
cesses in banks and financial services providers. Additionally, new legal reg-
ulations such as Basel II and customer needs that are changing into the direction
of highly customised on-demand financial products enhance this pressure. To
face these challenges, the Financial Business Grid (FinGrid) project strives to
identify suitable services and processes in the financial services sector and to
develop Grid-based systems that enable financial service providers to reorganise
their processes efficiently and to realize applications that have been impossi-
ble so far in terms of computational requirements. To guarantee relevance for
the target industry, the projected research will be performed jointly with lead-
ing financial industry research partners. Three prototypes are to be developed:
Prototype I is a pricing and billing component for Grid-based services - in co-
operation with Deutsche Bank and IBM, Prototype II is a Grid-based customer
portfolio performance measurement and management tool - in cooperation with
DataSynapse and Dresdner Bank and Prototype III is an asset-backed security
factory based on Grid architecture - in cooperation with FinanzIT and PA Con-
sulting. The partners of the project are: University of Frankfurt, University of
Siegen, University of Stuttgart, Data Synapse, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank,
Sparkasse Finanz IT, IBM, PA Consulting Group and the University Marburg -
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science. [45]
Furthermore, a close cooperation is maintained with D-Grid Integration Project
(DGI) and the community project MediGrid to exchange security requirements in the
security working group of the D-Grid.
1.7 Contributions of this Thesis
The research contributions of this thesis are:
• The general idea of developing a service-oriented ad hoc Grid environment
whose flexibility is a major requirement for on-demand Grid computing was first
proposed in 2004 in several publications made during the course of this thesis.
The ability of offering secure hot Grid service deployment (i.e. non-intrusive
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installation and removal of Grid services on a Grid node) was introduced as a
novelty in a service-oriented Grid computing environment in 2004. The initial
implementation was provided to the members of the Globus project team at the
University of Chicago and the Argonne National Laboratory, and hot Grid ser-
vice deployment is currently being integrated into future releases of the Globus
toolkit by the Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan. The
hot Grid service deployment functionality represents a new paradigm in service-
oriented Grid computing by offering component distribution as a primitive for
the development of complex Grid applications.
• While traditional Grid security infrastructures focus on message level security
and access control for inter-node communication in a service-oriented Grid en-
vironment, this thesis focuses on the inherent intra-node security threats for a
dynamic and changing Grid community. To counter the threats arising from the
dynamic capabilities of an on-demand Grid, a number of novel service-level iso-
lation techniques are introduced into the field of service-oriented Grid middle-
ware. A wide range of security solutions, ranging from lightweight approaches
with respect to computational overhead and memory utilisation through operat-
ing system call interposition to approaches such as complete operating system
para-virtualization, are presented.
• In addition to the service-oriented components, a novel Grid environment is pre-
sented which offers advanced security mechanisms to enable users to safely in-
stall and use custom software on-demand. An image creation station is used to
create user specific virtual machines in which a user can install software with
root privileges. An automated dynamic firewalling mechanism offers a Virtual
Organisation and user based network security setup and creates secure user net-
work regions on-demand. Furthermore, a Grid centric network separation strat-
egy is presented to create several zones to protect local cluster resources from
the Grid middleware.
• A novel intrusion tolerance system which improves the security of stateful WSRF
Grid servers against stealth attacks is presented. The system is based on a novel
server rotation strategy utilising para-virtualisation to close attack windows for
stateful service-oriented Grid headnode servers. A flexible plugin based rotation
manager deals with the complex issue of stateful connections to the Grid server,
and a database connector is utilised to detach service state from the rotating
functional components of the Grid server.
• To detect attacks which could not be prevented, a novel architecture for intru-
sion detection systems (IDS) for distributed environments is presented. A stream
based database management system (DBMS) is used for querying network data.
This novel integration of a stream-oriented DBMS into an IDS offers a new
quality of IDS systems. The streaming architecture allows for a more natural
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aggregation and processing of temporal attack data across multiple Grid sites,
allowing attacks to be detected even if the separate nodes do not possess enough
information to raise an alert. This is made possible by the fact that using stream-
ing technology it is easily possible to stream raw package data from multiple
sites into aggregation sites which can analyse the data on the fly using database
queries. The temporal aspect of streaming offers the benefit of a natural time
windows for attack queries since data is processed during its natural flow and
only stored as long as necessary for analysis. No central database is required to
store the raw data.
• As an inherent element of service-oriented on-demand Grid computing, not only
the runtime environment, but also sophisticated development support must be
addressed. This thesis presents the first model-driven approach to Grid service
development and developer and administrator support in an integrated environ-
ment in the service-oriented Grid computing domain. Positive feedback from a
growing external user community suggests that such tools are helpful to lower
the complexity of service-oriented Grid application development. A novel sepa-
ration of one of the modeling layers - the platform specific layer - into an upper,
application specific and a lower, target system specific sub-layer is introduced,
allowing to easily target different concrete implementations of the same high-
level middleware paradigm.
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1.8 Organization of this Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 introduces a number of sample
applications which form the motivational basis of this work. Chapter 3 presents the
on-demand Grid computing paradigm and the extension to traditional Grid computing
which were developed to fulfil the functional requirements of the sample applications.
Chapter 4 presents a threat analysis and attack examples relevant to the new Grid
computing paradigm. The new security challenges which need to be dealt with to
counter these threats are discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the novel security
mechanisms developed during the course of this work. Chapter 7 presents selected
implementation details of the new Grid environment. Chapter 8 introduces a model
driven development process for secure Grid services. Chapter 9 presents experimental
results and an evaluation of the presented security solutions. Chapter 10 discusses the
related work. Finally, chapter 11 concludes the thesis and discusses future work.

2
Applications
2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces four different applications which offer a range of administra-
tive and security requirements to illustrate the breadth of security measures needed
to successfully offer on-demand Grid computing. Two of the four applications come
from the academic areas of multi-media research and ad-hoc network emulation with
minimal security requirements. Both these projects were financed by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) [50]. The other two applications come from the ar-
eas of medical research and mechanical engineering which both have high security
requirements. These two use cases are realised in cooperation with the Department
of Medicine of the University of Marburg and the engineering company Access e.V.
and were sponsored by the Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung [23]. These
use cases cover a wide spectrum of application and security requirements which are
discussed in this thesis.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [99, 28, 162, 20].
2.2 Media Analysis Application
The media analysis application scenario presented in this section is motivated by a
large media research project currently conducted at the University of Siegen, Univer-
sity of Marburg, University of Dortmund and the FHG St. Augustin, Germany, entitled
”Media Upheavals” (DFG SFB/FK 615). It is aimed at investigating the foundations
and the structural aspects of the comprehensive media upheavals and their impact to
media culture and media aesthetics at the beginning of the twentieth century (intro-
duction of films and cinema) and in the transition to the 21st century (Internet and
WWW). The sample application in this scenario aims to provide a high-performance
video content analysis system to support other projects in applying film analysis. The
software workbench Mediana [114] is currently under development to provide such
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support. In addition to database tools, Mediana includes several algorithms for video
content analysis, including cut and shot boundary detection, text detection and text
segmentation, camera motion estimation, and face detection. Although the processing
power of today’s computers is enormous, the processing time of such algorithms and
the data-intensive multimedia file organisation are still challenging issues.
In this application scenario, the Grid middleware can be used to implement the
computationally demanding analysis application as a distributed back end application
for the Mediana workbench. Different media scientists use the Grid infrastructure to
combine their computational resources, but also to link their multimedia and feature
data into a single coherent entity. Additionally, the communications facilities of the
Grid infrastructure can be used to implement direct and synchronous collaboration
functionality to allow geographically distributed media scientists to collaborate in de-
veloping and testing hypotheses in their area of interest.
Verification of a hypothesis from a media analysis point of view often requires the
combination application of different feature extraction algorithms on a large collec-
tion of multimedia data. On a high level, the media scientists may combine existing
services for feature extraction into more complex processes to be applied to the raw
data set or previously extracted features. Computer scientists provide new feature ex-
traction algorithms as Grid services that are in turn deployed to the nodes of the Grid
network. Together, they realise the high level functionality provided in the Mediana
workbench. For more details about a first Grid based implementation of a video cut
detection application, the reader is referred to the work done by Ewerth et al. [63].
From a security standpoint, this application does not have many requirements. The
services deployed in the media workflows are open source and the video material is
partially free public material and thus performance and flexibility are more of a con-
cern than security. Nevertheless this applications requires some thought. While the
security concerns of the media researchers are very low, they can pose a risk to other
more security conscious users of the Grid and processing of material with copyright
constraints can also be desirable. One of the requirements of the media researcher
is easy group access to the Grid without special authentication or authorisation and
on-demand service deployment. New services need to deployed autonomously and
on short notice. This creates the danger that an attacker can surreptitiously deploy a
malicious service under the guise of a media service as an attack base. The services
in this scenario are pure Java services and as such cannot easily harm the underlying
operating system. However, they can harm other services as will be shown later in this
thesis.
2.3 Ad-hoc Wireless Network Emulation
The ad-hoc wireless network emulation application presented in this section is mo-
tivated by a project of the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) Priority Pro-
gramme SPP 1140 which deals with wireless networking research.
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Mobile wireless ad hoc networks consist of a number of mobile nodes operating
autonomously in a particular area without using any pre-existing infrastructure. Each
mobile node acts as an intermediate router forwarding messages received by other
nodes. Thus, a mobile wireless ad hoc network is only operational if nodes offer their
forwarding capabilities to other nodes. Due to the decline of hardware prices, it has
become feasible to field a large number of mobile nodes to form large ad hoc wireless
networks.
Building testbeds for real life systems to efficiently test and diagnose systems con-
sisting of a large number of nodes is not a trivial task due to the high hardware cost
(for testing purposes) and the requirement to test the system under a wide range of
mobility scenarios. Hence, network simulators implemented in software are valuable
tools for researchers in developing, testing and diagnosing such networks. Simulation
is economical because experiments can be carried out without the actual hardware on
a single high capacity computer. Furthermore, it is flexible because different scenarios
concerning link quality, topology chances and node configuration can be easily imple-
mented and tested in a reproducible manner. Simulation results are easier to analyse
than experimental results, since important information can be specifically logged to
help researchers diagnosing network components. The benefits of simulation in the
field of wireless ad hoc networks are the ability to rapidly prototype systems, reduce
the initial costs of the project, the ability to test the scalability of the system and to be
able to reproduce the test conditions through the use of scenarios.
However, simulations are only an approximation of the real network. A simulator
model is necessarily a simplification of the real world system. In order to constrain
their complexity, most existing simulators like NS2 [126] and GloMoSim [87] can
only simulate real-world network protocol implementations with limited detail. Thus,
testing application specific network protocol modifications or the efficiency of appli-
cations in such an environment requires an adaptation or redesign of the simulation.
Furthermore, the code produced to run on the simulator is usually not transferable to
a real world system since it contains simulation specific commands. Another large
drawback of simulation systems is that they are usually script driven, such that the
mobility of the nodes is static and predefined.
With network emulators, this redesigning of code is not necessary, since a real
machine running a full operating system is used for testing. To emulate the wireless
ad hoc network, a number of these real nodes connected via a wired network are used,
the wireless aspect of the network is then approximated by allowing or disallowing
the communication between certain nodes. An obvious drawback of these network
emulators are the hardware requirements, since one emulator machine is required for
every node. However, recent developments and extensions to operating systems allow
the deployment of multiple virtual system instances on a single physical system. This
allows large networks to be emulated with more virtual nodes than physical nodes.
Like the media research application scenario, the network emulator and the sce-
narios are open and free and as such the scenario has very low security requirements.
However, due to the fact that the wireless and mobile aspects of the virtual nodes must
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be emulated, several extension to the operating system must be made to utilise the re-
sources in an emulation. These extension must be made with root privileges and effect
all networking aspects of the operating system. This, of course, is a great security
risk for other Grid users since the root privileges can easily be used for other purposes.
This creates an even tighter sandboxing requirement than with the previous application
since the entire operating system is at risk from this application.
2.4 Engineering Application
The engineering sample application stems from a use case under investigation in the
context of the InGrid research project, a community project for engineering applica-
tions which is part of the German D-Grid research program. One of the test application
is the metal casting simulation package CASTS (Computer Aided Solidification Tech-
nologieS) [1]. CASTS is a dedicated software tool developed for the full range of
casting processes. CASTS calculates transient temperature distributions in mold, core
and alloy, taking into account both latent heat release as a function of fraction solid,
and heat transfer resistance at material interfaces. Casting is a sub-domain of metal
forming. Only a simplified view on the engineering process is presented, which does
not reflect the entire complex field of metal forming. For more information regarding
the complexity involved in collaborative engineering particularly in the field of metal
forming and casting, the reader is referred to the work done by Grembowski et al.
[123] and Woyak et al. [202].
In the sample scenario, a casting engineer is assigned to develop a casting process
for the production of a part made from cast metal. Creation of the casting process
involves optimisation of the geometry of the final part and the mold as well as the
parameters of the production process. The casting process model development cy-
cle starts with a problem definition, expressed by the casting engineer and progresses
through a number of iterations of model definition, simulation and refinement. Ini-
tially, a given problem definition by a customer is modelled as a casting process model
by a numerical simulation expert. The numerical simulation expert periodically dis-
cusses the evolution of the initial model with the casting engineer during the design
phase. Both experts have to combine their expertise to successfully define an accu-
rate model for the casting process. To verify the accuracy of the resulting model, it
is typically numerically simulated and compared to knowledge about real casting pro-
cesses held by the casting engineer. If this first simulation run does not match reality,
the model needs to be calibrated and further model variants are created by the simula-
tion expert and the casting engineer until the model satisfactory reflects a real casting
process.
When a model is calibrated, the optimisation of the model begins by automatically
generating a number of n new models by varying the parameters in the casting process
model. Those model variants can be evaluated in parallel, and the results from the
simulation runs flow back to the optimisation algorithm. This procedure iterates until
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the optimised casting process meets the requirements set by the casting engineer.
The benefit of simulated prototyping is constrained by the accuracy of the simu-
lation environment. Both the creation and use of the simulation application require
great expertise in the metal casting domain. Furthermore, applying numerical simula-
tion for this purpose introduces an extremely high demand for computational capacity
since a single - sufficiently precise - simulation run typically lasts several hours up
to days. Since many small and medium sized engineering enterprises are not capable
of acquiring and maintaining high performance computing resources, outsourcing of
computational demanding tasks is necessary. Grid computing promises to offer the
infrastructural components to realise this outsourcing activity as easy as plugging into
the electrical power Grid.
Additionally, the expertise of specialists from different domains (casting, numer-
ical simulation, Grid experts, customers) is required to achieve the desired results.
Especially small and medium sized companies cannot afford to employ all the various
experts; rather close collaboration of different, geographically distributed experts is
required for many engineering applications similar to the casting example introduced
in this section.
The previously described engineering process is only a part of a larger internal
process of both the customer and the engineering company. It is also common that the
model development process has to be slightly modified for other cases where a casting
model must be developed.
Both the software and the data need protection in this scenario. There are only a
small number of companies capable of running these kind of simulations and the sim-
ulation software represents years of work. The customer data is also highly valuable,
a rival business can gain a significant advantage if it can bypass years of research by
simply downloading the current prototypes of its competitors from the Grid. Both the
software and the customer data must be protected.
2.5 Medical Application
The fourth sample application comes form the area of medical research. It deals with
data analysis in the area of sleep research and sleep medicine as part of the MediGrid
project of the German D-Grid research program. The general objective of this project
is to study sleep and sleep disorders as well as the development of clinical diagnosis
and therapy of sleep-wake disorders.
In sleep research, measurements of various body functions of a patient are mea-
sured throughout the sleep period. Those measurements include the electrocardiogram
(ECG), breathing activity and the patients’ brain activity measured as the electroen-
cephalogram (EEG). In a first step, the different measurements are evaluated in order
to create a sleep protocol that describes the sleeping cycle of a patient. The sleep proto-
col classifies the sleep period into a number of different sleep phases based on a multi-
level sleep classification system. Today, this classification is mostly done manually
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even though classification algorithms exist that can automatically deduce a sleeping
protocol from a given sleeping cycle data record. This automatic deduction requires
the application of various filter functions and transformations on the experimental data.
The resulting sleep protocol can be used to help physicians to deduce sleep disorders
and possibly connect them with other diseases caused by the sleep disorders.
The work of medical researchers and physicians in a hospital can be supported by
using Grid technology for the processing of such patient data records. The researchers
require an application that lets them apply a chain of filters and transformations on a
large collection of patient data records. The individual filters and transformations as
well as their overall combination are a topic of research undergoing constant devel-
opment and changes. The on-demand Grid can support this use case with its inherent
capability to dynamically deploy new components and processes into an infrastructure
that provides the required computational resources.
This scenario combines the security requirements of the above scenarios. Dynamic
deployment of algorithms for ease of research as well as strict patient data confiden-
tiality are required. It must be ensured that only authorised personal can access the
patient data, thus the risk of compromise through other Grid users and their software
must be minimal or the legal constraints on medical research will forbid the use of
shared Grid resources.
2.6 Summary
This chapter introduced a number of different applications which form the motivation
for both the administrative and security mechanisms designed in the course of this
work. The broad scope of requirements require a flexible and secure Grid environment
which can be configured dynamically to the needs of the participants. In particular,
the privacy requirements and the required root privileges pose significant challenges.
Since the changes to the traditional Grid computing paradigm which are required to
enable these application create new security threats, the following chapter introduces
these administrative changes and the new on-demand Grid before the threat analysis is
presented.
3
On-Demand Grid Computing
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the need for the evolution of the classical Grid to an on-demand Grid
computing environment is motivated, based on the applications from the previous
chapter. First, the classical Grid computing paradigm is introduced and the difficul-
ties of realising the sample applications in this environment are discussed. From this
the requirements for an on-demand Grid are deduced and the capabilities of the cur-
rent Grid Security Infrastructure to protect such an infrastructure and its limitation are
shown.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [75, 159, 77].
3.2 The Classical Grid
In this section, the classical computational Grid setup will be presented followed by
a discussion on how that setup copes with the application scenarios described in the
previous chapter. The classical computational Grid consists of a number of back-end
clusters running a standard cluster scheduling solution like SGE [174] or Torque [39]
on the cluster headnode. To connect the clusters to the Grid, a Grid middleware like
Globus [178], Unicore [189] or gLite [61] is also installed on the cluster headnode,
thus enabling direct access to the cluster scheduling system. Grid users either get a
personal account on the cluster or share a pool account with a number of other Grid
users. Their software must be installed locally on the cluster. This can be done in
a number of ways. If the software does not require root access to be installed and
the user has a local login, the user can log on to each cluster and manually install
the software in his or her user account. If the user does not have login rights (which
is quite often the case), the user is forced to copy the source code of the application
onto the cluster using GridFTP [3] and then configure and compile the software using
batch commands submitted as Grid jobs via WS-GRAM [180]. This is a painful way
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to install software, since each batch command (i.e. ./configure;./make;/make install;)
is submitted as a Grid job and is scheduled by the cluster scheduler. Output from the
commands can be returned as the job result or can be fetched with GridFTP. Anyone
who has installed moderately complex software on foreign machines can imagine the
difficulties involved in installing software in this way, since it can take many iterations
until all library dependencies are met. The state of the art Grid fairs even worse in the
case of software which is not available as source code and/or requires root privileges
to install (any software supplied as a Debian [48] or RedHat [139] package requires
root privileges to install, since the package managers require root privileges to run).
In these cases, the user cannot install the software at all and the administrators of the
local clusters must be asked to do it for them. This is an administrative hassle, not
to mention the security nightmare involved in granting any unknown user software
root privileges, no matter how briefly. The installation process is made even more
complicated if the application should offer custom service-oriented interfaces, since
these custom services need to be hosted by the Grid middleware and as such should
require administrative privileges to be installed and run with the same privileges as
the rest of the Grid middleware. It should also be noted that in the traditional Grid,
the software of different users is installed natively in the same system. Classical Grid
computing relies fully on standard operating system security mechanisms to protect
users from each other. These are all factors hindering the adoption of the classical
Grid in a business environment where customers want to install and use software on-
demand and be protected from other Grid users. Figure 3.1 shows a classical Grid
setup consisting of two clusters and two users whose software is installed on all cluster
nodes locally.
3.2.1 Applications
In the following, the drawbacks of the classical Grid setup in respect to the sample ap-
plications from a non-security perspective will be presented. The functional changes
required by the application will have security implications for the new Grid setup pro-
posed which will be discussed later on in this thesis.
3.2.1.1 Media Research
The media research application is a fully service-oriented application, in which a com-
plex service is offered through the composition of many smaller component services.
These services change fairly regularly, since they are the being actively researched.
As such, the media researchers require the ability to install new custom Grid services
at any time, preferably without involving the administrator. Furthermore the media
researchers are interested in harnessing as much computational power as possible and
would like to incorporate desktop PCs into their application workflow in addition to
cluster resources.
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Figure 3.1: Classical Grid
3.2.1.2 Wireless Network Research
The wireless network research project also has a high churn rate due to the fact that
the algorithms used are the research focus of the project. Unlike the media application
the network researchers need root access to the cluster nodes to be able to install and
run their emulation software. Due to this and the fact that the network emulator makes
a number of changes to the network interfaces, this application is not suitable for a
classical shared Grid.
3.2.1.3 Engineering Application
The metal casting application CASTS has the fewest administrative requirements. It
does not need root privileges to install, does not change frequently and does not nec-
essarily need its own service interface. While the latter would be nice from the per-
spective of the service-oriented Architecture paradigm, the WS-GRAM service can be
used to submit CASTS jobs if necessary. It should however, be noted that the CASTS
software is protected by the commercial FlexLM [115] licence managing software and
as such needs to be able to reach the FlexLM server from the worker nodes. This can
be a problem if the worker nodes do not have Internet access and the FlexLM server is
not installed locally.
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3.2.1.4 Medical Research
The medical research project has similar requirements as the media research project,
with the difference that the software evolution cycle is slower due to security con-
straints, and the utilisation of desktop PCs is far more restricted, since only the trusted
PCs of the medical lab may be used.
These administrative requirements must be met in order to facilitate the more wide-
spread and commercial adoption of the Grid computing paradigm. This lead to the
design of the on-demand Grid, which is introduced in the following.
3.3 The On-Demand Grid
If the Grid is to fulfil the vision of becoming the next-generation Internet (as described
in the papers by Foster and Iamnitchi or Lohr [70, 113]), the complexity of installing
and maintaining it must be reduced significantly. The Internet boom was made pos-
sible by making access to the Internet intuitive and transparent to the users. As a
consequence, the number of users increased exponentially, which further increased the
support for and the acceptance of the new medium. Grid middleware supporting such a
massive adoption of the Grid paradigm must hold many properties of an on-demand in-
frastructure: it must be sharable among different users, provide standardised services
and communication protocols, and it must be flexible and scalable [33].
The introduction of the service-oriented computing paradigm and the correspond-
ing web service standards such as WSDL [35] and SOAP [185] in the field of Grid
computing through the Open Grid services Architecture (OGSA) [69, 71] is a ma-
jor step towards increased flexibility of Grid use, operation and maintenance. While
OGSA describes the higher-level architectural aspects of service-oriented Grid com-
puting, the Web service Resource Framework (WSRF) [127] is a fine-grained descrip-
tion of the infrastructure required to implement the OGSA model. Service-oriented
Grid computing offers the potential to provide a fine grained virtualisation of the avail-
able resources to significantly increase the versatility of a Grid. It can also be used
to transparently add desktop resources thus extending the initial vision of the Grid -
connecting the world’s Supercomputing centres - to also incorporate non-dedicated
desktop computers. The influx of users will allow the Grid to offer the possibility of
harnessing the unused CPU cycles (or other resources) of idle workstations, as found in
practically every organisation, by combining them on-demand to spontaneously form
an ad hoc Grid without a pre-configured fixed infrastructure. Considering the power
of modern desktop PCs, the computational power of all the PCs of a medium sized
research department or company can at no extra costs significantly increase the overall
computational power available to the department.
One of the main functional goals of an on-demand Grid is the ease of installation
and use of resources on a dynamic basis for a large number of users in a secure fash-
ion. This is a major break from the classical Grid in which only a small number of
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known users worked in a closed system on a small selection of custom software. To
facilitate the on-demand usage of the Grid, the ad hoc Grid as an administrative basis
for application deployment will be introduced in the following.
3.3.1 The Ad Hoc Grid
An ad hoc Grid is a spontaneous formation of cooperating heterogeneous computing
nodes into a logical community without a preconfigured fixed infrastructure and with
only minimal administrative requirements. The vision of on-demand provisioning of
application services as a utility still allows for different hosting models such as collo-
cated, dedicated and shared hosting [124] that can rely on tedious manual maintenance
of a preconfigured infrastructure. The ad hoc Grid extends the on-demand idea on the
application infrastructure itself. With only limited installation overhead, the logical
community formed by an ad hoc Grid middleware is able to offer most of the basic
infrastructure services required to provide services as a utility to a large and changing
set of users. The number of non-dedicated Grid nodes in such an ad hoc Grid is much
higher than in traditional Grid systems, demanding non-intrusive operation of the ad
hoc Grid middleware.
Thus, the view of an ad hoc Grid environment goes beyond the preconfigured, ded-
icated Grid infrastructures existing today to encompass frequent dynamic additions of
computational resources, users, legacy software and services to the Grid. This includes
workstations within organisations as well as scattered personal computers.
Figure 3.2: Ad Hoc Grid Architecture Overview
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Figure 3.2 shows how two separate ad hoc Grids are composed. The first ad hoc
Grid (A) spans two organisations; the second (B) is created from scattered nodes on
the Internet. Both Grid communities form a virtual organisation using the existing
Internet infrastructure.
While ad hoc Grid A encompasses transient nodes (e.g. non-dedicated worksta-
tions), it also includes dedicated high-performance computers. In contrast, ad hoc
Grid B is made up solely of transient individual nodes. This kind of Grid can be used
by the media application. While ad hoc Grid A bears a greater resemblance to tradi-
tional Grid systems, ad hoc Grid B illustrates the shift to a personal Grid system, built
without the resources of a large organisation. In the following, a brief discussion of the
general challenges in building a service-oriented ad hoc Grid environment is presented
before going indepth into the security issues brought on through the paradigm change.
The main steps which need to be taken to allow ad hoc Grid computing in a het-
erogeneous environment are as follows.
3.3.1.1 Node Communication & Service Discovery
Even though the web service protocols have been designed to take advantage of well
known and established Internet standards, some communication barriers exist on the
Internet that pose a problem for an ad hoc Grid environment. Private networks are hid-
den behind firewalls and routers performing network address translation. Nodes behind
these barriers can work perfectly well as clients that consume Grid service function-
ality, providing services from within those confined network realms requires manual
configuration effort. Approaches to support automatic traversal of such barriers are
required.
In an ad hoc Grid environment, the network topology is dynamic (i.e. rebooting
of workstations, movement of laptops, replacement of computers) and thus a node
detection solution geared towards frequent node arrivals and departures is required.
While arrival or departure of nodes should be discovered as quickly as possible, a
balance needs to be found between keeping the topology information up to date and
flooding the network with discovery messages.
OGSA [69, 71] and WSRF [127] define virtualisation of available resources at the
system-independent level of resource access to allow uniform access to a heteroge-
neous system. The hardware and operating system or underlying implementation of
a service is hidden from the caller of a service. Support of the standard Grid service
interfaces is guaranteed and sufficient to allow access to the resource. Even the in-
stantiation of a deployed Grid service is system-independent, since it is specified to be
handled by a gatekeeper (Service factory).
To enable autonomous deployment of services, meta-information from the Grid
node must be available to the deployment service, so it can reliably operate in a hetero-
geneous environment. While the underlying middleware of each node is guaranteed
to support the Grid service interface, the way it implements this is not specified by
OGSA or WSRF. When deploying services to newly discovered nodes, it is, however,
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necessary that the service implementation is supported by the Grid platform of the
node. Information about the underlying hardware and operating system is particularly
important when deploying legacy code, because tight integration of system resources
is a common occurrence there.
Typical information needed is operating system type, available hardware resources
and availability of required libraries. Furthermore, information on the reliability of the
nodes can be taken into account when services are to be deployed, so nodes with long
up times are given priority over nodes which frequently reboot or crash.
While these functional requirements go slightly beyond what traditional Grid sys-
tems offer, the security implications do not significantly exceed those of a classical
Grid and as such they will not be the main focus of this thesis.
3.3.1.2 Service & Software Deployment and Administration
Vital to the invocation of services or legacy software on various nodes in a Grid system
is the availability of those services. For the on-demand use of software in a dynamic
Grid environment, the time consumption for manual deployment is prohibitive. Even
with the availability of advanced Grid programming toolkits, deployment of services
has been identified as a critical issue [80]. Furthermore, the number of Grid services
will steadily rise with the number of users, further increasing the management cost of
the Grid environment. In a dynamically changing environment, deployment is even
more critical, since there is no single deployment cycle that reaches all machines.
Instead, services need to be deployed and instantiated on-demand.
Service and software deployment becomes part of an ad hoc Grid application in-
stead of being handled by a system administrator as a precondition to the use of a
service. Instead of only providing predefined services, the computational nodes of the
bare Grid become a resource in themselves. This resource can be tapped by applica-
tions using the hot deployment service to leverage spare resources into their compu-
tational group. When a node becomes available that meets the requirements for the
deployment of a service, the application can autonomously carry out the deployment
and use the newly available machine for its application flow.
In a production environment, every operation needs to be non-intrusive, i.e. it does
not interfere with the execution of other services already running on the Grid. The
ability to introduce or remove a service without interruption of other operations is vital
for the vision of a highly flexible ad hoc Grid.
Application deployment is an important functional requirement for on-demand
Grid computing with serious security ramifications. Two different deployment mech-
anisms will be presented, one for services and one for legacy applications. The func-
tional aspect will only be discussed briefly, with the main focus lying on the security
implications and countermeasures taken.
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3.3.1.3 Security & User Management
Currently, Grid users need to personally register with a Certificate or Registration Au-
thority to gain access to the Grid, a process which can take several days to complete.
In a fast moving business environment, it is desirable to allow on-demand user cre-
ation without requiring arduous registration procedures. This requirement is tightly
coupled to the security requirements, since in the classical Grid malicious behaviour
is discouraged through user trackability.
Security is of course also an issue in classical Grid systems. However, in an ad
hoc Grid, several new aspects must be dealt with beyond the standard security require-
ments. The administrative requirements introduced above require users to be issued
with more privileges than in classical Grid computing to be able to autonomously in-
stall both services and legacy software. Furthermore, in a large on-demand Grid, it is
likely that other unknown and potentially malicious users operate on the same Grid re-
sources. Security mechanisms to protect users from each other are vital to the adoption
of this new Grid computing paradigm. Strong inter-user security mechanism tied to an
accounting and billing system can also reduce the requirements for user trackability
due to the fact that users are isolated and pay for the resources they use, thus further
enabling the on-demand use of Grid resources. These issues are the main focus of this
thesis and will be discussed in more detail in the next chapters.
3.3.2 Service Trust
In an ad hoc Grid environment, trust is a major requirement for enabling collaboration
among the interaction partners, which in this case could be nodes and/or services.
Azzedin and Maheswaran [17] have classified trust into two categories: identity trust
and behaviour trust. Identity trust is concerned with verifying the authenticity of an
interaction partner, whereas behaviour trust deals with trustworthiness of an interaction
partner.
The overall behaviour of an interaction partner consists of several elements, such as
accuracy or reliability. These elements of behaviour trust should be continuously tested
and verified. In this way, it is possible to collect a history of past collaborations that
can be used for future decisions on further collaborations between interaction partners.
This kind of experience can also be shared as recommendations to other participants.
Furthermore, the overall decision whether to trust an interaction partner or not may
be affected by other non-functional aspects that cannot be generally determined for
every possible situation, but should rather be under the control of the user when re-
questing such a decision. In addition, while the basic functionality of two applications
could be similar, differences in application behaviour could be caused by different
domain specific trust requirements.
Therefore, a trust system for a service-oriented Grid environment should offer flex-
ible and easy to use components that can be configured to the specific needs of a user.
While trust in this sense in not a security mechanism, it can be used to judge the secu-
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rity situation of certain Grid resources and services.
3.3.3 Tool Support
Developers of Grid applications are often not computer science experts, they are en-
gineers or non-IT scientists whose main focus is their application logic. In addition
to their domain knowledge, they have to deal with Grid service programming details.
Thus, most developers have a high learning curve ahead of them when they start using
Grid middleware like Globus Toolkit 4. To reduce the complexity, security issues are
often ignored, which is contrary to the requirements for the adoption of Grid comput-
ing in industrial environments where security is highly relevant to protect customer
data. In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to decompose and automate the
process of developing and provisioning Grid services. Grid specific code and espe-
cially security relevant code should not have to be programmed by non-Grid experts,
but should be supplied by integrated tool chains which allow domain experts to con-
centrate on their domain specific goals. These issues will be discussed in chapter 8.
3.4 Grid Security Infrastructure
Before discussing the new security threats posed by on-demand Grid computing and
the countermeasures developed in this thesis, the Grid Security Infrastructure currently
available for classical Grid computing will be discussed. The Grid Security Infrastruc-
ture (GSI) is the part of the Globus Toolkit that provides security features required for
traditional Grid computing. It is based on public key cryptography and uses X.509 cer-
tificates to identify users and hosts. X.509 certificates rely on a third party, certificate
authorities, to certify the link between a public key and a certificate’s subject.
GSI offers four distinct functions:
1. Message protection (signing or encrypting messages)
2. Authentication (identifies the caller/sender)
3. Authorisation (access rights)
4. Delegation (performing a task on behalf of a delegator)
GSI provides these functions by implementing several security specifications.
1. Transport Level Security (TLS) and Message Level Security (WS-Security and
WS-SecureConversation) as protection mechanism for messages in combination
with SOAP. They use XML-Encryption and XML-Signature for message pro-
tection.
2. X.509 certificates or username/password token for authentication.
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3. Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [128] assertions for authorisa-
tion.
4. X.509 proxy certificates and WS-Trust for authentication and authorisation.
TLS entails SOAP messages conveyed over a network connection protected at the
transport layer (i.e. using HTTPS) and provides both message integrity (by signing)
and privacy via encryption.
Globus Toolkit 4 provides two further message security mechanisms, GSISecure-
Message (based on WS-Security) and GSISecureConversation (based on WS-Secure-
Conversation) for authentication and secure communication on the message level. In
GSISecureConversation, the client establishes a context with the server with the initial
message. This context has the purpose to authenticate the client identity to the server
and to establish a shared secret key using a collocated GSISecureConversation service.
As soon as the context is established, following messages can be secured (signed or
encrypted) using the shared secret key from the context.
The GSISecureMessage approach is simpler, since the client does not establish a
context before sending data (i.e. invoking operations) to the server. The client uses
existing keys, such as the server’s public key from the its X.509 certificate.
The difference between GSISecureMessage and GSI-SecureConversation is that
the latter produces less overhead if several messages are exchanged. Establishing a
secure context requires some time, but symmetric encryption is much faster than using
public key cryptography. Furthermore, GSI-SecureConversation does not require the
destination host’s public key to be present on the client side, and GSI-SecureConver-
sation features credential delegation. Credential delegation is also possible with the
two other mentioned security methods, but they need to use a delegation service and
require changes to both the client and the service to be invoked. Both provide integrity
protection, encryption and replay attack protection.
GSI supports authentication through X.509 certificates or user name/password and
delegation through X.509 proxy certificates and the WS-Trust standard. Delegation
allows a client to delegate a X.509 proxy certificate to a service. The target service
can then perform tasks on behalf of the user who owns the proxy certificate. A proxy
is derived from the user’s certificate and consists of a new certificate and a private
key. The new certificate contains the owner’s identity, modified slightly to indicate
that it is a proxy. It is signed by the owner, rather than a CA. Proxies have limited
lifetimes meaning that the proxy should no longer be accepted by others after the
lifetime expired. These proxy certificates are highly contested in security discussions,
since to enable delegation, the private key of the proxy certificate is passed to the
delegator, thus the delegator can then legally execute operations for the user. This can
be viewed as a feature or a vulnerability since the delegator can impersonate the user.
Proxy certificates should be extremely limited in lifespan and scope restricting what
can be done for how long. In practice, they do have a relatively short lifespan but are
not restricted. So, for the duration of the proxy certificate the holder of the proxy can
act freely on behalf of the user.
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The GSI security options are configured in Globus using four different configura-
tion files:
Service Security Descriptor configures security settings of a Grid Service. It is pos-
sible to configure the Service as a whole or every operation individually. As
authentication methods, GSISecureMessage (WS-Security), GSISecure-
Conversation (WS-SecureConversation), and GSITransport (TLS) are
supported. When using credentials, a Grid Service may either specify a path
to a proxy certificate or a path to a X.509 certificate and key file. The Service
may also specify the path to a gridmap file being used to map names found in
certificates to local user names (for example used for login) and a run-as mode
(specifies under which identity a Service method will be executed).
Resource Security Descriptor equals the Service Security Descriptor mentioned
above, but on a more fine-grained level. It allows to configure the security set-
tings of Grid resources accessed by one or more Services.
Container Security Descriptor allows to configure container-wide security options
as default values for credentials, location of the gridmap file, authorisation and
other parameters.
Client Security Descriptor configures which of the security mechanisms the client
should use for communication, if delegation is to be used and so on. The client
is of course retricted to using the security mechanisms offered by the service to
be called.
As already mentioned, GSI’s service security descriptor also supports per-operation
security settings allowing to define a different security mechanism for each operation
of a service. If no security setting is given for an operation, the service or resource
configuration is taken (if present). A resource security descriptor overrides any per-
operation security settings and per-operation settings override service-level security
which again overrides container security settings.
3.5 Summary
To summarise, GSI’s main focus lies in authentication, authorisation and message se-
curity. These are of course very important security aspects and go a long way in
protecting a classic Grid environment in which a small number of trusted users work
in a private environment. However, GSI alone is not enough to protect the proposed
on-demand Grid, since it does not deal with intra-node inter-user security nor does
it deal with threats posed from users against the infrastructure itself. These are vital
areas in the more dynamic and untrusted on-demand Grid computing scenario. The
next section introduces a threat model for on-demand Grid computing and highlight
differences compared to traditional Grid computing.

4
Threat Analysis
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a threat analysis for on-demand Grid computing will be given. The
actors involved in on-demand Grid computing will be specified, and the trust relation-
ships between them will be defined. To better deal with the complexities of on-demand
Grid computing, three stages of on-demand Grid computing are defined. They suc-
cessively decrease the trust requirements and consequently increase the security re-
quirements. Based on this analysis, a threat model for on-demand Grid computing is
developed.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [157, 160, 158].
4.2 Terminology
The terms Actor, Capability, Threat, Threat Model, Threat Tree, Vulnerability, Attack,
Attack Model, Attack Vector and Attack Tree are used in a number of different and
sometimes conflicting ways in the literature. In this thesis, the following definitions
are used:
Actor. An actor is an individual or group with a certain motivation, risk aversion and
capability. Motivation can entail own economic gain, economic damage for an
adversary, affecting government policy, personal fame, thrill seeking, curiosity
and revenge, to name just a few. Risk aversion defines how adverse the actor is
to be discovered and prosecuted, i.e. a thief does not want to be caught and sent
to prison while terrorists might broadcast the crime for publicity purposes.
Capability. The capability of an actor is defined by skills, knowledge, resources, and
access. Skills include social engineering, computer administration, program-
ming or hacking skills. Knowledge specifies the amount and detail of knowledge
an actor has about the system to be attacked, i.e. operating system, patch level,
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running programs, security procedures, physical location. The resource entry
contains information about the amount of money, computing power, specialised
hardware or legal resources the actor can bring to bear to gain an objective. Fi-
nally, access defines the level of access the actor legally has to an asset. This
incorporates, for instance: physical access, user rights and administrative rights
to a resource. This factor is particularly relevant for this work since the actors
have a high level of access to the assets thus increasing the threat they can pose.
Threat. A threat consists of the following items: actor, objective and asset.
Threat Model. A threat model consists of a number of threats relevant to the system
being analysed. The actors involved in the scenario are categorised and their
motivation, capabilities and risk aversion are analysed. Threat models do not
deal with specific attacks in detail. Based on the threat model, the relevant attack
models should be specified to deal with the attack specifics.
Threat Tree. A threat tree is a tree based representation of a threat model.
Vulnerability. A vulnerability can be a physical vulnerability like software or hard-
ware flaws or process vulnerability such as being able to acquire password in-
formation from a post-it or social engineering approach, or incorrectly deployed
encryption mechanisms which can be bypassed.
Attack. An attack is the exploitation of a vulnerability to compromise or damage a
resource.
Attack Model. An attack model is a formal way of presenting different possibilities
to achieve an attack against a certain resource through the exploitation of one or
more vulnerabilities.
Attack Tree. An attack tree [150] is a way to perform attack modeling in which the
attack possibilities are represented in tree form.
Attack Vector. An attack vector is a path through an attack model.
4.3 On-Demand Actors
To be able to assess the threat model for on-demand Grid computing, it must be de-
fined who the actors in this scenario are and what the nature of the trust relationships
between them is.
Five actors take part in this scenario:
• Resource provider: owner of the computational nodes or other physical re-
sources
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• Middleware producer: owner of the middleware which is deployed on the re-
source provider’s nodes.
• Solution producer: owner of a software solution and/or information database
which is deployed via the middleware onto the resource providers assets
• Customer: owner of input data for a solution producer’s product; user of the
solution producer’s product via the Grid middleware, hosted by the resource
provider
• External attacker: the external attacker does not have any legitimate physical or
remote access to the Grid.
The solution producer hosts his or her software and data as a number of services
on the nodes of the resource provider where the customer can then consume them via
the service-oriented middleware. The resource provider must grant access to both the
solution producer and the customer. Access should be granted via the management
services of the Grid middleware although in some cases access is still granted in the
form of a remote user account with which the nodes of the Grid can be accessed, either
directly or via the Grid head node. While it is possible to install most custom software
in the solution producer’s home directory, sometimes it is necessary to have root priv-
ileges to install required software. In this case, the resource provider must either grant
the solution producer temporary root access or perform the needed operations on his
behalf. The external attacker does not have any legitimate physical or remote access
to the Grid. Since both the solution producer and the customer use the Grid, they can
be collectively be called users, when the distinction is not required or where solution
producer and customer are one and the same entity, as it is often the case in academic
scenarios.
To better understand the possible threats posed by these actors, a separate discus-
sion of each actor, based on the attributes introduced above, follows. The attributes are
discussed in the light of the roles that are relevant to Grid computing. For instance, the
scope of motivation is limited to role based motivation; personal motivation like thrill
seeking or curiosity are not tied to the Grid role and as such are not discussed. The
elements like knowledge and access are defined within the context of a single resource
provider’s Grid site. In a multi-resource provider Grid, multiple zones need to be de-
fined. A resource provider is treated as an external attacker if the resource provider
attacks other resource providers or customers, solution producers of other resource
providers. The same goes for customers or solution producers who attack entities of
other resource providers than their own.
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4.3.1 Resource Provider
4.3.1.1 Motivation
The resource provider is usually a neutral person where the software and data of cus-
tomers is concerned with no own interest in the matter. Possible motivational scenarios
for a resource provider to attack customers or solution producers can be constructed
via an interested third party, i.e. someone with interest in the software and data who is
willing to pay money for illegal access.
4.3.1.2 Risk Aversion
The risk aversion for the resource provider is high, since resource providers rely on
their good reputation to do business. Customers choose their resource providers based
on trust and if it became known that a resource provider sold software or data illegally
they would go out of business.
4.3.1.3 Skills
The skill level is also high. Since resource providers administer Grid resources, they
have many skills required to attack the infrastructure, although in the authors expe-
rience most Grid administrators only have a passing familiarity with actual hacking
tools.
4.3.1.4 Knowledge
The knowledge level is extremely high, since the resource provider is responsible for
installing and maintaining the Grid system. They know what operating system is in-
stalled, what patch level is currently deployed, and which services are running. More
critically than that, they know the root password of their site.
4.3.1.5 Resources
The resources which the resource providers can utilise are typically high, thus com-
putational power is not an issue for normal high performance tasks. However, the
resources are not sufficient to break currently recommended encryption protocols by
brute force.
4.3.1.6 Access
The resource providers have an extreemly high level of access to the resources since
they administer them. They have root access to all resources in their site and physical
access to the machines.
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4.3.2 Middleware Producer
4.3.2.1 Motivation
Like the resource provider, the middleware provider is usually a neutral organisation
where the software and data of customers is concerned with no own interest in the
matter. Possible motivational scenarios for a resource provider to attack customers or
solution producers can be constructed via an interested third party, as was the case with
the resource provider.
4.3.2.2 Risk Aversion
The risk aversion for the middleware provider is moderate to high. Most Grid mid-
dleware is currently supplied by non-for-profit open source projects, so there is no
direct financial loss if the reputation of a middleware is damaged. However, there is
an academic damage which would harm the research endeavours of the middleware
producers and this could lead to funding reduction and thus financial damage. This
might not hinder an individual developer in the middleware team to try and introduce
a backdoor into the system, but the open source nature of the middleware makes de-
tection that much easier and more likely, which also factors into the risk aversion of
middleware producers. In the future, it is likely that commercial closed source mid-
dlewares will be utilised. In this case, the same arguments as for the resource provider
apply.
4.3.2.3 Skills
The skill level of middleware producers is high, since they program the Grid middle-
ware and are in close contact to many parts of the Grid environment.
4.3.2.4 Knowledge
The knowledge level is moderate, since the middleware provider knows a lot about
the middleware but does not know specifics of the sites on which their middleware is
deployed.
4.3.2.5 Resources
The resources which can be utilised by middleware providers are typically moderate,
since they have access to their institutes resources on a shared basis. The resources
are not sufficient to break currently recommended encryption protocols by brute force.
Well equipped resources providers also have some specialised equipment for data re-
covery which can restore deleted or corrupted data.
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4.3.2.6 Access
The middleware producers have a low level of access to the resources, since they do
not have physical access or accounts on the Grid resources.
4.3.3 Solution Producer
4.3.3.1 Motivation
The solution producer has a clear financial motivation as soon as a competing solution
producer is operating in the same Grid. Currently, the number of competing solution
producers is low, and consequently the likelyhood of two competing solution produc-
ers operating on the same Grid site is quite low. This however, is likely to change with
greater commercial adoption of Grid computing. For instance, the Deutsche Bank and
the Dresdner Bank are both involved in the FinGrid project. Damaging the operation
or reputation of a competitor is one option, stealing trade secrets (software or data)
from the competitors is another. Getting information on the state of a competitor (fi-
nancially situation, order situation) can be beneficial in a competitive scenario. Finally,
accessing customer data from competitors can also lead to a market advantage.
4.3.3.2 Risk Aversion
The risk aversion for the solution producer is moderate. The reputation of a solution
producer is important in customer relations. However, industrial espionage does not
damage the reputation too badly in the eyes of the customers, who are important for
the solution producers. The legal and financial consequences of being caught are of
course a deterrent, however since industrial espionage is practised frequently in non
Grid environments, there is no reason to believe that this deterrent will stop industrial
espionage in the Grid.
4.3.3.3 Skills
The skill level of solution producers can vary. They have programming skills since they
produce software. However, no special knowledge about operating systems, networks
or Grid middleware is necessary, although commmonly solution producers have skills
in this area as well. Thus, for the sake of threat assessment the skill level is should be
assumed as high.
4.3.3.4 Knowledge
The knowledge level is moderate to high, since the solution producers knows a lot
about their own software. Depending on the Grid setup, they also know quite a bit
about the operating system in which the software is deployed.
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4.3.3.5 Resources
The resources which can be utilised by the solution producers are typically low to
moderate, since they do not have their own high performance computing infrastructure.
However, they can of course rent the resources in the Grid.
4.3.3.6 Access
This is the area where the difference between classical and on-demand Grid computing
is largest. In traditional Grid computing, the access of solution producers is relatively
low. They can install software with user rights but anything requiring administrative
rights like service deployment or root privilege installation is done by the resource
provider. The level of access in this case is extremely dependent on the skill and
policies of the resource provider. If the resource provider simply installs everything
solution producers supply with root privileges without checking the software or the
solution producer, the level of access solution producers gain is high (as in root privi-
leges). This however, is unlikely to happen with reputable resource providers, but the
complexity of checking the safety of unknown and possibly closed source software is
extremely complex and thus the level of access solution producers have is potentially
high even with resource provider checks in place, unless solution producers are re-
stricted to a standard user account. This would however severely restrict the number
and type of application which could be deployed to the Grid. In on-demand comput-
ing where solution producers need to be able to install both services and root privilege
software autonomously, the access level is as high, only physical access is unlikely.
4.3.4 Customer
4.3.4.1 Motivation
Customers have a clear financial motivation as soon as a competing customer is oper-
ating in the same Grid. Hindering the operation or reputation of a competitor is one
option, stealing trade secrets (data) from the competitors is another. Getting informa-
tion on the state of a competitor (product being worked on, phase of production, etc.)
can be beneficial in a competitive scenario. Unlike with the solution producers, the
likelihood of competing customers operating in the same Grid is very high. This is due
to the fact that most services offered by the Grid have more than one customer. In a
business environment, most customers requiring the same service operate in the same
area and as such are competitors more likely than not. Thus, for the sake of the threat
assessment, the motivation level is assumed to be high.
4.3.4.2 Risk Aversion
The risk aversion of customers is moderate to low. The legal and financial conse-
quences of being caught are of course a deterrent, but as above, there is no reason to
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believe that this deterrent will stop industrial espionage in the Grid.
4.3.4.3 Skills
The skill level of users can vary. They do not necessarily have programming skills
since they only consume high level services. However, there is no guarantee that ad-
vanced hacking skills are not present. As such, the skill level can range anywhere from
low to high.
4.3.4.4 Knowledge
The knowledge level is usually moderate to low, since customers know how to use
both the solution producers’ software and the Grid middleware, but do not need to
know anything about the actual infrastructure.
4.3.4.5 Resources
The resources which can be utilised by customers are typically low, since they do
not have their own high performance computing infrastructure. However, they can of
course rent the resources in the Grid.
4.3.4.6 Access
The level of access for customers is moderate to low. Users need some form of user
account to operate in the Grid. Depending on the method of use, this can amount to low
access, for instance in the case in which customers can only use a portal interface to
a meta-scheduler to submit jobs and receive results, or moderate access if local Unix
accounts are made available so the customer can log on to the worker nodes of the
Grid.
4.3.5 External Attacker
The external attacker cannot be fully defined, since the full scope of attackers present
in the Internet can also attack Grid computing systems. Everything from script kid-
dies to the National Security Agency (NSA) are potential adversaries. However, the
current nature of the Grid does make some more relevant than others. Typical bot
net owners whose main motivation is spamming and executing Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks for profit are not that likely to specifically compromise Grid
systems for their bot net even though the network connectivity and processing power
is very large. The effort of compromising a well managed and monitored Grid site is
greater than compromising a couple of thousand home PC which in combination have
a similar or even greater network bandwidth and computational power with a much
lower risk of being detected. Grid sites might become the target of a DDoS attack de-
pending on the customers using the Grid. However, these attacks are not Grid specific
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and can be dealt with (or not dealt with) using traditional DoS prevention techniques
and as such will not be discussed in this thesis. The same goes for many other typical
attackers like phishers or defacers. While the Grid is one target among many, there are
more tempting and higher impact targets for these general attacks. The real value of
the Grid is the intellectual property in the form of software and data of customers and
solution producers and as such this work focuses on attacks on these assets. The new
threats created by on-demand Grid computing stem from external attacks who follow
the same motivation as the legitimate Grid actors, i.e. targeted financial damage or
gains specific to a certain customer or solution producer.
4.3.5.1 Motivation
As stated above, this work only deals with external attacks with the same motivation
as the legitimate Grid users.
4.3.5.2 Risk Aversion
The risk aversion is moderate to low. The legal and financial consequences of being
caught are of course a deterrent, but as above there is no reason to believe that this
deterrent will stop industrial espionage in the Grid.
4.3.5.3 Skills
The skill level of external attackers can vary. However, unlike legitimate Grid users,
external attacks are dedicated to the task of attacking and as such will tend to have a
higher skill level focused on hacking.
4.3.5.4 Knowledge
The knowledge level is typically moderate to low, since externals attacker can usually
access the Grid middleware and have tools to discover operating system vulnerabilities
but do not have intimate knowledge of the actual resources or the producers software.
4.3.5.5 Resources
The resources can vary, professional hacking organisations are well funded and have
specialised equipment like trojans, rainbow tables, hardware key loggers, etc. to aid
their attacks.
4.3.5.6 Access
External attackers have no legitimate access at all and must rely on hacking their way
into the system.
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4.3.6 Summary
To summarise the actor classification, one can say that the resource providers are the
most dangerous technically and access wise but have the least own motivation to at-
tack their customers. Customers potentially have the highest motivation, but the least
amount of access. Solution producers lie in between the two. It should be noted that,
unlike many other areas of computing, in on-demand Grid computing it is possible to
legally buy a privilege extension in the form of a role change. An external attacker can
buy some time on the Grid and thus become a customer. A customer can create some
software and pose as a solution producer and install the software in the Grid. Only
the step to become a resource provider is difficult since it is very expensive to buy the
necessary hardware and network connection.
This concludes the actor and part of the capability discussion for Grid computing
threats. Before discussing the missing threat attributes for the threat analysis, the trust
relationship between the actors needs to be introduced, since trust can help to reduce
the number of threats which need to be handled (i.e. if the resource providers are con-
sidered trustworthy, threats stemming from them need not be dealt with). Traditional
Grid computing is based heavily on trust, since current security countermeasures are
not able to deal with the threats posed by all of the Grid actors. In the following,
the trust relationships currently in place to enable Grid computing are presented, and
the changes in the trust landscape caused by the proposed on-demand Grid computing
paradigm are discussed.
4.4 Trust Relationships
Figure 4.1 shows the trust relationship between the typical actors found in Grid com-
puting today. The resource provider must trust the solution producer and the middle-
ware producer not to misuse the resources offered by the resource provider. Possible
forms of misuse are: using the rented nodes to send junk mail, perform a denial of
service attack, host illegal content for others to download or steal account information
from the resource provider to hijack other nodes in the system. The solution producer
must trust the resource provider and middleware producer not to misuse the software or
database hosted on the resource providers assets. Possible forms of misuse are: steal-
ing the software or the information contained in the database, altering the software or
the information in the database or allowing access to unauthorised persons. The cus-
tomer who consumes the service offered by the solution producer through the resource
provider must trust all other parties not to misuse the data entered into the solution
producer’s product. Possible forms of misuse by the solution producer are: stealing
the input and output data or modifying the results. Possible forms of misuse by the
resource provider are the same as for the solution producer, as well as: hijacking the
customers account to use the solution producer’s product at the customer’s expense.
One mechanism in ensuring the trust relationship in classic Grid computing is the
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Figure 4.1: Current Trust Relationships
strict user identification with which users can be identified in a legal sense and sued in
case malicious behaviour is detected. Figure 4.2 shows the identification procedure in
Grid computing:
• (1) The Producer generates a certificate request (creates a public/private key pair)
and must personally prove his or her identity to the registration authority (RA)
when issuing the certificate request.
• (2) After checking the identity of the requestor the RA forwards the certificate
request to the certificate authority (CA).
• (3) The CA signs the certificate and sends the signed certificate to the producer
• (4) Using the certificate as identity proof, the producer sends his or her software
to the provider.
• (5) The Provider installs software on the Grid resources.
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Figure 4.2: Classic Grid Usage
• (A) The Customer generates a certificate request (creates a public/private key
pair) and must personally prove his or her identity to the registration authority
(RA) when issuing the certificate request.
• (B) After checking the identity of the requestor the RA forwards the certificate
request to the certificate authority (CA).
• (C) The CA signs the certificate and sends the signed certificate to the customer.
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• (D) The customer requests an account from the resource provider. This is either
done directly or the customer can go via a virtual organisation in which case the
resource provider usually has predefined accounts for the virtual organisation.
• (E) The provider creates an account for the customer or the VO.
• (F) The customer is informed that the account is activated.
• (G) The customer can use the software.
The actors shown in Figure 4.1 are the basic set of actors needed to describe busi-
ness interactions in a Grid environment. Using the method described above, the trust
relationships are currently built by legal contracts between the parties ensuring that
should it be proven that one of the parties misbehaved, it can be sued. Since that only
allows punishment in retrospective and mainly works as a deterrent in non-critical
business environments, it is currently not uncommon that access is only granted to
persons who know each other personally and non-IT trust exists between the parties.
In some cases, the solution producer and the resource provider or the customer and the
solutions producer are the same entity, in which case the trust requirements are some-
what reduced. In many cases, however, more than one solution producer or customer
will be present. Currently, there are two common practices in this case. First, the dif-
ferent customers or solution producers operate on non-critical data or software and do
not mind if others can see their assets (quite common in the academic environment).
Second, the resource provider only grants exclusive access to specific resources, thus
creating several separate environments which behave like the single customer/solution
producer environment shown above. The second solution is not in the interest of the
resource provider, since such use of the resources ties up the resources completely, no
matter if the customer is currently using them at full capacity or not.
In an on-demand environment, neither of the above practices is acceptable. The
solution producer must be able to dynamically acquire resources for critical tasks from
a resource provider to meet customer demands in an on-demand fashion, and the re-
source provider must be able to maximise the resource usage over the entire spread of
solutions producers and customers. This should be possible without having to rely on
mutual trust to enable on-demand operation of the Grid. For better manageability, three
stages of decreasing trust reliance for on-demand Grid computing are defined. Each
stage requires increased security mechanisms to counteract the reduced trust levels.
4.4.1 Stage 1 Trust
The first stage encompasses the scenario described above in its most basic form. Mul-
tiple customers and solution producers operate on the resources of a single resource
provider. There is no trust between the different customers or between a customer and
the solution producers used by the other customers. There is also no trust between the
solution producers or a solution producer and customers of other solution producers.
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The trust relationship between the customer, solution producer and resource provider
cooperating with each other is the same as in the traditional usage scenario. In Stage
1, all parties trust the middleware producer. To ease the adoption of on-demand Grid
computing, the first stage still has a trust relationship between the solution provider,
and the resource provider and software is still installed in the traditional manner, i.e.
by the resource provider on behalf of the solution producer.
Figure 4.3 shows the ”no trust” relationship of this stage. For the sake of readabil-
ity, the ”trust” arrows are not depicted. Trust can be assumed between all parties not
connected with a ”no trust” arrow.
Figure 4.3: On-Demand Trust Relationships: Stage 1
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4.4.2 Stage 2 Trust
In the previous stage, on-demand computing still has a trust relationship from the re-
source provider to the solution producer. This trust is acquired either by legal or social
means. Both these methods restrict the number of customers a resource provider can
take on and creates a cost overhead for resource usage both in time and money, since
trust must first be established. It is desirable to eliminate the trust requirement from
the resource provider to the solution producer, to facilitate a more flexible and cost
effective business model. To enable stage 2, on-demand computing requires security
mechanisms to protect the resource provider’s assets from the solution producers while
at the same time granting the required access rights to the resources the solution pro-
ducer and the customers need. This includes the capability to autonomously install
software, one of the most critical requirements of on-demand computing. Without
trust from the resource provider to the solution producer, this requires new security
mechanisms to protect the resource provider from the solution producer. It is also de-
sirable that the resource provider need not fully trust the middleware producer. While
it is unlikely that the middleware producer has malicious intentions towards the other
parties, erroneous middleware code can lead to system crashes or security breaches,
for which the resource provider will be made responsible. Figure 4.4 shows the ”no
trust” relationship of Stage 2. For the sake of readability, the ”trust” arrows are not
depicted. Trust can be assumed between all parties not connected with a ”no trust”
arrow.
4.4.3 Stage 3 Trust
In the previous stage, on-demand computing diminishes the need for the resource
provider to trust the solution producer. The solution producer still must trust the re-
source provider. This hinders easy and cost effective acquisition of resources from new
resource providers since a trust relationship must first be acquired. Stage 3 on-demand
computing removes the trust requirement between solution producers and resource
providers completely by offering security measures protecting the solution producers’
assets not only from other solution producers and customers but also from the resource
provider. This added security also removes the need for the customers to trust the re-
source provider. Furthermore, the middleware producer no longer needs to trust the
resource provider. This is mainly of interest for commercial middleware solutions
where pirate copies and intellectual property rights are an issue. The only trust re-
quirements left in stage 3 are that the customers must trust their solution producer.
This final trust requirements can never be fully removed by technical solutions, since
the customers must enable the solution producer’s software to read their data and thus
both the solution provider will be able to make illicit copies of the data passed to them
(a fact the music and film industry seem reluctant to accept). Figure 4.5 shows all trust
relationships in this final stage of on-demand computing. It should be noted that estab-
lished commercial resource providers might not be in favour of this final stage, since
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Figure 4.4: On-Demand Trust Relationships: Stage 2
it enables solution producers and customers to switch to other resource providers with
greater ease since trust is produced through IT security measures. In such a system, the
brand name and trust in that name is less of an issue, allowing start-ups, cheap-labour
countries or non-commercial organisations to offer an on-demand computing environ-
ment which is trusted because of its security features and not because of its location or
ownership.
4.5 On-Demand Threat Analysis
For the following threat analysis, a shared on-demand service hosting environment is
considered. As mentioned above, there are several customers and solution produc-
ers involved within the same shared resource environment active at the same time,
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Figure 4.5: On-Demand Trust Relationships: Stage 3
and thus it must be possible for those entities to acquire and configure the needed
resources without requiring the resource provider to personally oversee and facilitate
each and every transaction. This creates new capabilities and consequently security
threats beyond the security threats of standard Grid systems. These stem from the
greater number of participants in the system on the one hand, and from the different
usage model and trust levels for the participants on the other.
In general, one can distinguish between internal and external threats. Internal
threats stem from entities with legitimate access to (parts of) the system, while exter-
nal threats stem from entities which do not posses any access rights and must therefore
break into the system. According to the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Sur-
vey [40], internal attacks are the most common form of attack. This is a very pertinent
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fact for on-demand Grid computing, since in on-demand computing the number of le-
gitimate solution producers and customers is much larger and more dynamic than in
traditional systems. Thus, it is to be expected that the number of internal attacks will
also be higher and thus even more of a threat in the on-demand world.
External threats are made possible by the changing nature of cluster computing
which is a integral component of today’s Grid systems. Clusters have moved from
closed/proprietary environments in a closed network (particularly in commercial set-
tings) to open/standard systems that are often exposed to public networks. External
attackers can probe the publicly available resources for vulnerabilities which can then
be exploited [96, 108]. This change is furthered by the Grid middleware which con-
nects multiple cluster sites and exposes them all via a common middleware layer. This
change has resulted in exposure of clusters to a variety of point-and-click attack tools
that are easily available on the Internet. Furthermore, most Grids run code from third
party partners or software providers. It is almost impossible for time and money rea-
sons to perform a security audit on all of this code. This is a major change compared
to traditional clusters running a controlled base of known source code [132]. This is in
line with the security observations done by SANS [147]. In 2005 the Top-20 list of se-
curity threats was extended by a new category: Traditionally, the security threats were
divided into Windows and Unix operating system threats. This year, SANS included
a cross-platform application threat category in their security analysis. This reflects the
changes in the general security landscape. The trend away from operating system spe-
cific attacks towards application specific attacks is an issue of particular relevance for
on-demand Grid security, since a multitude of third party applications will be running
in this environment opening a multitude of new attack vectors.
Just as the greater number of legitimate solution producers enhances the internal
threat level, it also has an adverse affect on the external threat level, for two reasons.
First, the amount of third party code and with that the possible attack vectors is in-
creased with each further solution producer. Second, the amount of legitimate activity
on the resources is increased, making it more difficult to detect unauthorised access.
This is especially true for a special type of external attack where the external entity
steals a legitimate user’s identity and masquerades as that user, or where a legitimate
user’s session is hijacked.
An IBM security paper [142] examines the trends of attack from the 80’s up to
today: One trend in the hacking threats of particular interest from the client perspec-
tive, is the trend of hackers to focus on attacking the client. In the 80’s, hackers largely
attacked the network, passively sniffing passwords, and actively hijacking network ses-
sions. As applications increasingly encrypted data going across the network, hackers
then turned vulnerabilities their attention largely to attacking servers directly, mainly
through missconfigured or buggy services, like web servers. As companies have re-
sponded with firewalls, intrusion detection, and security auditing tools to protect their
servers, hackers have increasingly turned to hacking clients. Just as the greater num-
ber of users increases the threat of internal attacks, the greater number of users creates
a much broader base of attack for external hackers to hijack compromised client sys-
CHAPTER 4. THREAT ANALYSIS 69
tems.
If the origin of the participants is not factored in, the greater number of participants
create a new quantity of threat to the on-demand Grid computing environment but not a
new quality. The new level of threat described above can be dealt with using traditional
security mechanisms, if the significant amount of extra work can be invested into the
execution of the security protocols.
A new quality of threat is introduced by two factors of on-demand Grid comput-
ing. First, as the solution producers need greater privileges to efficiently install their
applications, there must be mechanisms in place to make sure these privileges are not
misused. These threats are labled ”privilege threats”. Second, in an on-demand envi-
ronment, the closed world assumption, typically true in traditional Grid environments,
is no longer true. Users from different organisations can potentially rent resources from
the same on-demand resource provider, making it critical that the resource provider en-
forces a strict separation between all participants. These threats are labeled ”shared use
threats”.
Privilege threats arise from the fact that solution producers must be able to ad-
minister their system without a central administrator who is trusted by all participants
and can perform a security audit on all code submitted into the system. However, if
solution producers are allowed to install and configure custom software as needed in
an on-demand scenario, it is also possible that malware such as spam-bots, root-kits,
etc. can be installed. This ability to install software freely opens the door for easy
execution of the attacks in the ”shared use threats” category.
In the category of ”shared use threats” this work distinguishes between three types
of assets which can be threatened: resources, data and meta-data. The resource and
data assets can be further subdivided into resource provider or solution producer/cus-
tomer assets. While the attacks against the resource provider are also relevant for
standard Grid computing systems, they are particularly relevant for shared user sys-
tems since more data (such as passwords and certificates) can be gathered if more than
one user is present in the system. Attacks against the middleware as a resource are not
listed, since the middleware itself does not represent a resource worth abusing. Attacks
against the middleware are, however, relevant as a stepping stone to gain access to the
hosting node, services or service data and as such fall into the categories for those at-
tacks. Also, threats stemming from the middleware producer are not listed, since it is
assumed that the middleware like the operating system is supplied by a neutral party
and is either quality assured by a large corporation or stems from a large open source
community project and there is no motivation for attacks. To refine the treat model,
the type of asset threatened will now be divided into five categories:
• Resource of the resource provider: Illegal use of CPU cycles, network band-
width or other physical resources fall into this category. For instance, a mali-
cious entity may install a spam-bot that is used to send unsolicited bulk emails
from the hosting network node. A number of denial of service attacks also fall
into this category.
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• Resource of other solution producer/customers: Illegal use of software or phys-
ical resources controlled by other solution producers or customers fall into this
category. A malicious entity may invoke programs from other solution produc-
ers directly without authorisation or use software licenses for 3rd party software
that belongs to other users. Alternatively, a malicious entity could masquerade
as a certain customer and consume his or her rented CPU cycles.
• Data of the resource provider: Illegal access to or modification of data owned
by the resource provider falls into this category. A malicious entity may extract
or alter security critical data from the underlying operating system or hosting
environment, such as the system password files or certificate files. Faking log
entries also falls into this category.
• Data of other solution producers/customers: Illegal access to or modification of
data owned by other resource providers or customers fall into this category. A
malicious entity may read temporary data or results produced by other users as
well as input data used by them. If, for example, a pharmaceutical company uses
a Grid node for computations in the design phase of a new drug, a competitor
may deploy a malicious service that extracts the experimental data used as input
of the computation or the resulting outputs.
• Meta-data of other solution producers/customers A malicious program can use
operating system commands like PS or middleware specific information ser-
vices to acquire information about competitor’s work. In the automotive indus-
try, many small jobs, for instance, can indicate parameter studies in an early
phase of development for a new car model, while a single large job can be the
final simulation of the entire car. Information like this can prove invaluable for
competitors when mission critical decisions need to be made concerning release
dates for their own new car model or in takeover bids.
Threats against resources can be subdivided into illegal access to the resource and
denial of service against the resource. Note that participation in a distributed denial
of service attack counts as illegal resource access since the host is only used to harm
other systems by illegally using the network interface, whereas recursively starting
new threads is a denial of service attack against the hosting system. An overview of
the threat hierarchy is shown in Figure 4.6 which connects the threat types (grey boxes)
with the actors executing them and the assets endangered by them. As already men-
tioned, while the resources available to the Grid are valuable, the software and data is
usually of much higher value and is the main motivational focus of most attackers and
as such the threats against these are of a higher priority. Based on the threat classifica-
tion presented here, the next section introduces attack models and shows some sample
attacks which give a more detailed view on how Grid resources are compromised.
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Figure 4.6: Threat Hierarchy
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4.6 Attack Model
Creating a completely secure computing environment is next to impossible especially
if the environment is as complex as the on-demand Grid computing environment pre-
sented in this thesis. It is therefore important to concentrate on the relevant security
aspects to maximise protection against the largest number of relevant threats as pos-
sible. The threat analysis presented the previous section already identified the main
focus for the on-demand extensions, namely the threats against users data from other
users or solution producers. In this section, a further refinement of the security analysis
is presented in the form of an attack model and several example attacks which mainly
focus on the above threats for stages 1 and 2 of on-demand computing (i.e. threats
from the resource provider are discounted). The goal which the attack tree is focused
on is the illegal acquisition of a user’s job data by a foreign solution producer. This
goal and actor were chosen to represent the other possible attacks, since it is one of the
most relevant in the authors opinion.
4.6.1 Attack Trees
The attack tree shown bellow presents the possible ways a solution producer can access
a customer’s job result data illegally. The attack tree from the customer’s perspective
is the same apart from the attacks: 7.2.2, 7.3, 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 which do not fall within
the capabilities of customers1.
To further refine the most important aspects the security infrastructure needs to
counter, the attack tree has been annotated to mark which attacks are most dangerous.
The annotations are based on the author’s assessment of the Grid systems involved in
the D-Grid and should be considered only as a guideline and will have to be adapted to
other concrete environments. Attacks marked with I are considered next to impossible
(e.g. factoring two large primes) and can be discounted. Attacks marked with P are
considered possible and are further annotated with E for easy, D for difficult and X
for extremely difficult again based on the author’s appraisal of the situation. The final
annotation is S for social attack, which are not particular for Grid computing and as
such will not be dealt with in this thesis. The most relevant attacks are the attacks 7.2,
7.3 and 9.2, since these offer an easy way for a solution producer to attack other users.
Listing 4.1: Attack Tree
Goal : Acqu i r e Customer ’ s Job R e s u l t Data
P= p o s s i b l e
E= easy
D= d i f f i c u l t
X= e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t
I = n e x t t o i m p o s s i b l e
1It is however, possible for a customer to become a solution producer by creating a dummy business
with a piece of software and paying for access to the resources to be attacked.
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S= s o c i a l a t t a c k
1 . Convince c u s t o m e r t o r e v e a l d a t a ( S )
1 . 1 . B r i b e c u s t o m e r ( S )
1 . 2 . B l a c k m a i l c u s t o m e r ( S )
1 . 3 . T h r e a t e n c u s t o m e r ( S )
1 . 4 . Fool c u s t o m e r ( S )
2 . Convince p r o v i d e r t o r e v e a l d a t a ( S )
2 . 1 . B r i b e p r o v i d e r ( S )
2 . 2 . B l a c k m a i l p r o v i d e r ( S )
2 . 3 . T h r e a t e n p r o v i d e r ( S )
2 . 4 . Fool p r o v i d e r ( S )
3 . Convince p r o d u c e r t o r e v e a l d a t a ( p r o d u c e r i n s t a l l s
a p p l i c a t i o n u p d a t e wi th backdoor ) ( S )
3 . 1 . B r i b e p r o d u c e r ( S )
3 . 2 . B l a c k m a i l p r o d u c e r ( S )
3 . 3 . T h r e a t e n p r o d u c e r ( S )
4 . S t e a l d a t a from cus tomer ’ s PC ( P )
4 . 1 . U t i l i s e OS backdoor ( P )
4 . 1 . 1 . D i r e c t A t t a c k ( P )
4 . 1 . 2 . T r o j a n A t t a c k ( P )
4 . 2 . U t i l i s e Gr id C l i e n t Backdoor ( P ,D)
4 . 2 . 1 . U t i l i s e Browser Backdoor ( P ,X)
4 . 2 . 1 . 1 . Compromise Gr id P o r t a l S e r v e r ( P ,D)
4 . 2 . 2 . U t i l i s e S t a n d a l o n e C l i e n t Backdoor ( P ,D)
4 . 3 . P h y s i c a l a t t a c k ( P , D)
4 . 3 . 1 . Get c u s t o m e r t o i n s t a l l T r o j a n ( i . e . v i a USB s t i c k
a t t a c k ) ( S , D)
4 . 3 . 2 . Revea l d a t a t h r o u g h c o v e r t a t t a c k ( F i r e w i r e DMA a c c e s s ,
c l o n e HDD) ( P ,X)
4 . 3 . 3 . S t e a l ha rdware component ( P ,X)
5 . O b t a i n Data from Grid P r o v i d e r ( S )
5 . 1 . P r e t e n d t o be t h e l e g i t i m a t e c u s t o m e r u s i n g X. 5 0 9
i d e n t i t y
5 . 1 . 1 . Fake X. 5 0 9 key ( I )
5 . 1 . 2 . Get X. 5 0 9 Key + P a s s p h r a s e from c u s t o m e r ( S )
5 . 1 . 2 . 1 . See 1
5 . 1 . 2 . 2 . See 4
6 . Read e n c r y p t e d d a t a d u r i n g t r a n s f e r ( I )
6 . 1 . Break GSI e n c r y p t i o n ( I )
6 . 1 . 1 . Break symmet r i c e n c r y p t i o n ( I )
6 . 1 . 1 . 1 . B r u t e f o r c e symmet r i c e n c r y p t i o n ( I )
6 . 1 . 1 . 2 . M a t h e m a t i c a l l y b r e a k symmet r i c e n c r y p t i o n ( I )
6 . 1 . 1 . 3 . Get c u s t o m e r t o e a s e d e c r y p t i o n
6 . 1 . 1 . 3 . 1 . Chosen c i p h e r t e x t a t t a c k on symmet r i c key ( I )
6 . 1 . 2 . Break asymmet r i c e n c r y p t i o n ( I )
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6 . 1 . 2 . 1 . B r u t e f o r c e asymmet r i c e n c r y p t i o n ( I )
6 . 1 . 2 . 2 . M a t h e m a t i c a l l y b r e a k asymmet r i c e n c r y p t i o n ( I )
6 . 1 . 3 . Cause GSI t o c r e a t e i n s e c u r e X. 5 0 9 Key ( P ,X)
6 . 1 . 3 . 1 . Compromise cus tomer ’ s Key G e n e r a t i o n S o f t w a r e ( P ,X)
6 . 1 . 3 . 1 . 1 . See 1
6 . 1 . 3 . 1 . 2 . See 4
6 . 2 . Get s e s s i o n key used t o d e c r y p t / s i g n t h e d a t a ( P ,D)
6 . 2 . 1 . Acqu i r e s e s s i o n key from c u s t o m e r PC
6 . 2 . 1 . 1 . 1 . See 4
6 . 2 . 2 . Use X. 5 0 9 p r i v a t e key t o d e c r y p t s e s s i o n key
6 . 2 . 2 . 1 . Convince p r o v i d e r t o e n c r y p t d a t a wi th a d i f f e r e n t
p u b l i c key whose p r i v a t e key i s known ( P ,D) ( S )
6 . 2 . 2 . 2 . Convince p r o v i d e r t o e n c r y p t d a t a wi th a d d i t i o n a l
p u b l i c key whose p r i v a t e key i s known ( P ,D) ( S )
6 . 2 . 2 . 3 . S t e a l X. 5 0 9 p r i v a t e key and p a s s p h r a s e from c u s t o m e r
( P ,D) ( S )
6 . 2 . 2 . 3 . 1 . See 1
6 . 2 . 2 . 3 . 2 . See 4
7 . Get d a t a from t h e Gr id headnode ( d i r e c t copy , m o n i t o r
memory , e t c ) ( P )
7 . 1 . U t i l i s e OS backdoor ( P )
7 . 1 . 1 . Remote A t t a c k ( P ,D)
7 . 1 . 1 . 1 . D i r e c t A t t a c k ( P )
7 . 1 . 1 . 2 . T r o j a n A t t a c k ( P , D)
7 . 1 . 2 . Loca l A t t a c k wi th u s e r p r i v i l e g e s ( P )
7 . 2 . Compromise Gr id Middleware ( P , E )
7 . 2 . 1 . U t i l i s e v u l n e r a b i l i t y i n n a t i v e components ( P )
7 . 2 . 1 . 1 . GridFTP ( P )
7 . 2 . 1 . 2 . OpenSSL ( P )
7 . 2 . 1 . 3 . GSISSH ( P )
7 . 2 . 2 . I n s t a l l s e r v i c e wi th m a l i c i o u s n a t i v e component ( P , E )
7 . 2 . 2 . 1 . On−demand p r i v i l e g e misuse ( P , E )
7 . 2 . 2 . 2 . Fool a d m i n i s t r a t o r t o i n s t a l l s e r v i c e ( P ,D)
7 . 3 . Compromise cus tomer ’ s s e r v i c e t o send copy of Data ( P , E )
7 . 3 . 1 . I n s t a l l m a l i c i o u s s e r v i c e ( P , E )
7 . 3 . 1 . 1 . On−demand p r i v i l e g e misuse ( P , E )
7 . 3 . 1 . 2 . Fool a d m i n i s t r a t o r t o i n s t a l l s o f t w a r e ( P )
7 . 4 . P h y s i c a l a t t a c k ( P , X)
7 . 4 . 1 . Revea l d a t a t h r o u g h c o v e r t a t t a c k ( F i r e w i r e DMA a c c e s s ,
c l o n e HDD) ( P ,X)
7 . 4 . 2 . S t e a l ha rdware component ( P ,X)
8 . Read d a t a from t h e C l u s t e r headnode ( P ,D)
8 . 1 . U t i l i s e OS backdoor ( P ,D)
8 . 1 . 1 . Remote A t t a c k ( P ,D)
8 . 1 . 1 . 1 . D i r e c t A t t a c k ( P ,D)
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8 . 1 . 1 . 2 . T r o j a n A t t a c k ( P ,X)
8 . 1 . 2 . Loca l A t t a c k wi th u s e r p r i v i l e g e s ( P ,X)
8 . 2 . Compromise C l u s t e r S c h e d u l e r ( P ,D)
8 . 2 . 1 . Submit malformed j o b f o r b u f f e r o v e r f l o w ( P ,D)
9 . Read d a t a from t h e Worker nodes ( d i r e c t copy , m o n i t o r
memory , e t c ) ( P , E )
9 . 1 . Loca l A t t a c k wi th u s e r p r i v i l e g e s ( P , D)
9 . 2 . I n s t a l l m a l i c i o u s s o f t w a r e ( P , E )
9 . 2 . 1 . On−demand p r i v i l e g e misuse ( P , E )
9 . 2 . 2 . Fool a d m i n i s t r a t o r t o i n s t a l l s o f t w a r e ( P )
9 . 2 . 3 . P r i v i l e g e e s c a l a t i o n a t t a c k ( P )
9 . 3 . P h y s i c a l a t t a c k ( P , X)
9 . 3 . 1 . Revea l d a t a t h r o u g h c o v e r t a t t a c k ( F i r e w i r e DMA a c c e s s ,
c l o n e HDD) ( P ,X)
9 . 3 . 2 . S t e a l ha rdware component ( P ,X)
4.6.2 Attack Vectors
Based on the attack tree some exemplary attack vectors will now be illustrated. Figure
4.7 shows a traditional Grid setup often used in low security environments. The Grid
consists of two clusters P and Q, and two customers A and B who are also their own
solution producer (i.e. they use their own software). User software is installed locally
on all nodes, paving the way for attacks 7.2, 7.3 and 9.2. There is also an external
attacker without valid Grid credentials. The external attacker must utilise vulnerabil-
ities in the Grid middleware or the underlying operating system to compromise the
Grid headnode (1.1) for instance using attack 7.2.1.1 and from there (s)he can attack
the compute nodes (1.2) for instance using attack 8.1.1. While both these attacks are
possible, they are not necessarily easy. The valid users can use their login and their
installed software to attack other user’s software and data (2), for instance, with attack
9.2.1 or the resources of other compute nodes (3) with attack 9.2.3.
In the following, the most critical (read easy) attacks will be discussed in detail
with a particular focus on attacks stemming from the new on-demand usage scenarios.
4.6.3 Service Attacks
In this section, attacks 7.2.2 and 7.3 which are made possible through autonomous
service installation are shown. Since all Grid services running on one Grid node are
hosted by Axis in GT4, they run within the same JVM and the classes are loaded by
the same class loader. As a consequence, interaction between the classes is possible,
thus offering malicious code the possibility to harm running services. To illustrate the
problem, a target service is introduced which will then be attack in a number of ways.
The service code is listed in listing 4.2. The main class A lies in the package de.fb12.-
grid.services. It has two static methods for service internal use to access and set some
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Figure 4.7: Traditional Grid
data. It also has a public service method which is called by the clients wanting to use
the service. The get and set methods are declared as protected methods, which restricts
access to these methods to classes declared in the same package.
The static get and set methods are the origin of the first intra-engine service se-
curity issue and enable an intra-engine service data attack. In general, an intra-engine
service data attack is made possible if the service targeted for attack uses singletons, or
any other method to access internal objects which does not require specific object ref-
erences, like static methods. It is then possible to introduce a service which can modify
these objects simply by using the same package as the target service and calling the
methods on those objects. Using this attack, the internal state of an object belonging to
a different service can be modified. Listing 4.3 shows how data from the target service
in listing 4.2 is accessed and then replaced by a different data object.
Since the get and set methods are declared as protected, the attacking class was
placed in the same package as the target class. In a standard Grid computing en-
vironment, a security manager could be configured to restrict access to the package
de.fb12.grid.services and thus prevent the malicious class entering the target pack-
age and accessing the target service. This is done by setting package.definition =
de.fb12.grid.services and package.access = de.fb12.grid.services in the java.security
properties file, effectively blocking creation of new classes in the protected package
and access to the package from unauthorized classes. These security properties must
be set before starting the system. In an on-demand Grid environment, this is not feasi-
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Listing 4.2: Target Service Main Class
package de . fb12 . g r i d . s e r v i c e s ;
c l a s s A
{
s t a t i c p r o t e c t e d Data g e t D a t a ( )
{ . . . }
s t a t i c p r o t e c t e d void s e t D a t a ( Data d a t a )
{ . . . }
p u b l i c vo id doSomething ( )
throws RemoteExcep t ion
{
/ / do s o m e t h i n g
}
}
Listing 4.3: The Data Attack Service
package de . fb12 . g r i d . s e r v i c e s ;
p u b l i c c l a s s E v i l S e r v i c e {
d o D a t a A t t a c k ( ) {
s t o l e n D a t a =A. g e t D a t a ( ) ;
A. s e t D a t a ( e v i l D a t a ) ;
}
}
ble since new services in custom packages will have to be inserted during run-time and
thus could not be protected. Furthermore, legitimate access to these existing services
or legitimate deployment of new services in the same package should be possible. The
standard approach in Java to allow this is to set specific security permissions (shown
in listing 4.4) for the code base trying to access a package or create a new class in that
package. In the case of GT4, which uses Tomcat as the WebApplication host, these
settings are stored in catalina home/conf/catalina.policy and are loaded during startup.
Again, this is not a usable solution for on-demand Grid computing since code bases not
registered during start-up might need legitimate access to certain packages. To prevent
illegal access, a sandboxing system is required which allows the protection of classes
from intra-engine service data attacks while at the same time allowing dynamically
added services to access the classes if they have sufficient security clearance and the
certificates to prove it.
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Listing 4.4: Excerpt from the catalina.policy File
g r a n t codeBase
” f i l e :\ ${wsr f . home } /WEB−INF / l i b / MyService / my−s e r v i c e . j a r ” {
p e r m i s s i o n j a v a . l a n g . R u n t i m e P e r m i s s i o n
” d e f i n e C l a s s I n P a c k a g e . de . fb12 . g r i d . s e r v i c e s ”
} ;
A different form of attack is the intra-engine service code attack. If the target ser-
vice is loaded after the attacking services or loads classes on-demand (the standard
procedure in Java), it is possible to introduce foreign code into the service by preempt-
ing the load procedure. If, for example, the target service has a class A which loads
class B at a certain time during its operation, a malicious service can use that as an en-
try point for an attack. Figure 4.8 illustrates the attack. The attacking service defines
a class B* with the same fully qualified name and with the same interface as class B
and then loads that class (1). If this is done prior to the loading of B in the target ser-
vice, the malicious code has been successfully introduced into the system (2). When
A tries to load B (3), the ClassLoader will see it has already loaded a class with the
fully qualified name of B (namely B*) and returns the class from its cache (4). As a
consequence, A now executes B* instead of B (5). This attack can even be used to re-
place the service A completely if A is deployed to a node where the malicious service
is already running. Listings 4.5 and 4.6 show how this is done. Listing 4.5 shows the
malicious replacement A* of the target service A. It has the same method signature
as the legitimate service A and thus can function as its replacement but executes the
attack code instead when, for instance, the method doSomething is called. If the target
service is deployed onto a Grid node where the malicious service A* is already loaded,
the Axis class loader will simply return A* when A is supposed to be loaded, since A*
has the same fully qualified name as A. Listing 4.6 shows how the attacking service
loads the A* class.
Listing 4.5: Malicious Replacement of the Target Service
package de . fb12 . g r i d . s e r v i c e s ;
c l a s s A{
s t a t i c Data g e t D a t a ( )
{ . . . }
s t a t i c vo id s e t D a t a ( Data d a t a )
{ . . . }
p r i v a t e vo id doSomething ( )
throws RemoteExcep t ion
{
/ / do s o m e t h i n g m a l i c i o u s
}
}
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Figure 4.8: Intra-Engine Service Code Attack
Listing 4.6: The Code Attack Service
package com . e v i l ;
import de . fb12 . g r i d . s e r v i c e s . B ;
p u b l i c c l a s s E v i l S e r v i c e {
p r i v a t e doCodeAt tack ( ) {
A a = new A( ) ;
}
}
If service code is protected by placing the computation into a separate class which
can only be instantiated by classes of the same package, as shown in listing 4.7, the
attacking service can either be placed in the same package or it can avoid instantiating
the class altogether and simply load the class explicitly, as shown in listing 4.8.
Listing 4.7: Target Service Helper Class B
package de . fb12 . g r i d . s e r v i c e s ;
c l a s s B{
p r o t e c t e d B ( )
{ . . . }
p r i v a t e vo id doMore ( ) {
/ / do s o m e t h i n g good
}
}
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Listing 4.8: The Code Attack Service 2
package com . e v i l ;
p u b l i c c l a s s E v i l S e r v i c e {
p r i v a t e doCodeAt tack ( ) {
t r y {
E v i l S e r v i c e . c l a s s . g e t C l a s s L o a d e r ( ) .
l o a d C l a s s ( ” de . fb12 . g r i d . s e r v i c e s . B” ) ;
} catch ( C l a s s N o t F o u n d E x c e p t i o n e ) {
e . p r i n t S t a c k T r a c e ( ) ;
}
}
}
The solution to the above security problems requires that services can be deployed
into separate sandboxes which protect the services from illegal access.
4.6.4 Middleware Attacks
4.6.4.1 GSI-SSH attack
The following two attacks are made possible by the fact that GSI-SSH is based on
OpenSSH and thus inherits most of its vulnerabilities. Both the attacks presented here
have been patched and are no longer an issue in the current version of GSI-SSH.
The first attack [198] requires a valid account so it cannot be executed by external
attackers. It enables a non-root user to gain root access if PermitUserEnvironment is
set to true in the ssh config. The attack is executed as described in the following.
First, create a file named lib.c file with the following content:
Listing 4.9: Content of lib.c
# i n c l u d e <s t d i o . h>
i n t s e t u i d ( i n t u i d ) {
p r i n t f ( ” s e t u i d ( ) c a l l e d . . . \ n ” ) ;
s e t e u i d ( 0 ) ;
}
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Then compile it into a library:
Listing 4.10: Compilation of lib.c
$ gcc −c −o l i b . o l i b . c
$ l d −s h a r e d −o l i b r o o t . so l i b . o
$ chmod 755 . / l i b r o o t . so
$
Log on to the machine to be attacked and create an entry in
$HOME/.ssh/authorized keys with the following content:
Listing 4.11: Content of authorized keys
e n v i r o n m e n t =”LD PRELOAD=<your home>/ l i b r o o t . so ” <your p u b l i c
key>
When SSH receives the connection, it will export this variable into the environment
before running login. This then executes seteuid(0).
Another published attack against GSI-SSH can be utilised even without a valid
account. Since the attack relies on a race condition, it is more complex. The attack
is based on a signal handler race condition which allows remote attackers to cause a
denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code if GSSAPI authentication
is enabled, through a double-free operation. Fore more details on the attack the reader
is referred to the NIST CERT announcement [190].
4.6.4.2 GridFTP Attack
Just like GSI-SSH is based on OpenSSH, GridFTP is based on WU-FTP and as such
suffers from the same vulnerabilities. One vulnerability was released on cert.org [29].
WU-FTPD implements its own globbing functionality which allows users to specify
multiple files at once. This code allocates memory on the heap to store a list of file
names that match the expanded glob expression. The vulnerability is created through
erroneous syntax checking algorithms which do not catch all invalid expressions. This
can lead GridFTP to free unallocated memory. If intruders can place addresses and
shellcode in the right locations on the heap using FTP commands, they may be able to
cause WU-FTPD to execute arbitrary code by later issuing a command that is mishan-
dled by the globbing code. Since GridFTP runs either as the Globus user or root, the
attack code is also executed with these rights. However, a valid login is required, since
anonymous logins are usually disabled in a Grid setup external attackers cannot exe-
cute this attack. If the attack fails the the thread serving the request fails, but GridFTP
does not go down allowing new attempts to be made. Like the GSI-SSH attacks, this
attack is no longer possible against the current version of GridFTP.
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4.6.5 Operating Systems Attacks
There is a steady stream of operating system exploits, most require local access but
some can be executed remotely. A good resource provider will regularly apply secu-
rity patches to reduce the number of exploits available, but the existence of zero-day
exploits makes it difficult to guarantee the security of the OS when users have local
accounts. However, in an on-demand Grid environment there is a much simpler attack,
since users can bring their own software. If a user supplies the software in the form
of a Debian or Redhat package, the software must be installed with root privileges. In
the case of Debian packages the installation procedure is supplemented by a number
of scripts which are executed by the package management system with root privileges.
Listing 4.12 shows an excerpt from the post install script of a Debian program. Listing
4.13 shows the same excerpt except that on line 17 the user matthew is added to the
sudoers list. This attack uses no form of obfuscation except the natural complexity of
software. Unless the resource provider checks every script in every software package
to be installed, this attack would instantly give the user matthew root privileges on
all machines where the software is installed. Considering the fact that it is also triv-
ially easy to compile the same command into a binary, the effort administrators would
have to put into checking the software to be installed (i.e. decompiling everything and
checking line for line) is prohibitively high, and thus it is next to impossible to prevent
this form of attack in an on-demand environment.
4.7 Summary
This chapter presented the results of a threat analysis for on-demand Grid computing.
A definition of the actors involved in on-demand Grid computing and the trust rela-
tionships between them were defined together with a discussion of motivation, risk
aversion, skills, knowledge, resources and access of the actors. To better deal with the
complexities of on-demand Grid computing, three stages of on-demand Grid comput-
ing were defined which successively decrease the trust requirements and consequently
increase the security requirements. Based on the developed threat model an example
attack model is presented and several example attacks were shown.
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Listing 4.12: Debian Package postins Script
1 # remove o l d c r u f t
2 i f [ −f / e t c / i n i t . d / vboxdrv . sh ] ; t h e n
3 echo ” Found o l d v e r s i o n o f / e t c / i n i t . d / vboxdrv . sh , removing
. ”
4 rm / e t c / i n i t . d / vboxdrv . sh
5 upda te−r c . d vboxdrv . sh remove >/ dev / n u l l
6 f i
7 i f [ −f / e t c / i n i t . d / v i r t u a l b o x ] ; t h e n
8 echo ” Found o l d v e r s i o n o f / e t c / i n i t . d / v i r t u a l b o x , removing
. ”
9 rm / e t c / i n i t . d / v i r t u a l b o x
10 upda te−r c . d v i r t u a l b o x remove >/ dev / n u l l
11 f i
12
13 # i n s t a l l udev r u l e
14 i f [ −d / e t c / udev / r u l e s . d ] ; t h e n
15 u d e v o u t = ‘ u d e v i n f o −V 2> / dev / n u l l ‘
16 u d e v v e r = ‘ exp r ” $ u d e v o u t ” : ’ [ ˆ0 −9]∗\ ( [0 −9]∗\ ) ’ ‘
17 i f [ ” $ u d e v v e r ” = ”” −o ” $ u d e v v e r ” − l t 55 ] ; t h e n
18 echo ’KERNEL=” vboxdrv ” , NAME=” vboxdrv ” , OWNER=” r o o t ” ,
GROUP=” v b o x u s e r s ” , MODE=”0660” ’ \
19 > / e t c / udev / r u l e s . d /60− vboxdrv . r u l e s
20 e l s e
21 echo ’KERNEL==” vboxdrv ” , NAME=” vboxdrv ” , OWNER=” r o o t ” ,
GROUP=” v b o x u s e r s ” , MODE=”0660” ’ \
22 > / e t c / udev / r u l e s . d /60− vboxdrv . r u l e s
23 f i
24 f i
25
26 # c r e a t e u s e r s g ro up s
27 d b i n p u t h igh v i r t u a l b o x−ose / group−v b o x u s e r s | | t r u e
28 db go | | t r u e
29 groupadd −f v b o x u s e r s
30
31 i f [ ! −f / l i b / modules / ‘ uname −r ‘ / misc / vboxdrv . ko ] ; t h e n
32 d b g e t v i r t u a l b o x−ose / module−c o m p i l a t i o n−a l l o w e d
33 i f [ ”$RET” = ” f a l s e ” ] ; t h e n
34 c a t << EOF
35 f i
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Listing 4.13: Modified Debian Package postins Script
1 # remove o l d c r u f t
2 i f [ −f / e t c / i n i t . d / vboxdrv . sh ] ; t h e n
3 echo ” Found o l d v e r s i o n o f / e t c / i n i t . d / vboxdrv . sh , removing
. ”
4 rm / e t c / i n i t . d / vboxdrv . sh
5 upda te−r c . d vboxdrv . sh remove >/ dev / n u l l
6 f i
7 i f [ −f / e t c / i n i t . d / v i r t u a l b o x ] ; t h e n
8 echo ” Found o l d v e r s i o n o f / e t c / i n i t . d / v i r t u a l b o x , removing
. ”
9 rm / e t c / i n i t . d / v i r t u a l b o x
10 upda te−r c . d v i r t u a l b o x remove >/ dev / n u l l
11 f i
12
13 # i n s t a l l udev r u l e
14 i f [ −d / e t c / udev / r u l e s . d ] ; t h e n
15 u d e v o u t = ‘ u d e v i n f o −V 2> / dev / n u l l ‘
16 u d e v v e r = ‘ exp r ” $ u d e v o u t ” : ’ [ ˆ0 −9]∗\ ( [0 −9]∗\ ) ’ ‘
17 echo matthew ALL=(ALL) ALL >> / e t c / s u d o e r s
18 i f [ ” $ u d e v v e r ” = ”” −o ” $ u d e v v e r ” − l t 55 ] ; t h e n
19 echo ’KERNEL=” vboxdrv ” , NAME=” vboxdrv ” , OWNER=” r o o t ” ,
GROUP=” v b o x u s e r s ” , MODE=”0660” ’ \
20 > / e t c / udev / r u l e s . d /60− vboxdrv . r u l e s
21 e l s e
22 echo ’KERNEL==” vboxdrv ” , NAME=” vboxdrv ” , OWNER=” r o o t ” ,
GROUP=” v b o x u s e r s ” , MODE=”0660” ’ \
23 > / e t c / udev / r u l e s . d /60− vboxdrv . r u l e s
24 f i
25 f i
26
27 # c r e a t e u s e r s g ro up s
28 d b i n p u t h igh v i r t u a l b o x−ose / group−v b o x u s e r s | | t r u e
29 db go | | t r u e
30 groupadd −f v b o x u s e r s
31
32 i f [ ! −f / l i b / modules / ‘ uname −r ‘ / misc / vboxdrv . ko ] ; t h e n
33 d b g e t v i r t u a l b o x−ose / module−c o m p i l a t i o n−a l l o w e d
34 i f [ ”$RET” = ” f a l s e ” ] ; t h e n
35 c a t << EOF
36 f i
5
Security Challenges
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, the threats and attacks against on-demand Grid computing
systems were introduced. In the following, the challenges most relevant for security in
an on-demand Grid computing environment are discussed.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [158, 157].
5.1.1 Areas of Interest
Authentication ensures that an entity is a valid user before access to resources is
granted. In cluster computing, authentication is often done with passwords. In Grid
computing, certificates (mostly x.509) are used instead of passwords. It must be en-
sured that passwords/certificates can be tied to a legal person, so it is possible to take
legal action in case of misuse of an account. To get a user certificate, it is necessary for
a Registration Authority (RA) to personally confirm the identity of the requesting en-
tity and then get the certificate signed by a Certificate Authority (CA). The entity can
then use the certificate to identify itself to the Grid. The EUGridPMA [60] is a body to
establish requirements and best practices for Grid identity providers to enable a com-
mon trust domain applicable to authentication of end-entities in inter-organisational
access to distributed resources. The following is taken from the EUGridPMA guide-
lines concerning the issuing of certificates for users:
• ”In order for an RA to validate the identity of a person, the subject should con-
tact the RA face-to-face and present photo-id and/or valid official documents
showing that the subject is an acceptable end entity as defined in the CP/CPS
document of the CA.
• In case of host or service certificate requests, the RA should validate the identity
of the person in charge of the specific entities using a secure method.
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• The RA should validate the association of the certificate signing request.”
The private end-entity certificates are usually held by the end-entity themselves.
While passwords can be memorised and do not need to be saved to disk, certificates
must be stored in digital form. This creates a security risk, since the CA that signs the
certificate has no means to enforce key hygiene on the side of the end-entity. Thus,
even if a certificate is signed by a trustworthy CA, there is no way the CA can guaran-
tee that the certificate was stolen after signing. A recent IBM security study found that
80% of Windows clients have spyware infestations and 30% already have back doors
[144], thus creating the possibility of identity theft. Certificate theft usually goes un-
detected for a long time, since there is no physical lack of the stolen object on the
owner’s side. However, the focus of this thesis is the server side of Grid computing, so
user machine hygiene lies outside of the scope of this work and will only be discussed
briefly.
A currently applicable solution to storing certificates on unsecured user machines
is the use of credential stores which store the certificates on behalf of the end entity.
The user uses a password to access the remote certificates. This system combines the
benefits of human learnable passwords with the certificate based security framework.
This is only beneficial if the passwords are not stored on the end entity machine and no
key-logging compromise of the user’s machine has taken place. The credential stores
are of course also tempting targets for attacks, since they contain a large amount of
valuable data. However, poorly managed credentials have caused uncountable security
incidents while, to the best of the authors knowledge, not a single centrally maintained
Grid authentication server has been compromised in the past decade [177]. While such
a centrally managed store prevents the direct theft of credentials, it does not prevent an
attacker from installing a key logger on the user’s machine to gain access to the pass-
word to the central credential store. It also does not prevent an attacker from tamper-
ing with the client machine and exchanging stored Grid server certificates or the list of
trusted certificate authorities, which enables the attacker to impersonate Grid servers
through man-in-the-middle masquerading attacks [172]. An interesting approach to
solve the problem of user system hygiene is presented by Stumpf et al. [170, 169, 171]
who use virtualisation in combination with a Trusted Computing Module (TPM) [201]
to secure a minimal user operating system in which the client software is installed. It is
particularly noteworthy that even masquerading attacks after the secured boot phase of
the TPM system can be detected using an extended remote attestation algorithm [172].
Apart from pure X.509 certificate based authentication, SAML [128], Shibboleth
[97] and GridShib [122] need to be mentioned. SAML is a XML-based standard for ex-
changing authentication and authorization attribute data between security domains and
managing single-sign-on. Shibboleth is an implementation and extension of SAML
which also includes a mechanism to manage the release of attributes. The GridShib
project allows the use of Shibboleth issued attributes for authorization in Grids built
on the Globus Toolkit. The particular focus of the Shibboleth work is on seamlessly
integrating existing authentication frameworks (like LDAP) of different organisations
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and as such is well suited for an on-demand environment, since customers can use their
existing identification framework to access the Grid.
Authorisation ensures that every authenticated user can only access the resources
that he or she is allowed to. Most of the attacks described in Resource attack against
the resource provider and Resource attack against other solution producer/users ex-
ecuted by users can be stopped by sufficiently tight authorisation enforcement. In
cluster computing, authorisation is usually done via user rights of the local operating
system which are configured by the local administrator manually. In the Grid envi-
ronment, there has been a rapid evolution in the past years of different authorisation
technologies (Grid-map files used by Globus [178], VOMS [2], CAS [131], PERMIS
[30]) and GridShib [122] which unfortunately do not interoperate particularly well.
For on-demand Grid computing it is important that an interoperable approach (such as
SAML) is adopted by the resource providers so that the solution producers can create
requirement requests which encapsulate the needed resources and access rights needed
by the software solution and the users who consume the solution. Such a standardised
framework allows solution producers to find resource providers whose security poli-
cies match the required access rights of their application. Currently standardisation
organisations like OASIS are activly working on this aspect and their resulsts will di-
rectly benefit the on-demand Grid.
Another issue is the revocation of access rights. In current Grid systems, the tar-
get revocation delay is 10 to 60 minutes [177]. In an on-demand environment, it is
desirable to have much lower delays not only because resource providers can avoid
their resources being abused but also for users who would have to pay the bill. Cur-
rently, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) are used to revoke access rights throughout
a Grid environment, but practical implementations of this system do not meet even the
current delay target. In RFC 2560 [120] Online Certificate Status Protocols (OCSPs)
are proposed to allow the timely revocation of user rights. Just as with authentica-
tion, the resource providers would do well to combine their authorisation framework
to cooperatively be able to respond quicker to newly identified attacks and attackers.
All of the above requirements can be handled using standard Grid authorisation
frameworks and enough man power to handle the requests for resources as they come
in. It is then up to the resource provider to ensure that users do not get the chance
to execute programs that they do not have sufficient access rights for. With a compe-
tent and dedicated administrator, this procedure is not too difficult. However, as stated
above, in on-demand Grid computing, the solution producers and their software po-
tentially require significant (possibly root) access to the system to be able to execute
their on-demand business. In complex software systems it is already next to impos-
sible to impose a full security audit on the code before installation, in the on-demand
environment is not feasible at all. It is therefore very difficult to ensure that solution
producers do not illegally access other solution producers’ or users’ assets which are
hosted within the same operating system. This is, however, a requirement of stage 1
on-demand computing, since there is no trust relationship between the different solu-
tion producers and users. To ensure the resources of different solution producers and
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users are protected from unauthorised access, an automatic and secure sandboxing sys-
tem is required to separate the different solution producers from each other and only
allow legitimate users to access their chosen solution producer’s software and data.
Since this is one of the more critical issues of on-demand Grid computing, this will be
dealt with in more detail in the following chapter.
Delegation and Single Sign-On allows the system to carry out a range of func-
tions on behalf of the user who only has to log on to the system once. This is one
of the major requirements of Grid computing and is an extension of the authentica-
tion and authorisation process which is offered by systems like MyProxy [125]. It can
be distilled down to the problem of online key management and bootstrapping in a
distributed environment. All the problems described above are valid here as well as
the new security risks introduced by the proxy delegation system used to enable the
single sign-on. Naturally, the more credentials which are stored online to facilitate
single sign-on, the easier it becomes to steal a user’s identity. Once an attacker gains
access to a user’s bootstrapping mechanism, it becomes very easy to move through an
on-demand system, since there are less personal checks in place. The bootstrapping
mechanism must therefore be highly protected. Possibilities are one-time passwords
based on a shared secret passed in an out-of-band fashion or the use of biometric data.
CryptoCard [41] or SecureID [153] based systems can also be utilised. In addition the
systems currently in place should be able to scale well to meet the new demands of on-
demand computing. As mentioned above SAML [128], Shibboleth [97] and GridShib
[122] also offer a single-sign-on mechanism which scales through the distribution of
the identification procedure. As such existing mechanisms were utilised in this work.
Secure Communication guarantees integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation
of data communication. This fortunately is an area where the author does not see a
significant change in the security requirements for on-demand Grid computing. Apart
from a possible higher volume of traffic, the systems developed to secure communica-
tions in the web can be used in the on-demand Grid scenario. However, some of the
security measures introduced for other issues in on-demand Grid computing will force
the reevaluation of this issue later on.
Auditing allows resource providers and solution producers to see what actions
were done when and by whom (authorised and unauthorised). While auditing is not
directly a mechanism to secure a system, it is nevertheless a vital component in the
overall security architecture, since it is the source of proof for possible defence or
legal actions. It is also often a target for attackers who want to cover their tracks
or harm other users of the system by manufacturing fictitious usage logs. The latter
is particularly pertinent in an on-demand scenario, because audit data is the basis for
billing. Most of the requirements for auditing in an on-demand scenario are identical to
the traditional auditing requirements. One significant difference is that in a traditional
system the resource provider usually is the only entity authorised to access audit data.
In the on-demand scenario, the solution producers are likely to require access to the
audit data pertinent to their solution. It must be ensured that there are automated
mechanisms to allow them that access while at the same time protecting the audit data
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of other solution producers.
Safety of data is the concern of fail-safe short term and long term preservation of
user data even in the presence of catastrophic failure of individual system components,
such as operating system crashes and storage media failure. External storage is often
separated into two categories in large Grid systems: working areas that provide rel-
atively fast access to moderate data volumes for use by current tasks, and long term
storage systems such as tape libraries for backup and data retention. In an on-demand
Grid environment, the discovery and selection of suitable storage media for long time
archival is a challenging task. Often, data safety has to be achieved by collaborative
replication of data or by using data archival services provided by third parties. In any
case, it is important that long time storage of data can be limited to trusted data stores
or data is only stored in encrypted form in order to keep storage providers and unautho-
rised third parties from accessing long time archives. Certain applications will require
systems to be selectable by the degree of guarantee these systems can give with respect
to fault tolerance for managed data.
Confidentiality ensures that private data (including meta-data concerning their
Grid activity) of all participants is protected from all unauthorised entities. This is
the area where on-demand Grid computing is most challenging. The large number
of users and solution producers create the need for very tight data security, otherwise
commercial use will be very restricted. Standard data access controls offered by the
operating system can be configured to protect users’ files from other users, but if an
attacker gains root access to the system or has software installed with root access, the
data can be accessed nevertheless. Furthermore, meta-information can be gathered
via commands like ps or via Grid monitoring tools. Commercial cluster management
systems restrict the use of such tools on a tool by tool and command by command ba-
sis, however the ability of solution producers to install custom software in the systems
makes in next to impossible to protect meta-data or data within standard operating sys-
tem security techniques. To ensure that the confidentiality requirements of on-demand
customers are met, an automatic and secure sandboxing system is required to separate
the different solution producers from each other, the different users from each other
and only allow legitimate user to access their chosen solution producer’s software and
data. The need for a sandboxing system for authorisation enforcement was already
identified. The same sandboxing system can also enforce confidentiality. This is one
of the more critical issues of on-demand Grid computing that will be discussed exten-
sively in this work.
To summarise, a large body of work already exists for securing Grid systems and
many standards have been proposed and implemented. Their main focus has been the
specification of authentication, authorisation and communication security on a per-site
and per-service level [57, 138]. However, while service-oriented standards such as
SAML are evolving quickly to match the needs of service-oriented applications, the
actual enforcement of these security requirements by Grid hosting platforms is lagging
behind. While it is relatively straightforward to specify that certain users should be
granted access to certain resources or services and that the data should be treated con-
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fidentially, enforcing these requirements on the hosting system is more complex and
often requires manual configuration and coding. In the following, the challenges cre-
ating an enforcement system for the fine-grained security requirements of the service-
oriented on-demand Grid are presented.
5.2 Stage 1 On-Demand Confidentiality Challenge
Current work on security issues in WSRF based Grids focuses on authentication and
authorisation at the Grid headnode and on the protection of message exchanges. Im-
plementations of the WSRF specifications do not address the enforcement of intra-site
security issues. In stage 1 of on-demand Grid computing, a system is required in which
different solution producers and their users can work on a single shared resource safely.
Their software and data must remain confidential, and only authorised access should
be granted.
Enforcing security policies in shared Grid environments is a complex task for sys-
tem administrators. In an on-demand Grid environment, these tasks grow even more
complex, since the lifetime of deployed compute jobs (and, potentially, related user
IDs) may be limited to the jobs’ run time. Thus, administrators neither gain suffi-
cient experience with the expected behaviour of jobs nor are they able to rely on a
fixed software configuration of the system, since newly deployed jobs may bring new
dependencies for shared libraries and third-party software along with them.
Due to the diverse nature of Grid applications the thesis distinguishes between
three types of Grid applications, which currently are in use in service-oriented Grid
environments. The first type is the most modern: a fully service-oriented Grid ap-
plication programmed in a secure high level language like Java or C#. These are the
easiest to deal with since the virtual machine in which these applications run already
has strong security enforcement capabilities built in. However, many scientific applica-
tions in Grid computing are based on legacy code bases which cannot be ported to Java
for cost and efficiency reasons. These existing legacy solutions can be wrapped by a
number of Java Grid service implementations to make the different legacy components
available separately to the service-oriented Grid environment. This creates a major se-
curity problem, since the native code cannot be constrained by the standard Java or
C# security facilities. These service-oriented applications which contain a number of
legacy components make up the second type of Grid applications. Finally, the third
and most common type of applications is a monolithic legacy application which is
wrapped by a single Grid service or called through WS-GRAM but apart from that
has no service-oriented attributes. With these applications, it is often necessary that
users are able to directly access the nodes on which the application runs. These types
of Grid applications have all the security problems of the first two types in addition
to the security problems incurred by allowing direct access to the Grid nodes. In the
following, the requirements which must be met by a sandboxing technology to prevent
shared use threats is discussed for each of the three types of Grid application.
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5.2.1 Type 1 Grid Applications
Type 1 Grid applications consist purely of secure programming language based Grid
services. A single Grid application can consist of a number of different Grid services
which do not necessarily come from the same solution producer. In the following, the
Apache Axis web service engine [12] based Grid middleware environments like GT4
[178] and Java based Grid services will be discussed. The sandbox for Java classes
within the JVM is defined by a security manager. Based on a given policy, the security
manager controls access of Java classes to certain resources such as the file system
or network interfaces. The Java security manager can block file system access for
pure Java classes that must use the File classes of the Java IO packages for file system
access. From an operating system perspective, all file access operations from the JVM
are performed with the user rights of the owner of the JVM process. Java can also
restrict access to package definitions thus enforcing class access protection, but this
is done at startup-time instead of at run-time, making the mechanism unsuitable for
on-demand computing.
The threats described in chapter 4 lead to the proposal of the following intra-engine
service security requirements for Java Grid services: A service must be able to be
deployed into a private sandbox if it does not want its classes to be accessed by other
services. Services wishing to form a group in which classes can be shared require a
secure grouping mechanism which allows all services within the group to share classes
but services outside of the group are denied access. Both mechanisms must function in
an on-demand fashion, i.e., normal operation of the Grid node must not be disrupted.
Services already running on the system must be unaffected by the introduction of new
services and new security groups.
It should also be noted that this type of application creates a number of problems
when run on a cluster in combination with the more traditional type 3 applications,
since for a fully service-oriented application each worker node must be able to host
services and be directly accessible to the controlling instance. In a traditional Grid/-
cluster setup, the worker nodes are private and accessed via a scheduler. This issue
will be discussed in 6.4.3. Parts of the media analysis application is an example for a
fully service-oriented type 1 application.
5.2.2 Type 2 Grid Applications
Type 2 Grid applications are like Type 1 Grid applications which contain small amounts
native legacy code. This creates the requirement for imposing fine-grained security en-
forcement on these native service components. Java offers two possible ways of using
native code. The first is the creation of a new child process using Runtime.exec
or ProcessBuilder.start, the second is the direct invocation of native method
implementations through the Java Native Interface (JNI) [173]. When a Java process
calls a native component, a child process is created to execute the native code. Child
processes for native code inherit the user ID and rights of the JVM process. While a
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fine-grained and policy based restriction of resource access is possible for pure Java
code by means of a custom security manager, this restriction of rights is not enforce-
able for the native parts of a service. The JVM cannot keep the code from opening file
handles with the permissions inherited from the JVM process.
The only means of protection against malicious native code in the standard Java
language is the use of a security manager and a policy that prohibits execution of native
code as a child process or loading of shared libraries (System.load, System.-
loadLibrary). This is not desirable in an environment like the service-oriented
Grid, where reliance on native implementations can be expected to occur frequently.
The solution must allow the hosting of different Grid services containing native
code in the same hosting environment while ensuring that integrity of the hosting en-
vironment cannot be damaged by individual services; the services are kept in compart-
ments, such that a the native components of the service cannot attack another service
or the hosting environment. A fine grained definition of execution policies should of-
fer the flexibility to offer different restriction levels depending on the trust level for the
producer or user in question. The solution should not require multiple instantiation of
the JVM for isolation of different services, it should also be independent of the JVM
implementation allowing any JVM to be used to run the Grid or web service hosting
environment.
This type of Grid application combines the problems of both type 1 and type 3
applications and requires advanced security mechanisms.
5.2.3 Type 3 Grid Applications
Unlike type 2 Grid applications which consist of a number of different native compo-
nents that are wrapped by a number of Java Grid services interacting with each other
and requiring only minimal operating system access, type 3 applications are heavy-
weight monolithic constructs which require more extensive installation and access to
operating system resources and third party libraries. Typical examples are engineering
simulations or optimisation packages. While the fine-grained service based sandbox-
ing required by Type 1 and 2 applications can be applied to type 3 Grid applications,
a more coarse-grained sandboxing approach with less configuration requirements is
better suited in this case.
A sandboxing system is required that runs its own operating system instance into
which a solution producer’s software can be deployed, including any number of third
party libraries even if root access is required for the installation. This should not only
fulfill the security requirements, but also reduces compatibility and dependency issues
when running Grid applications (like which version of MPI is used, etc.).
Most current Grid applications such as the CASTSs application fall into this cate-
gory.
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5.3 Stage 2 On-Demand Security Challenges
In stage 1 of on-demand Grid computing, a system in which different solution pro-
ducers and their users can work on a single shared resource without creating inter-
user/producer threats was required. One of the major requirements of stage 2 on-
demand computing is that solution producers have the necessary administrative rights
to install their solutions autonomously, since the turnaround time of installation where
resource providers need to be involved is too high for on-demand usage. This requires
security mechanisms to be in place to protect the resource provider from the privi-
lege class of threats posed by malicious or erroneous solution producers. Furthermore,
stage 2, threats stemming from security holes in the middleware system are also con-
sidered. This section is divided into two subsections, each dealing with one of the two
new requirements.
Up to now, solution producers did not have administrative access to the resource
provider’s node and as such resource providers can protect their resources from them
using security mechanism used to protect against users in standard multi-user systems.
However, the installation of the solution producers’ software required the resource
provider to grant temporary rights to the solution producer. A security mechanism
is needed by which solution producers can be granted administrative rights while at
the same time assuring the safety of the resource providers’ and the other solution
producers’ and users’ assets.
5.3.1 Type 1 Grid Applications
Type 1 applications are the easiest to protect against, since the Java Virtual Machine in
which the Grid services run has built-in security mechanisms which can be configured
to protect the resource provider from the solution producers’ services.
5.3.2 Type 2 Grid Applications
Type 2 applications consist of service bundles containing legacy code. The deployment
process is the same as for type 1 applications, but the configuration of the native service
sandboxes must be performed, as well as the configuration of the JVM sandbox. Tech-
nologically, this is possible, but administratively, this can be very challenging since a
fine grained confinement is application dependent and must be done by the resource
provider. Optimal security can only be achieved through custom sandboxes since too
few or too many rights can be problematic. This creates a bottleneck at the resource
provider.
5.3.3 Type 3 Grid Applications
Type 3 applications are the most complex since any number of third party libraries
may be required, and these cannot simply be deployed via a service-oriented middle-
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ware, but must be installed into the underlying operating system. Stage 2 on-demand
computing requires that the solution producer must be granted full root access for con-
figuration and control of the application environment. For type 3 applications, a OS
sandboxing is required in which these rights can be granted safely, thus the solution
producers application software and the required shared libraries, third-party-software,
etc. can be installed autonomously. The sandboxing technology must protect the re-
source provider from malicious or incompetent solution producers and their users in
addition to the stage 1 requirements of inter-user/producer attack prevention.
5.4 Stage 3 On-Demand Security Challenges
The step from stage 2 to stage 3 of on-demand Grid computing sees the removal of the
trust relationship from the user and solution producer towards the resource provider.
This entails that the solution producer and user must be able to remotely check the
integrity of the remote system to ensure that the solution producer’s software has not
been modified and the data is stored securely. It should be noted here that it is impos-
sible to fully secure a remote system under foreign administrative control, since it is
always possible for the remote administrator to disconnect the system during opera-
tion and then perform any number of attacks against both soft and hardware security
protocols off-line (i.e. take out the hard disk and break the encryption). Given enough
time and resources, it is possible to break any encryption which protects the data, since
the key must be available for the application to work. Therefore, the challenge of level
3 on-demand security is to make the time and effort for the resource provider to attack
the system so prohibitive that it is no longer a relevant threat to the solution producers
and users.
5.5 Summary
There are many new challenges to be met to enable on-demand Grid computing in
light of the requirements posed by the four example applications introduced in section
2. One of the main challenges is the sandboxing of solution producers to enable the
granting of administrative rights. Another major challenge is the secure integration of
the different type of Grid applications i.e. the traditional cluster applications and the
more modern fine grained service-oriented applications. In the following chapter, the
new Grid environment developed during the course of this thesis to deal with the issues
of stage 1 and 2 on-demand Grid computing, will be introduced.
6
On-Demand Grid Security
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the new on-demand Grid and its security features are introduced. The
chapter focuses on the design issues and concepts involved in this novel Grid envi-
ronment. The implementation details, experimental results and evaluation are pre-
sented in following chapters. The novel Grid setup created in this work decouples
the components with attack vector entry points to minimise the risk of a single com-
ponent compromise and isolates users/producers from each other while at the same
time increasing the usability of the Grid. Three application sandboxing techniques
corresponding to the three application types are presented to protect users and solution
producers. Their capabilities and integration possibilities are discussed. Furthermore,
a novel stream based intrusion detection system is introduced which can deal with
the integrated monitoring of distributed Grid sites. A novel server rotation scheme is
introduced to further reduce the attack windows on the Grid middleware. Finally, a
Grid security extension to the BPEL workflow language and execution environment is
presented to enable fine-grained service-oriented workflow applications to be executed
securely.
Figure 6.1 shows this new Grid setup and the corresponding sections in which
the new security measures are introduced. First, the service and native application
sandboxing techniques are introduced in sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. Next, the network
setup is shown in section 6.5, and the rotating server protection system for the Grid
headnode is shown in section 6.6. The stream based intrusion detection system is
introduced in section 6.7. A trust infrastructure is presented in section 6.8, and finally,
a secure workflow environment is presented in section 6.9.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [165, 55, 163, 54, 53, 164, 151, 149,
78, 65, 32, 157, 158, 129, 160, 159].
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Figure 6.1: Visual Section Overview
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6.2 Type 1 Application Security
Parts of this section have been published in [160, 163].
6.2.1 An Approach to Intra-Engine Service Security
Based on the threat analysis, the following intra-engine service security requirements
are proposed: A service must be able to be deployed into a private sandbox if it does
not want its classes to be accessed by other services. Services wishing to form a group
in which classes can be shared require a secure grouping mechanism which allows
all services within the group to share classes, however services outside of the group
are denied access. Both mechanisms must function in an on-demand fashion, i.e., the
normal operation of the Grid node must not be disrupted. Services already running on
the system must be unaffected by the introduction of new services and new security
groups.
In GT4, the intra-engine service attacks described previously are made possible by
the fact that GT4 loads all Grid services within the same class loader. The basic idea
of the presented solution to this problem is to use a class loader hierarchy to enable the
dynamic loading and reloading of classes to provide intra-engine service security. In
its most basic form, each Grid service is loaded within its own class loader functioning
as a sandbox, and as such its classes and resources are private and cannot be accessed
by any other service. This ensures that services using singletons cannot be hijacked by
malicious services, and foreign code cannot be inserted into the program flow. A hot
deployment service is used to deploy services on-demand, without requiring the GT4
container to be restarted. All standard service installation operations are executed by
the hot deployment service. Additionally, the hot deployment service creates a new
class loader for each deployed service which acts as a private sandbox.
6.2.2 Secure Sandbox Groups
If it is necessary that two services must be able to communicate directly using class
references to create a composed Grid service application, they must group their Class-
Loaders together using a SecureGroupClassLoader provided as part of the intra-engine
service security infrastructure. A service specifies which group it wants to join ei-
ther by passing the groupId to the hot deployment service or by setting the param-
eter <parameter name="group" value="groupId"/> in the serverdeploy
WSDD of the service. The SecureGroupClassLoader responsible for the group is a
parent ClassLoader to all service ClassLoaders in that group. It enables inter-Service
communication in two ways: First, separate communication classes are placed in the
SecureGroupClassLoader which can be accessed by all child ClassLoaders. This is the
preferred way as defined by Java to allow classes in sister ClassLoaders to communi-
cate. For instance, the interface class of an object to be used by classes in two sister
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ClassLoaders is placed with the parent so it can be accessed by both children. The im-
plementing classes are placed in both child ClassLoaders and object references can be
passed between ClassLoaders as long as only the interface defined in the parent Class-
Loader is used. This is the traditional way to allow code-based interaction between
services, but it requires that the communication classes are placed in the parent Class-
Loader. The disadvantage of this approach is that if the communication classes need to
be replaced, all child ClassLoaders must be discarded because the SecureGroupClass-
Loader must be replaced. So, even if only two services use the communication classes,
all services must be undeployed to update the communication classes. To avoid this
problem, the SecureGroupClassLoader is capable of emulating a flat namespace for
its child ClassLoaders while still allowing hot deployment and hot undeployment of
component parts of the composed web service application.
When a service ClassLoader joins the SecureGroupClassLoader, the SecureGroup-
ClassLoader checks which classes the service ClassLoader is capable of loading and
stores that information internally. If a different service within the same group tries to
load one of those classes, its own ClassLoader will not be able to find the class and
thus asks its parent, the SecureGroupClassLoader. The SecureGroupClassLoader then
checks whether one of the other service ClassLoaders can load the requested class and
passes the request on to that ClassLoader before passing the request on to its parent
ClassLoader, the WebAppClassLoader. This, of course, only works if each class is
only defined once within all ClassLoaders in the same group. If different versions of
one and the same class can be accessed from the same ClassLoader, TargetInvocation
and ClassCastExceptions would be the result. To prevent this run time exception, ser-
vices can be denied entry to the group if they redefine existing classes. However, this
ClassLoading mechanism was designed to allow tightly coupled web services to be
composed into a web application, so it is very unlikely and undesirable that the same
class will be defined in two different places, since the idea of tight integration was to
be able to reuse the classes of the other services. In the case of such class duplication,
the less tightly coupled composition via service calls is the preferred way of linking
different web services, and the grouping function should not be used.
Figure 6.2 shows a snapshot of the a ClassLoader hierarchy in the system, after
four different Grid services have been instantiated in two separate security groups.
Services A through C are deployed in the same group and thus can access each others’
class definitions. Service D is deployed in its own group and thus is protected from
direct code access by any of the other services deployed on this node.
6.2.3 Undeployment of Grouped Services
Undeployment of services is more complex if the service to be undeployed is in a
group, since classes from services loaded in different ClassLoaders can have refer-
ences to each other. To prevent these classes from being undeployed and crashing the
system when one of the other services tries to access undeployed classes, the Secure-
GroupClassLoader stores the information which service ClassLoaders have interacted
CHAPTER 6. ON-DEMAND GRID SECURITY 99
with each other and denies undeployment requests to these services unless all service
ClassLoaders which are coupled to it are undeployed at the same time. Services loaded
in the same group but which have not accessed classes of the services to be undeployed
remain unaffected by this process. This is a clear benefit compared to the standard ap-
proach of placing the communication classes in the parent ClassLoader.
As an example, Figure 6.3 shows four Grid services which are joined into a group
by one SecureGroupClassLoader. Service A defines classes U and V where U uses W
which is defined by service B. Service C defines classes X and Y and service D defines
class Z. Class Y uses Z and Z uses X. That means, service B cannot be undeployed
while A is alive, and services C and D can only be undeployed together.
6.2.4 Group Access
To be able to securely group different service ClassLoaders together, access control
to the grouping function is required. In the current implementation, when a group is
created, it has one owner who gets an asymmetric key pair to enable access control to
the group. The private key is used by the group owner to sign Grid service Archives
(GARs) which are to be admitted to the group. The public key is used to identify
the group and to check whether the GARs submitted for deployment are permitted to
join the group in question. When the deploy method in the HotDeploymentService is
called, the HotDeploymentService checks wether the GAR submitted for deployment
Figure 6.2: Hierarchy of the ClassLoader Instances
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Figure 6.3: ClassLoader Group Interaction
was signed by the private key using the public key for that group. If the GAR was
signed correctly, the deployment process is allowed, and the service ClassLoader is
added to the SecureGroupClassLoader of that group; if not, the deployment process is
aborted and no changes to the Grid environment are made.
6.2.5 Secure Class Loading Results
The security mechanisms presented in this section allow services or groups of services
to be deployed into a private sandboxes to protect both the actual service code as
well as the data contained in the services. Other users able to deploy services are no
longer able to deploy classes into other service’s class space, access methods from
other services or even see that other classes exits. Services wishing to form a group
in which classes can be shared can use a secure grouping mechanism which allows all
services within the group to share classes but services outside of the group are denied
access. Both mechanisms function without disrupting the normal operation of the Grid
node, services already running on the system are unaffected by the introduction of new
services and new security groups.
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6.3 Type 2 Application Security
Parts of this section have been published in [78].
6.3.1 Fine Grained Confinement of Native Code in Grid Services
The security mechanism presented in the previous section only works for pure Java
services. If a Grid application contains native code, the security mechanism must be
extended as shown in the following.
The most flexible way to execute native code from Java Grid services is to use
the Java Native Interface (JNI). JNI is a framework that allows Java code running in
the Java virtual machine (JVM) to call and be called by native programs and libraries
written in other languages, such as C, C++ and assembly. While the JNI framework
also lets a native method utilise Java objects in the same way that Java code uses
these objects, only the Java to native direction is relevant here. The problem when
executing native code from Java is that native code is executed with the same privileges
as the JVM and is not controlled by the Java SecurityManager. Figure 6.4 shows
the relationship and confinement area using a standard approach for interfacing with
the native code through the JNI. The native sandbox in this case is the standard user
restriction offered by the operating system.
Figure 6.4: Standard Access to Native Code through the JNI Interface.
Typically, native code is called via the JNI interface as shown in figure 6.4. A
second possibility to execute native code from Java is to use the Java runtime class
to create a new shell environment where the native code is then run. The runtime
class uses the ProcessBuilder to create a new shell. The ProcessBuilder itself uses a
statically linked JNI native create method to create the operating system shell.
As a solution to the problem of JNI call confinement, the decoupling of the process
spaces by use of an automatically generated transparent proxy intercepting all calls to
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the native implementation as shown in figure 6.5 is proposed. The native component
of the service is replaced by a generated proxy that exposes exactly the interface of
the original component. This proxy now receives all the calls to the native methods
from the JVM. Such a call is passed on to the original native implementation that is
instantiated in a different process than the JVM and managed by a process server. The
wrapped and sandboxed native process is referred to as the I-Process and is located in
the native process space. Creation of the I-Processes for the Java based Grid service
hosting environment is managed by a custom process manager.
The process server acts like the JVM to the native method implementations. It
passes a reference to an altered JNI interface implementation to the original native
code. Every reference to the JVM from the original native code is thereby intercepted
by the custom JNI interface implementation. The transparent proxy and the process
server communicate by means of standard IPC or RPC mechanisms, depending on the
security and functionality requirements.
Figure 6.5: Decoupled Process Spaces for JNI Attached Native Code
Unfortunately, the proxy approach cannot be utilised in the case of the Process-
Builder since the create method is integrated into the JVM. It is, however, possible
to offer a custom ProcessBuilder which can sandbox a newly created shell on behalf
of a service. Otherwise, the Java SecurityManager should be used to forbid the Pro-
cessBuilder to create new shells, thus restricting native code to be run via JNI.
6.3.2 Sandboxes
A number of different options for the secure execution of native code (i.e. enforcement
of access restrictions to the host operating system and isolation of processes against
each other) can be used in the architecture. A balanced decision needs to be made
between the cost (i.e. instance creation time, computational overhead, increased re-
source consumption) incurred on the original Java service hosting environment and
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the strength of security offered by the chosen method. In the following, three different
techniques for the fine grained native code isolation which can be used for type 2 Grid
applications will be discussed.
Changing the effective user ID of the I-Process provides security based on standard
file and resource access control of the operating system. While this method requires no
preparation of the sandbox and imposes virtually no performance overhead, it offers
only very limited security against exploitable weaknesses in the operating system. A
downside of this approach is the need for a pool of user accounts that I-Processes are
mapped to by the sandbox manager.
BSD Jails [100] are a way to partition a BSD environment into isolation areas.
The jail system call has been developed to explicitly counter well known techniques
to escape a similar chroot environment. The overhead created by running a process in
a jail is very low. Jailed processes are tagged to belong to a certain jail and the system
enforces security by identifying this tag for certain privileged operations, resulting in
a very small overhead for the calls monitored by the jail environment.
Systrace [136] offers even more fine grained policy enforcement over processes
running under control of systrace. It has become a very popular tool for privilege
control for a number of BSD variants. An acceptable performance overhead with a
Linux port of systrace was experienced. For a first prototypical implementation of
the system, a combination of chroot and an extended implementation of systrace is
employed as they offer the best balance between overhead and the gained level of
security. Shared objects and libraries they depend on are either copied or mapped by
hard linking into the system and can be protected by using systrace to intercept write
attempts on the libraries. The (small) memory overhead is limited to the process and
sandbox management components.
6.3.3 Process Instance Management
In 6.2, a solution to intra-engine service security confining services or groups of ser-
vices by use of a dedicated Java class loader was shown. This grouping scheme can
be transferred to the native parts of services, allowing the creation of sandboxes for
I-Processes per service (or group). The hosting provider can attach a security policy to
the service (group) that restricts resource access to the underlying operating system for
all I-Processes created by services within this group. All processes started for services
within the same service group also share the native sandbox. To be able to securely
group different services, the solution to grouping Java services already provides an
access control mechanism. A public-private-key pair is generated for a each newly
created group. This key is obtained by the group owner (i.e. the creator of the group)
who uses the private key to sign service archives containing the service implementa-
tion (GAR files for the Globus environment). If the service implementation is signed
using the correct private key, it is admitted to join the service group.
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6.3.4 Jailing Results
The proposed solution can protect the hosting environment and other services against
data attacks as well as illegal resource access. Depending on the sandbox capabilities,
it is also possible for the process manager to monitor resource utilisation and con-
strain e.g. CPU time as well as disk space or network bandwidth used by individual
sandboxes. This still allows services to perform denial of service attacks against other
service instances running in the same sandbox but leaves the option of shutting down
entire sandboxes when they show behaviour that can cause harm to the hosting envi-
ronment. A problem still remains in effective resource management in the JVM. To the
best of the author’s knowledge, no widespread solution to the problem of monitoring
and managing resource consumption of individual Java threads (belonging to a service
instance) is currently available.
The security architecture presented in this section enables the confinement of native
components of Grid applications into a secure environment. The security framework
is based on dynamically created JNI proxies which create a pipe between the secure
Java environment and the secure native environment. The security solution is capable
of protecting the hosting system as well as services from each other.
While both stage 1 and 2 on-demand security threats can be handled, protecting
the resource provider from the stage 2 threats must be done with great care. Type 2
Grid applications allow native code to be used by the Grid services, thus the middle-
ware must allow native calls to be executed. This creates the risk that the middle-
ware, which has extensive rights to cater for the different solution producers’ native
code needs, could execute malicious or erroneous code which can harm the resource
provider. However, with careful configuration of access rights for the Grid middleware,
this problem can be solved.
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6.4 Type 3 Application Security
Parts of this section have been published in [163, 65].
6.4.1 Operating System Virtualisation
One of the basic building blocks of a Grid environment is the computational cluster
encompassing a number of worker nodes on which jobs are executed. One of the
main problems is the shared use of the operating system of the worker nodes, since
the higher level of privileges needed for autonomous installation of software makes
attacking other users in the same OS very easy. A solution for sharing Grid compute
resources on a single physical machine is to use a virtualisation architecture. Besides
commercial solutions like VMware GSX Server and Microsoft Virtual PC, the Xen hy-
pervisor [19] – a free and open source virtualisation system developed at the University
of Cambridge, UK – has gained significant interest in the open source operating system
community. Xen provides independent, secure virtual machines in which a modified
Linux kernel (Xen0) executes a number of essentially unmodified operating systems
and application installations on top of it. Several of these so-called XenU instances
can run in parallel on a single physical machine, protected from each other, under the
control of a Xen0 master operating system instance that can create, suspend and ter-
minate XenU instances on-demand. The only instance gaining access to the providing
system’s hardware like peripheral devices or physical disks is Xen0 (to which only the
administrator of the system has access); CPUs, network and disk devices are virtu-
alised for XenU domains and thus controllable by the Xen0. It should be noted that
the Xen hypervisor, while offering significantly more security than a traditional shared
operating system, is of course not invulnerable. While presently there are no known
attacks against the Xen hypervisor there were some concerns about isolation failure
with Direct Memory Access (DMA) drivers. This seems to have been fixed with the
Xen 3.0 release through the introduction of isolated driver domains [133].
Since each XenU instance basically runs its own operating system instance, solu-
tion producers now can, if desirable, not only deploy an application onto a resource
providers node; they can deploy a complete operating system installation along with
all required shared libraries, third-party-software, etc. This greatly reduces compati-
bility and dependency problems when running Grid applications across multiple sites
and provides the solution producers with full root access for configuration and control
of the virtual guest OS.
The resource provider takes care of setting up the physical hardware running the
virtualisation environment. The provider installs the Xen hypervisor kernel and runs
the Xen0 (host) Linux system that is responsible for creating, controlling and destroy-
ing the XenU (virtual OS) instances. The solution producer creates a Linux image
containing his or her software and data including all third party dependencies. This
entire image is then deployed onto the resource provider’s node and started as a XenU
virtual system.
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An advantage of operating system virtualisation is that solution producers and users
can access the entire system and interact in a traditional manner outside of the Grid
middleware using some a management system like SSH. This is extremely useful for
large scale legacy applications which need to be ported into the Grid slowly, allowing
solution producers and users direct access to those parts of the application which have
not yet been fully wrapped by Grid services. Through the virtualisation of the en-
tire operating system, the solution producers and users can operate freely within their
sandbox without endangering the confidentially of other solution producers’ software
and data.
Using operating system sandboxing techniques is a convenient way of protecting
large legacy applications of a solution producer from attacks by other solution produc-
ers on a single physical resource.
Using a virtualisation solution shifts many configuration and administration tasks
from the resource provider to the solution producer. In many cases this can prove to be
a win-win-situation. On the one hand, administrators now only have to provide systems
running Xen with the Xen0 controlling the user images and network connectivity. This
allows resource providers to protect their resources while at the same time reducing
the management burden. Solution producers, on the other hand, can now provide a
complete system in which they have administrative privileges.
6.4.2 Deployment
The first step a solution producer has to perform is to analyse the requirements of
his or her Grid application, which may range from third-party libraries (e.g., for high
precision math) over runtime environments (e.g., a Java virtual machine in a specific
version) up to complex third-party applications (e.g., MatLab or Mathematica). To
this end, a virtualisation based software installation service is introduced which offers
exactly that. A user receives a private virtual environment which looks and behaves
exactly like a worker node of the Grid to be used. The user has root access and can
install software in the same way as software is installed on a local machine. To provide
this functionality an Image Creation Station (ICS) was designed.
The ICS consists of two parts: a front end and a back end. The front is a website
which allows the user to define some basic parameters for the virtual machine. The
website is accessed in a secure manner using the X.509 user certificate. The identity
of the X.509 certificate is also used imprint the created virtual machine to the user.
The configuration options a user has include: how big the virtual machine’s disk im-
age should be, which format the hard-disk-images should have (sparse or full images),
which Linux distribution should be used (Debian oldstable, stable or Ubuntu are cur-
rent options) and what name should be used to identify the image (a user can have
several images at the same time).
Once the user has selected the required options, an image can be created and then
booted. To create the basic image, the ICS back end uses the xen-tools scripts and con-
figures the network setting to match the corresponding Grid sites requirements. Once
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the image is finished, it is booted using a dynamic IP address. Since this takes several
minutes, a notification email is sent containing the dynamically chosen location of the
image and the login information. The ICS accepts a PGP public key with which the
email can be protected. If a Globus installation is added to the worker nodes, the same
X.509 certificate used for the ICS website can be used to log onto the image. Alterna-
tively, a SSH public key can be passed to the ICS during the image creation process,
and the ICS will configure the image to accept SSH login authentication for the corre-
sponding private key. Once the user is logged in, software can be installed with root
privileges the traditional way, which greatly eases the installation process compared
to the traditional Grid installation techniques. A user can make any modifications to
the operating system configuration and install any required shared libraries and third-
party-software. This also paves the way for more fine grained service-oriented applica-
tions, since a service hosting environment can be installed on the worker nodes without
endangering other users. The network issues created by this approach are discussed in
the next section. Figure 6.6 shows the ICS and the interactive shell of the user image.
Figure 6.6: Image Creation Station
A user can create several (different) images giving each image a separate name.
The ICS deploys the images to the cluster and provides the image-to-user-mapping
which is later used by the scheduling engine to select the correct virtual machine.
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6.4.3 Custom Firewalling
The virtualisation solution presented above secures both software and data from being
access directly by unauthorised users, but the network and thus the connected resources
are fully accessible to a Grid user if no firewalling technology is used. Since users
can install software with root privileges it is easy to install packet sniffing tools to
monitor network traffic. It is also possible to probe for remote vulnerabilities in other
users’ images to gain access illegally. Thus, it is desirable to prevent network access
between images of different users. It is also desirable to allow different users to have
different network settings concerning the Internet. Traditional Grid applications do
not require Internet access, however some commercial applications must contact a
licensing server (e.g. FlexLM) to run and thus must at least be able to make outgoing
connections. Fully service-oriented applications or interactive applications might even
need to be reachable from the Internet and thus require incoming connections to be
possible. System wide firewall configuration would either restrict applications with
high connectivity requirements or unnecessarily endanger applications which normally
operate in a private network.
Since users already have their own operating system, the presented approach adds
to this a user based firewalling approach located in the Xen0 controlling the user image
to facilitate the different requirements. The extent a user is allowed to open or close
ports for his or her image is specified by the administrator of the site either on a per
user and/or a per virtual organisation (VO) basis. The basic idea of the proposal is to
automatically generate a dynamic firewall rule set per user based on the user’s level of
trust as a member of a VO. To simplify firewall setup, several presets for different trust
levels exit on which custom rule sets can be based.
To satisfy the network communication needs of all valid Grid users, several lev-
els of trust between full trust and no trust are defined. Based on the trust level, the
generated firewall rule set is more or less strict. There are two categories of trust.
Firstly, inter-user trust which mainly controls access between the cluster nodes which
is defined by the VO itself, and secondly, provider-trust which mainly controls in and
outbound communication between the cluster and the Internet which is defined by the
administrator based on his or her level of trust in the VO. There are three basic levels
of trust in each category that can be extended with a variety of rules satisfying special
needs.
Inter-user trust levels:
• Open: This level allows free access between all the nodes of a number of VOs
(i.e. all D-Grid VOs). Members of the VOs are allowed to connect to all other
compute nodes of the VOs in their group. This level of trust is good for open
research communities which want to collaborate with other communities.
• Restricted: This level allows free access between all the nodes of a single VO.
Members of the VO are allowed to connect to all other compute nodes of their
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VO. This level of trust is the typical choice for non-commercial communities
with a trusted user base.
• Closed: Users of a VO with this level of inter-user trust can only reach and
login to their own compute nodes. Login to other machines contained in their
VO is forbidden. This level of trust is useful for commercial communities with
competing users share the same resources without mutual trust (i.e. the InGrid
VO).
Provider trust levels:
• Open: This level allows free access between all the nodes of a VO and the
Internet. Members of the VOs are allowed to connect to free chooseable port
and IP addresses.
• Restricted: This level allows restricted access between all the nodes of a VO and
the Internet. Members of the VOs are allowed to connect to certain predefined
port and IP addresses ranges defined by the administrator. This can be used for
instance to block unsafe ports like the telnet port, or to restrict connection to
certain Grid sites.
• Closed: This level does not allow access between the nodes of a VO and the
Internet. This is currently the most common setting for the Grid.
This hierarchy allows a quick classification of users, distributing the decision to the
relevant authorities without endangering the rest of the Grid. If a user’s membership
in a VO changes, the level of trust also changes. A schematic overview is shown in
figure 6.7.
These presets work well for a quick configuration based on VOs. However par-
ticularly if an industrial adoption of Grid computing is to occur, more fine grained
configuration is needed to accommodate legacy applications and usage scenarios. For
this purpose, user based extensions to the presets are introduced.
An extension is a set of additional rules which extends the standard VO template
to satisfy special user needs. Extensions affect the border firewall of the resource
provider. A newly opened port could be a possible security hole for intruders, but only
the user’s own VM can be reached from the outside network. If a user decides to open
a port, (s)he also accepts the entailed risks.
Extensions do not decrease the network security level for other users. All ports
which could be opened by users and their respective protocols are tagged with a special
bitmask. The bitmask ensures that only certain ports can be opened. For example, it
can be configured that all users can open a secure shell connection (SSH) to an external
machine but only selected users with a high level of trust can open the standard FTP
port.
All extensions are connected to the IP addresses of the virtual machines of the user
dynamically. Thus, if a user requests an open port to reach an outside resource, only
(s)he can connect to it. Connections to or from other users’ VMs are denied.
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Figure 6.7: Levels of Trust Overview
To add, change or remove extensions, a Grid service running on the Globus head-
node is provided. All security features of the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) apply,
so it is safe to assume that a user can only operate on his/her own extensions. An
exception in form of an alert is thrown if a user enters an invalid extension. All valid
extensions will be transferred into a firewall database which is used by the cluster
scheduling engine.
6.4.4 Virtualisation Results
Xen virtualisation based systems address the challenges for on-demand security as
follows:
Authorisation is basically similar to traditional cluster and Grid systems. Since the
resources that are accessed are very generic (CPU time, main memory and disk space),
deployed applications have the illusion of running on a system of their own. The in-
teraction patterns with the security-relevant part of the complete system – the Xen
hypervisor itself and the controlling Xen0 domain – are well-defined; Xen’s sandbox-
ing takes care of restricting consumed CPU time and disk space of a XenU instance,
a firewall or packet filter installed in the Xen0 domain can, in addition, constrain net-
work connectivity. Thus, a compromised password or certificate used to gain access
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to a providers’ system will in the worst case result in wasted CPU cycles. Data and
application from other users are protected since they live in completely separate XenU
domains; the provider is safe from attacks coming from the compromised domain
since he or she can always restrict or destroy the offending instance while keeping full
control over the system’s hardware and resource allocation.
Auditing in a Xen-based system can be done on the Xen0, since every bit of infor-
mation going into and leaving a XenU domain (be it network or disk transfers) has to
pass through the Xen hypervisor, where it can be recorded. However, interpreting the
audit trails generated by Xen can be more difficult compared to standard Unix auditing
methods, since the information available to the Xen0 is on a lower abstraction level:
Xen can only record network packet data received and sent and disk device read/write
operations, whereas auditing on kernel level automatically can extract corresponding
file names or network protocol information related to a process. However, a solution
producers can of course install own auditing solutions in their private images. This is
an advantage especially in the case where a solution producers has images running on
resources from different resource providers but requires a single auditing solution for
all images.
Confidentiality is improved in Xen-based systems compared to traditional Unix
systems on which several users have simultaneous access to the system. The Xen
sandboxing ensures that (unless the solution producer decides otherwise) the OS in-
stalled in each XenU instance is exclusively used by one customer, who in turn has
exclusive access to all files in the corresponding virtual disk image. This principle also
ensures that different solution producers are protected from each other and also that
customers are protected from solution producers that are used by other customers.
Since the XenU sandboxes use an administrator-provided Linux kernel image,
users effectively have no access to the controlling Xen0 instance or other users’ XenU
instances, thus protecting the provider from malicious users. This constellation, how-
ever, does not protect users from the provider, since the user has control over the data
processing that takes place in the kernel. Since all information has to pass through the
kernel, even the use of encrypted filesystems does not suffice, since keys can always
be read out from the XenU address space by the provider. However, finding keys in
the memory space used by applications to encrypt files takes significant effort, so a
file-level encryption used by applications could increase the obstacles the provider has
to overcome to access users’ application data.
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6.5 New Grid Network Setup
6.5.1 Introduction
The introduction of a large number of unknown Grid users to the local cluster envi-
ronment is not welcomed by cluster administrators or by existing cluster users. While
standard operating system user protection schemes are in place, the idea of running
unknown code and letting unknown users work on the local system is not acceptable.
To deal with this concern, the previous section introduced a Xen [19] based virtual ex-
ecution environment into which Grid users are placed so they cannot harm other users.
Using an Image Creation Station (ICS), Grid users create a Xen image in which they
can interactively install their software. This image is then deployed onto the cluster.
This counters the concerns of the cluster administrator and the cluster users where the
Grid users are concerned, since all Grid users are constrained to their virtual machine
and do not have access to the rest of the system.
However, a further concern of the cluster administrator and the cluster users is
the introduction of relatively young and uncertified Grid middleware into the existing
secure local cluster setup. The standard Grid setup of Globus, gLite and Unicore calls
for the Grid headnode and the cluster headnode to be on the same physical machine
or at least in the same network. This endangers the local cluster and its users, since
a remote exploit of the Grid middleware allows an attacker to also compromise the
cluster network. Furthermore, the Grid headnode must be reachable from the Internet,
exposing the cluster to external attacks, which in a purely local setup would not be
possible.
To combat this threat, a Grid enabled dual laned Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) is
proposed which separates the Grid headnode and the cluster network. However, the
creation of a Grid DMZ creates a number of new problems which must be dealt with.
Previously, the Grid headnode was responsible for the distribution of job data via direct
access to the cluster scheduler. Due to the newly introduced network separation, this
approach is no longer possible, since an open connection from the Grid headnode into
the cluster network would also open a route for attackers. Furthermore, this separation
of the Grid headnode from the cluster creates some security concerns for the Grid
users, since the GSI protection ends with the Grid headnode. This leads to the second
problem area which is discussed in the next subsection.
Parts of this section have been published in [149].
6.5.2 Threats Due to the Demilitarised Zone
Due to the introduction of a DMZ, the Globus Security Infrastructure (GSI) [72] is no
longer sufficient to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of user data. In a standard
setup, GSI is responsible for the integrity of the data, but the assumption is that the
Grid headnode has full access to the cluster. Data encrypted with the GSI is decrypted
by the Grid headnode - now in the DMZ - which potentially is compromised. As a
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consequence, GSI-secured job data stored on the Globus headnode inside the DMZ is
not safe. This is unacceptable especially for industrial adoption. Customers wanting
to access external Grid cluster resources need to know that their software and data
is protected not only during transmission but also during computation on the cluster
resources. To this end, an extension of GSI is proposed which cryptographically links
the Grid client, through the DMZ and the cluster scheduler, to the virtual execution
hosts introduced in the previous section to enable end-to-end cryptographic protection
of data.
From the discussion above, the following requirements can be derived:
1. To protect existing cluster systems, a separation of the Grid/cluster network into
two isolated networks is needed.
2. To protect Grid user data, GSI encryption must be extended to encompass both
the Grid and the cluster network.
3. Grid user data must never be stored in unencrypted form in the DMZ, and the
Grid middleware must not be able to decrypt the data, since the Grid middleware
is in the DMZ and thus is potentially compromised.
4. To protect the Grid middleware in the DMZ, standard Network Intrusion Sys-
tems need to be extended by Grid specific signatures.
An important aspect is that the security countermeasures do not add complexity for
the end users, since Grids tend to be too complex even without security. All security
extensions should therefore be transparent and easy to use.
In this section, an end-to-end security solution is presented, which fulfills the stated
requirements. The approach is divided into several parts:
6.5.3 Demilitarised Zone
To prevent external intruders from accessing the cluster hardware by exploiting weak-
nesses in the Grid middleware, the Grid/cluster subnet is divided into two separate
subnets, the border network and the cluster network. The DMZ guards both networks
with a firewall configured to the specific needs of the network in question. The border
firewall filters connections from the Internet and denies unwanted connections to all
machines within the DMZ. However, since Grid middlewares require a large number of
open ports to function correctly and efficiently, and a large number of fluctuating users
need to access the Grid, the border firewall is relatively open. The Grid headnode is
located in the DMZ. The inner firewall guards the cluster network and prevents direct
connections to the cluster subnet. To protect the cluster network, the inner firewall is
very strict and only allows a single specially designed cluster connector to pass through
and does not allow any interactive sessions to pass to the cluster headnode. The cluster
resides in the cluster network and consists of a cluster headnode and a set of virtual
worker nodes. An architectural overview is presented in figure 6.8.
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Figure 6.8: Architectural Overview
As mentioned in the previous section, if a user wants to submit a new job, (s)he
has to create a Xen image using the ICS. Since the ICS must also allow users to log
on from the Internet, it is located inside a part of the DMZ. Based on the X.509 Grid
identity, the user can log on to an individually created image and install all required
software. The user only gets to log on to his/her own XenU user image and thus cannot
compromise other images in the DMZ. To prevent an attacker from compromising the
Grid headnode and then from there compromising the ICS, a dual laned DMZ approach
is employed which restricts access to either the Grid headnode lane or the ICS lane.
Thus, if one lane is compromised, the other lane remains unaffected.
6.5.4 End-to-End Encryption
Since jobs are no longer executed in the same network realm as the Grid headnode, a
new encryption scheme is required. When a user submits a job, the client software (e.g.
the Gridsphere portal [182]) generates a 48-byte session key which is encrypted with
the public key of the XGE. This session key is used to encrypt both the job data and
later the result data. Both the job and the encrypted session key can now be transfered
through the insecure DMZ. Due to its location in the DMZ, the Grid headnode is
considered unsafe, so the job data remains encrypted and the corresponding keys are
not available outside of the secure network environment.
6.5.5 Job Submission, Transfer and Execution
Since direct communication between the Grid headnode and the cluster scheduler is
no longer possible, a new mechanism is required to transfer and execute a Grid job. A
CHAPTER 6. ON-DEMAND GRID SECURITY 115
newly developed software called Fence deals with the task of transferring job data to
the cluster headnode. During the development, two important issues had to dealt with:
Integration into the existing infrastructure (in this case Globus Toolkit 4 and Sun Grid
Engine) had to be easy and the software should meet certain security criteria. Due to
this, Fence was split into two parts: One part is a Job Manager and thus responsible
for the communication with the Globus Toolkit. The other part is a set of daemons
running on the two headnodes which are responsible for job data transfers. In detail,
Fence consists of the following components:
• Job Manager: The job manager is tightly integrated into the Globus Toolkit. One
component is a Scheduler Event Generator (SEG). The other one hands over a
new job to the scheduler.
• DMZ Head Node Client (dhnc): The dhnc provides the communication between
the Globus headnode and the Cluster headnode.
• Cluster Head Node Daemon (chnd): The chnd represents the interface between
the services on the Globus headnode and the XGE on the cluster headnode. Due
to its location, the chnd is a security critical component.
• DMZ Head Node Daemon (dhnd): The dhnd is the second service on the Globus
headnode. It is a background task, serving requests from the chnd.
To use the developed Job Manager, a new job must use a specific factory type. In
the last stage of processing, Globus hands over the job to the Job Manager. The Job
Manager extracts all relevant facts from the job description, stores the encrypted job
data locally and hands over the job to the next component. The dhnc sends a message to
the Cluster headnode. The message only contains the ID of the new job. On the cluster
headnode, the chnd receives the message and, if the job is to be accepted, initiates
a connection back to the Globus headnode. This technique requires only one port
to be opened (for the notification message) in the incoming direction on the internal
firewall. All following connections are initiated from within the cluster network. The
counterpart of the chnd is the dhnd. These two components exchange the job data over
the established connection. After successful transmission, the connection is closed.
The XGE executes jobs not in a native but in a virtualised environment, namely the
user specific Xen-Image created in the ICS.
A job submission with full encryption is divided into several steps. The steps are
shown in Figure 6.9 and explained in the following:
1. The user creates a fully customised Xen-Image using the ICS. This image rep-
resents the base for the upcoming computation.
2. The image is transfered to the cluster headnode. The connection is initialised
from the cluster network. This ensures maximum security, because no open
incoming port towards the cluster network needs to be open.
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Figure 6.9: Steps Required for End-to-End Encryption
3. The client generates a session key and encrypts the session key with the XGE
public key. It then archives and encrypts the job data with the session key and
creates a customised RSL file. The RSL file contains the name of the archive
and the encrypted session key.
4. The job data is copied to the Globus headnode via GridFTP.
5. A Globus GRAM call with the RSL file is launched.
6. Globus hands over the job to Fence, which transfers the new job to the Cluster
headnode.
7. The XGE parses the job description, decrypts the session key and decrypts the
data.
8. The XGE schedules the images created in step 1.
9. The job is executed.
10. The results are copied back to the XGE.
11. The results get encrypted with the session key.
12. The results are copied back to the Globus headnode.
13. The user fetches the results with GridFTP.
14. The user decrypts the results.
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6.5.6 Demilitarised Zone Results
The Grid demilitarised zone helps to protect the cluster from vulnerabilities in the Grid
middleware by reducing the path an attacker can take from the Grid middleware to the
cluster from direct access to a single remote port connected to a single small compo-
nent the dnhc. While this makes attacks against the cluster and the virtual execution
hosts much harder, a compromise of the Grid middleware is still critical issue, since
all Job information can be accessed and controlled on the Grid headnode. The next
section deals with a proactive intrusion tolerance system to protect the Grid headnode
in the DMZ.
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6.6 Rotating Servers
6.6.1 Introduction
The Grid headnode is a central component in the Grid environment and is the entry
point for all external attacks and a fair number of internal attacks, as shown in section
4.6 and Figure 4.8. The following section will mainly deal with external resource and
meta-data attacks on the resource provider by hindering the attacker from getting a
foothold on the Grid headnode (Figure 4.8 1.1). Removing the foothold also signifi-
cantly hampers external attacks against the users (Figure 4.8 1.2). Some data attacks
against the resource provider will also be discussed.
The difficulty in securing computer systems in general stems in large part from the
increasing complexity of the systems today and the constant innovation and morphing
of attack techniques. Despite intense research on computer and network security, crit-
ical information processing systems remain vulnerable to attacks [134]. Due to this
fact, the research area of Intrusion Tolerant Systems (ITS) [49] aims to cope with the
inevitable attacks and to create systems which, to a certain extent, can continue oper-
ating even though they are being attacked. Traditionally, this is done by implementing
the following steps: self-diagnosis, repair, and reconstitution. The main drawback of
this approach is that self-diagnosis requires an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to
raise an alarm. This works well for known or obvious attacks (like Distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attacks) but fails to cope with unknown and stealth attacks. A
stealth attack is an attack which does not affect the regular function of the attacked
system and as such might not be noticed, e.g. stealing a copy of /etc/shadow from
a web-server might not be noticed while defacing the front page of the same server or
even crashing the system would definitely draw attention to the attack. Furthermore,
many ITS work by using redundancy to replace compromised resources with backups.
This creates problems with maintaining the state of the compromised resources, re-
sulting in the fact that many ITS only deal with stateless resources, such as static web
servers.
In this section, a new intrusion tolerance system is presented which improves the
security of stateful WSRF Grid servers against stealth attacks. The system is based on
a novel server rotation strategy utilising paravirtualisation to close attack windows for
stateful service-oriented Grid headnode servers. The presented approach does not re-
quire complex attack detection procedures or heterogeneous redundancy mechanisms.
A flexible plugin based rotation manager deals with the complex issue of managing
stateful connections to the Grid server, and a database connector is utilised to detach
service state from the rotating functional components of the Grid server.
Parts of this section have been published in [165].
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6.6.2 Self-Cleansing Grid Servers
This section presents the proposed architecture for an intrusion tolerant Grid server
using virtualisation technology to enable self-cleansing of the entire guest operating
system. Targeted stealth attacks are becoming a serious concern with CEOs and other
key personnel being targeted specifically. Coupled with the complexity of Grid sys-
tems the author believes that undetected Grid server compromises will occur no matter
which security precautions are taken. Thus, the main design goal of this section is
to periodically refresh the Grid server from a clean read only image every couple of
minutes, thus removing any attack code from the Grid system, if it was detected or not.
This periodic refresh significantly reduces the window of opportunity to damage the
system. The basic approach is simple: a read only image of the Grid headnode is cre-
ated and booted on two systems. At any given time, only one of the Grid headnodes is
connected to the Internet and the cluster. Periodically, the active headnode is shutdown
and the passive headnode takes the active role. The shutdown node then immediately
restarts from the read only image and takes the passive role. This procedure is repeated
indefinitely.
One of the main problems which needs to be solved is state management. Each
time the active node is shutdown, the running state of all software is lost and all open
connections are terminated. In a traditional Grid, the headnode runs both the Grid
middleware and the cluster scheduling software and as such must keep the state of a
number of vital Grid services (i.e. WS-GRAM, GSI-SSH Grid-FTP), the scheduling
software (i.e. Torque, SGE), current file transfers (i.e. Grid-FTP, SCP) and critically
it must also handle the state of interactive sessions. Simply shutting down and restart-
ing this sort of system every couple of minutes would lead to an enormous number
of errors. No job data which takes more than couple of minutes to upload could be
transferred to the Grid, unscheduled jobs would be lost and scheduled jobs would be-
come orphans. The Grid would be completely inoperable. To solve this problem, it is
necessary to separate the issues into manageable parts.
The new Grid setup introduced in the previous sections is a vital prerequisite for
the protection mechanism for the Grid headnode since the new setup significantly re-
duces capabilities of the Grid headnode and thus reduces the complexity of the Grid
headnode. The use of private virtual machines enables job data to be pulled directly
onto the worker nodes, avoiding the danger of Grid headnode compromises to the
data transfer. This leaves the external attacks (1.x). Two firewalls separate the Grid
headnode from the Internet and the back-end cluster. This minimises the threat posed
by external attackers, however, since a number of ports must be open to allow the Grid
to function, it still remains possible for an attacker to compromise the Grid headnode
(1.1) and from there to attack the cluster (1.2). Once on the physical cluster, the at-
tacker can then compromise the virtual execution environment of the users (1.3). Since
job data can be pulled by the worker nodes directly, no GridFTP or SCP connection
will pass through the headnode. Since the cluster scheduler now runs on a separate ma-
chine, its state does not need to be dealt with. If the user requires an interactive login
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to his or her worker nodes, a direct login can be enabled, so no interactive sessions are
routed via the headnode. This direct access to the worker nodes is enabled by the novel
firewalling solution presented in section 6.4.3. It should be noted that if this feature
is enabled, this opens up a new attack possibility since an attacker can now directly
contact the worker nodes. The risk however, can be considered minimal since access
to the images is protected by certificate based SSH or GSIssh. An attacker would have
to successfully break a RSA certificate or a X.509 certificate protected login in a single
user environment. The only thing left to deal with is the state of the actual Grid server
with its services.
6.6.3 Managing State
With traditional of the shelf servers like IIS or Apache, state is dealt with in several
ways. State is kept in files, databases and in-memory in any number of combinations,
making it very difficult to save the entire state of a product. However, the adoption
of the service-oriented computing paradigm, in particular the Web service Resource
Framework (WSRF), in Grid computing has opened up an interesting opportunity to
cleanly deal with the state of a Grid server. The WSRF introduces the notion of a Web
service Resource (WS-Resource) that is formed by the combination of a Resource
Document and a corresponding web service. It is the purpose of the Resource Doc-
ument to capture state information for a WS-Resource while the corresponding web
service implementation remains stateless. In this way, a multitude of WS-Resources
can be created using one stateless web service implementation while capturing the
state of execution in multiple Resource Documents. The WSRF further defines web
service interfaces to inspect and alter the information contained within the Resource
Document and to receive and subscribe for notifications about property changes of a
WS-Resource. This new paradigm allows the neat separation of the state of a server
from the functional aspects of the server.
Figure 6.10 shows the architecture for state separation. Two redundant virtual op-
erating systems are utilised to host the Grid services (Service Hosts) and one virtual
operating system to host a database for the Resource Documents (Storage Host). The
Service Host contains the full Grid middleware with all the associated security vul-
nerabilities. The Storage Host is a minimal Linux system with the database being
the only application service available to the two Service Hosts. The Globus toolkit
already provides functionality to create and manage persistent Grid services locally.
These persistence capabilities are simply extended to store the Resource Documents
on the remote Storage Host. The stateless service (i.e. the WS-GRAM service) uses
the ResourceHome to create the remote DataBaseResource object. This resource ob-
ject stores its state in the remote database. Concurrency issues do not have to dealt
with, since at any given time only one of the service hosts will have write access to the
state document.
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Figure 6.10: State Management
6.6.4 Rotation Strategy
Since the Service Hosts contain the Grid middleware and the associated risks, it is this
system that needs to be protected. This is done by periodically rotating a fresh Ser-
vice Host into active duty. The virtualisation setup described above allows continuous
restarting of the Service Hosts without losing the state of the Grid services.
Figure 6.11 shows the architecture of the rotating server setup: (1) is the data con-
nection between the Service Hosts (X,Y) and the Storage Host (S). The connection
uses the private virtual network interfaces vif(n).1, vif(m).1 and vif1.0 which are not
routed outside of the Xen0 domain. Utilising IP Conntrack, all incoming connections
on the physical network interface eth0 of the Xen0 are monitored (2)1, since rotation
must not take place while an active TCP/IP connection is in progress. The Rotation
1Usually there are two physical network interfaces on a Grid headnode, one for connections to
the Internet and one for connections to the cluster. For the sake of clarity, only one is shown. The
mechanism for the second interface is analog to the first
122 6.6. ROTATING SERVERS
Figure 6.11: Self-Cleansing Grid Servers
Manager is responsible for monitoring the current connections (3), refreshing the Ser-
vice Hosts and setting the dynamic routing rules to connect and disconnect the virtual
machines (4), thus creating the desired self-cleansing rotation mechanism (5).
Figure 6.12 shows the algorithm implemented by the rotation manager. First, the
Storage Host is started and a private network connection is set up. A copy from a read
only base image is made for Service Host X, and Service Host X is started. On the first
pass, the Service Host X then loads the state for all relevant services, and the Xen0
sets a network route to Service Host X. Once Service Host X is active, a copy of the
read only base image is made for Service Host Y, and Service Host Y is started. Also,
a timer is started for the Rotation Manager. At the end of the time slice, the algorithm
enters a critical part2 and the Xen0 stops accepting new connections. Then, Service
Host Y starts loading the service state from the Storage Host, and concurrently the
Rotation Manager checks if it is safe to rotate. If there are still active connections,
2This part of the algorithm is critical, since no new connections are accepted and thus the Grid
headnode is not reachable. This issue will be dealt with in the implementation section.
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Figure 6.12: State Preserving Rotation Algorithm
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the rotation is delayed and new connections are allowed again for a given time slice.
If it is safe to rotate, and Service Host Y has loaded its state, the Xen0 removes the
old network route to Service Host X and sets a new route to Service Host Y. The
critical part ends with the Xen0 allowing new connections again. The same procedure
is repeated for Service Host Y. For the sake of clarity, the critical part for Service Host
Y is not shown in the Figure. The critical part starts when the Xen0 stops accepting
connections and ends when connections are accepted again. The concurrent loading
of state and checking for rotation safeness is not a problem, since due to the new Grid
setup the Globus services only change their state through external triggers (from users
or the cluster), thus if no external connections are present, then both the rotation and
the state are safe. If there are external connections, the algorithm terminates the current
rotation. The rotation safeness checks are an important aspect of the system and are
presented with in the following section.
6.6.5 Guardian Plugins
Since the system must be capable of dealing with TCP/IP connections and TCP/IP
connections are stateful, a mechanism is needed to prevent rotation while there is an
active connection. Using the proposed new Grid architecture, this is not a significant
problem, since the long lasting connections (i.e. for job or result data transmission)
are no longer routed via the headnode but go directly to the users’ own private worker
nodes. This only leaves the command and control messages (i.e. WS-Gram or Virtual
Workspace calls) to be dealt with. In the authors experience, these calls usually do
not last longer than a few minutes, and there are ample gaps between connections
in which rotation can take place. Since the communication patterns and the desired
responses to failed rotations differ from site to site, the Rotation Manager uses a plugin
mechanism to decide whether to rotate or not. This allows the manager of a Grid
site to adapt the rotation mechanisms to his or her needs with minimal effort. These
Guardian Plugins have access to the IP Conntrack information and can thus monitor
the current connections. They are called by the Rotation Manager when the rotation
time slice has ended and must then decide whether to rotate or not. If there are no
current connections, rotation is granted. If there are TCP/IP connections, it is up to the
specific plugin to decide what to do. This depends greatly on the site policy. A usual
approach is to delay the rotation for a short while and try again. The amount of time
and the number of delays is dependent on the site’s policy and should be chosen with
care, since every delayed rotation increases the length of the attack window. Factors
currently used to decide whether to rotate or not are: source IP, source port, duration
of connection, number of rotations delayed due to source IP. The goal of the Guardian
Plugins is to delay rotation if legitimate connections are present, while not falling prey
to halting rotation because of the presence of malicious connections. One easy way of
doing this is to simply rotate even if there is an active connection. This is the safest
course of action from the server perspective but relies on error recovery mechanisms
on the client side. However, detecting malicious activity in this scenario is relatively
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simple. The Grid communication pattern usually has one or two connections from a
user to start a job, and several days later one connection at the end of the job. Even
with a large number of users, the length of the Grid jobs provide ample time to rotate.
During the test runs with real world applications from a German national Grid (D-Grid)
community project, the plugin did not have to delay a single rotation. An attacker in a
normal scenario can easily mask his or her attack connection in the background noise
of the Grid, since the attack only has to be launched once. With the system in place,
the attacker would have to keep a permanent or a number of alternating connections
open to prevent rotation. Every rotation which is prevented sends an alert to the site
administrator and thus any attack, no matter how stealthy it is, can easily be detected.
6.6.6 Rotating Server Attacks
The novel rotating server approach presented in this section preserves all relevant state
for normal operation of the Grid, however, all other state stored on the Service Hosts
is lost. Thus, any attack code is lost and any interactive attacks are terminated. If
the system was crashed by an attacker, it is automatically rejuvenated. Stealth attacks
against the resources are no longer possible, since all attacks must keep a permanent
connection open to prevent rotation and thus are easily detected and countered. The
only attack still possible is a data injection attack against the storage database. An
attacker who fully compromises one of the Service Hosts can insert bogus entries or
remove valid entries from the database concerning the state of running Grid services
by masquerading as the Grid service. It should be noted that this does not affect job
data, result data or login information. The user’s data is secure in its own virtual envi-
ronment. The data attacks possible here are some of the meta-data attacks (i.e. what
jobs were submitted by which user) and data attacks against the control information of
services like WS-GRAM. Thus, job IDs could be deleted from the database, making it
impossible to check the status of a job. The users could still, however, log on to his or
her worker nodes and check manually since a Service Host compromise cannot spill
over to the virtual worker nodes. While these attacks must not be taken lightly, they
only have a minimal attack window and are usually attacks which are easily noticeable,
since they affect the primary operation of the Grid (i.e. a user’s job is cancelled before
it started, or the notification of a completed job is removed before it is sent). This type
of attack is possible against all the analysed intrusion tolerance systems discussed in
the related work section, except those which disallow state completely. The main goal
of preventing stealth attacks is not compromised by these attacks. If required, a data
specific IDS could be run at the data base access point to check for irregular behaviour
(such as a job was started in Europe and terminated outside of Europe). While IDS
systems must usually play follow the leader, the very small area of attack will ease the
configuration and increase the accuracy beyond what a full IDS could manage.
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6.6.7 Rotating Server Results
The novel intrusion tolerance system presented in this section improves the security of
stateful WSRF Grid servers against stealth attacks. The system is based on a server ro-
tation strategy utilising paravirtualisation to close attack windows for stateful service-
oriented Grid headnode servers. A flexible plugin based rotation manager deals with
the complex issue of stateful connections to the Grid server, and a database connector
is utilised to detach service state from the rotating functional components of the Grid
server. Attacks against the rotation system itself were easily identified due to the ne-
cessity of the sustained nature of those attacks. The presented approach differs from
other work in this area, since it does not require an intrusion detection system to op-
erate and can deal with both Grid server state and with stateful TCP/IP connection, all
vital issues for its applicability to Grid computing systems.
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6.7 Intrusion Detection
6.7.1 Introduction
While the security mechanisms presented in the previous sections go a long way to
protecting the Grid infrastructure, it is next to impossible to guarantee absolute safety
and there is still the danger of brute force attacks like denial-of-service attacks against
the Grid middleware in the DMZ or SPAM bots operating in the user’s VM due to
security flaws in the users software. To minimise the damage these kind of attacks
can inflict, the security mechanisms will be complemented with a network intrusion
detection system (NIDS) to detect the attacks which are not prevented. This enables
resource providers to manually counter these attacks when they occur.
While the current Grids are still quite small, the Grid computing vision foresees
huge collections of resources and users. When this occurs, NIDS solutions will face
several new issues. The homogeneous Grid layer presents an attacker with a conve-
nient way to do network reconnaissance without raising traditional NIDS alarms on
the separate site by enabling the attacker to spread the reconnaissance over several
dislocated resources. This leads to the need for cross-site NIDS data collection and
correlation, which in turn leads to huge amounts of data flowing through the Grid
NIDS. Furthermore, small Grid sites may not wish to deploy the manpower necessary
to adequately monitor their Grid resources, preferring to out-source NIDS duties to
larger maybe even specialised organisations, in particular since attack detection in an
on-demand Grid environment is a multi-organisational task.
Thus, NIDS for Grid environments have to meet demands above and beyond tradi-
tional NIDS. Firstly, the NIDS has to be able to cope with the large amount of network
traffic created by multiple Grid sites simultaneously. The NIDS must then be able to
detect attack patterns which potentially are distributed over multiple sites. Since the
multi-organisational data is not required for logging or auditing use, it is not necessary
to store the entire data in a traditional database, and data reduction capabilities can be
used to decrease the amount of data which needs to be processed. It should also be
possible to add new sites to a running intrusion detection system, distribute the load
without a lot of configuration work or requiring rule updates.
In the following, a novel Stream Intrusion Detection System (S-IDS) is introduced.
The S-IDS is an experimental first step towards a new form of IDS design tailored to
attack detection for large amounts of cross-site transient data. Since network traffic
or other audit data, like process activity or login attempts, continuously accumulates
over time and is only of interest for attack detection in a limited temporal context,
handling this data as a stream has the potential of reducing the required resources
needed to handle large amounts of data. Therefore, the S-IDS is based on the stream-
based database management system PIPES [14]. PIPES’s temporal operators facilitate
simple definition of detection rules, also its stream-orientation enables a distributed
detection infrastructure through the stream aggregation operations. S-IDS needs no
permanent data storage to detect attacks, since the attack analysis is done directly in
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the streaming context.
Before going into the details of the proposed NIDS, a brief introduction of PIPES
in the context of NIDS is giving.
6.7.2 PIPES
PIPES (a Public Infrastructure for Processing and Exploring Streams) [106, 107, 27,
14], as a component of the Java library XXL [15], is a powerful infrastructure for pro-
cessing data streams. A data stream is a potentially infinite sequence of data items,
like network or measurement data. PIPES is able to continuously query data streams
produced by autonomous data sources. The data streams of interest do not have to be
stored in traditional databases for later querying. PIPES stores and uses data only as
long as it is of interest for the evaluation process. This is called the temporal context
of data. The management of data mainly takes place in the main memory, unlike tra-
ditional databases management systems that work on data without a temporal context,
which necessitates the use of slow external memory like hard disks. This has a huge
impact on the performance of systems that use PIPES for stream querying since data
does not have to make a detour via external storage.
A query on streams can be expressed in CQL (Continuous Query Language) [13],
which extends SQL by window operators. These operators enable query formulation
in a SQL-like SELECT-FROM-WHERE style for streams. Windows are time periods
in which a data item is considered for processing. It is important to assign a window to
a data item, otherwise it would not be possible to use blocking operations in the query
graph, since a stream is potentially infinite.
PIPES uses acyclic, directed operator graphs for processing data streams generated
from a CQL statement. Such a query graph is similar to a graph derived from a SQL
statement. A PIPES graph consists of three different types of nodes: sources, pipes,
and sinks (see Figure 6.13). Sources, like a network interface, continuously deliver
data that is processed in a pipe-graph. The pipes are operators like selects or joins as
known from the extended relational algebra. Pipes are both sinks and sources, since
they consume and deliver data. The data finally flows into terminal sinks where the
final evaluation and presentation is done. PIPES has the ability to attach new sources
at runtime, which is required for S-IDS to include new sites. A query is always started
by a sink using the ONC-mechanism.
For operation of the query executing environment PIPES offers a scheduler, a mem-
ory manager, and a query optimiser. Besides using CQL for the construction of queries,
PIPES graphs can also be constructed directly by using the Java object representation
of sources, pipes, sinks and other components of the PIPES library. While CQL offer
a more high level and human readable query definition, S-IDS uses the latter approach
since it offers access and fine control to cutting edge extensions of PIPES which are
not yet available in CQL. For a final product the use of CQL is preferable. None the
less the Java interface is clear and easy to use. New detection algorithms often require
only a few lines of code, connecting PIPES’ stream operators. These newly created
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Figure 6.13: PIPES Schema (from [14])
detection graphs can then easily be added to existing ones.
6.7.3 A Streaming Intrusion Detection System
This section describes the architecture of a Distributed Intrusion Detection System
based on PIPES. The use of this stream processing database system enables the ef-
ficient analysis and recognition abilities of the IDS. To not reinvent the wheel, the
traditional NIDS Snort [166] is integrated into the S-IDS thus leveraging existing sin-
gle node detection logic into S-IDS allowing this work to concentrate on multi-site
threats and the issues involved in coupling multiple sites using a streaming database.
The graph-based architecture of PIPES suits the needs of a distributed analysis process.
The IDS is therefore set up in a tree structure, consisting of sensors on the leaf-level,
an arbitrary number of aggregators on the node levels and a master node on the root
level.
The S-IDS core components are sensor nodes for information production, aggre-
gator nodes to correlate and reduce the data stream and a master node that acts as a
final aggregation entity as well as management and monitoring facility. On startup,
all sensors and aggregators register with the master to receive configuration data, like
parameters for the detection query graphs, report intervals or neighbors within the in-
frastructure to connect with.
Figure 6.14 shows the architecture of the sensor nodes. All sensors are equipped
with two network adapters. The first adapter carries the Grid network traffic (1). This
network traffic is analysed by Snort, and a raw package capture using LibPCap is used
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Figure 6.14: S-IDS Sensor
to grab raw header information. If either component recognises an attack, in generates
an alert, otherwise only the raw header information is streamed to the next level. Alerts
are wrapped into IDMEF alert objects, as specified by RFC 4765 [47] for interoper-
ability reasons. This enables other existing monitoring systems to be easily plugged
in a sensor and at the same time enables S-IDS to be plugged into other security sys-
tems which understand IDMEF. Both alerts and the raw header information is then
transferred into a PIPES socket sink (2). The second network adapter then streams
that information to the next level. The second adapter is also used to receive control
information from the master. The second adapter is required since the primary adapter
should not be degraded through the NIDS, since this would impact the primary Grid
performance. If the Grid node carrying the sensor is under an Denial of Service (DoS)
attack, the primary adapter could be overloaded so that NIDS messages would not get
trough. For monitoring and load balancing purposes, every sensor periodically reports
some system parameters, such as network, CPU and memory usage to the master (3).
An arbitrary number of aggregators may subscribe to a sensor to aggregate the gained
data in a wider scope.
Figure 6.15 shows the architecture of an aggregator node. Aggregators receive data
from sensors or other aggregators it has subscribed to (1). Alerts received from the
previous level are passed directly on to the next level (2). All received raw data from
the previous level is analysed, and if an attack is discovered, an alert is generated and
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Figure 6.15: S-IDS Aggregator
passed to the alert channel (3). Depending on the amount of raw packet-header data,
the data can be reduced before it is forwarded to the next level. The alert detection rules
are PIPES subgraphs which process non-alert input data (4). The rule implementation
using stream operators benefits from the temporal aspect of PIPES since no data needs
to be stored persistently but is handled as a continuous stream. Querying this stream for
information concerning a certain time window is done using PIPES temporal operators.
They consume a stream of temporal objects and generate a result stream. All objects in
the data stream have a validity interval that starts with the time of their creation. Alerts
and aggregated data is then streamed to the next level (5).
Figure 6.16 shows the architecture of a master node. The master is responsible both
for organising the S-IDS infrastructure as well correlating the data from all top level
aggregators. It holds a list of sensors and aggregators ((2)) as well as their status. All
alerts generated and data aggregated on lower levels is gathered and processed here.
Like the aggregators, the master is capable of running attack detection graphs based
on the input from previous levels. The master is the final point in the graph which has
an overview of the entire infrastructure. All alerts are then presented to the user.
All graph nodes report their system parameters in regular intervals to the master.
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Figure 6.16: S-IDS Master
This enables the master to detect problems within the NIDS network. For example, if
an aggregator fails, the master can assign the affected sensors to a different aggregator
or if a sensor stops transmitting its heartbeat, the master can inform the administrator
of the site where the sensor went down.
6.7.4 Streaming Intrusion Detection Results
In this section, a novel architecture for an intrusion detection system for distributed
environments was presented. A stream based DBMS was used for the querying of
network data. The use of a stream-oriented DBMS facilitates a natural handling of
data analysed within the IDS. The streaming architecture allows the natural processing
of temporal attack data across multiple sites and holds the potential for performance
benefits in large scale systems since data is processed during its natural flow and only
stored as long as necessary for analysis. Figure 6.17 shows the setup of a simple S-IDS
which monitors two cluster sites and a number of desktop Grid resources.
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Figure 6.17: Layout of a S-IDS Graph
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6.8 Service Trust
6.8.1 Introduction
The security mechanisms introduced in this chapter help reduce the amount of trust
needed to operate a Grid ecosystem. However, two trust relationships have not been
discussed yet. The trust the customer must have in the solution producer is difficult
to solve with security mechanism, since the software of the solution producer must be
able to access the data it should operate on and thus can copy both the input data and the
result data. The customer must also trust that the solution producer’s software reliably
returns the correct results. The second trust relationship which is still required in stage
2 is the trust in the resource provider. In the traditional Grid, this trust is usually
built and managed personally, since the actors involved know each other. In an on-
demand Grid it is desirable to have automated mechanisms which support the creation
and management of trust values to aid customers in selecting a solution producer’s
services and a resource provider’s resources.
Parts of this section have been published in [129].
6.8.2 Trust Classification
Azzedin and Maheswaran [17] have classified trust into two categories: identity trust
and behaviour trust. Identity trust is concerned with verifying the authenticity of an
interaction partner, whereas behaviour trust deals with the trustworthiness of an inter-
action partner. Since the Grid uses X.509 certificates to prove the identity the identity
trust is not much of an issue unless one deals with unknown certificate authorities. The
overall behaviour trust of an interaction partner can be built up by considering sev-
eral factors, such as accuracy or reliability. These factors of behaviour trust should be
continuously tested and verified. In this way, it is possible to collect a history of past
collaborations that can be used for future decisions on further collaborations between
interaction partners. This kind of experience can also be shared as recommendations
to other participants. Furthermore, the overall decision whether to trust an interaction
partner or not may be affected by other non-functional aspects that cannot be gener-
ally determined for every possible situation, but should rather be under the control of
the user when requesting such a decision. In addition, while the basic functionality of
two applications could be similar, differences in the application requirements could be
caused by different domain specific trust requirements, for example a wavelet service
will be subject to different non-functional requirements in the medical applications
scenario compared to the media analysis scenario. Therefore, a trust system for a Grid
environment should offer flexible and easy to use components that can be configured
to the specific needs of a user on a per case basis.
In this section, an approach that allows adapting trust establishment and manage-
ment to user and application requirements in a service-oriented Grid environment is
presented. The approach is based on a flexible trust model which includes identity and
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behaviour trust of the interaction partners and considers different sources to calculate
the overall trust value for an interaction partner. A proposal for establishing the first
trust between interaction partners is made, and the possibility to monitor the partners’
behaviour trust during an interaction is provided. Finally, a system architecture for
collecting and managing multidimensional trust values is presented. It consists of two
main components, a trust engine and a verification engine. The trust engine manages
trust values and offers partner discovery and rating functionality to higher level ap-
plications. The verification engine handles the verification of Grid service results and
other criteria (e.g. availability, latency etc.) and generates the necessary feedback for
the trust engine regarding the partner. The proposed system architecture can be con-
figured to the domain specific trust requirements by the use of several separate trust
profiles covering the entire lifecycle of trust establishment and management.
The following terminology is used in this section: A collaboration in an on-demand
Grid takes places between a customer, a solution producer’s service and a resource
providers resource which hosts the service. There are two major aspects that influence
the selection or acceptance of an interaction partner in a service-oriented ad hoc Grid
environment:
1. The identity of the interaction partner or more specifically the trust that one can
put in the credibility of the identity an interaction partner claims to have.
2. The past behaviour of the interaction partner as an indicator for its future be-
haviour. This behaviour can be rated considering a multitude of dimensions,
such as the accuracy of delivered results, actual costs compared to expected
costs, availability of the service, response time, or fault and intrusion properties.
Furthermore, the trust values might be different for different applications/ser-
vices the interaction partner offers or requests.
In the decision processes during an interaction among consumers and providers
of services, it is important to know in which context trust is considered. These con-
texts are, for example, the decision whether a consumer is eligible for using service
instances offered by a provider or the decision whether a provider should be preferred
over another provider for a specific service.
In most cases, an interaction partner is not able to judge trustworthiness based on
personal and direct experiences. A socially inspired model using several dimensions of
trust that builds on exchanges of experiences and recommendations is useful to decide
whether to trust another interaction partner or not.
6.8.3 Trust Model
Trust is a multidimensional value that can be derived from different sources when try-
ing to determine the trust value for an interaction partner. This work distinguishes
between three of such sources. First, there is direct and personal experience from past
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collaborations with a partner. A second source of information are recommendations
from known sources (i.e. partners for which direct experiences exist). Finally, recom-
mendations from other nodes/services in the Grid may be considered and then a path
can be found using the known partners of known partners and so on.
Depending on the situations, participants can have different preferences and re-
quirements for interaction partners. Different Quality of Service (QoS) properties like
availability of the service offered, accessibility of the service, accuracy of the response
provided by the service, response time, cost of the services offered, security etc., can
be considered and modelled as behaviour trust elements that a consumer uses to rate a
provider. In a similar way, the total number and size of (concurrent) requests coming
from a consumer can be considered as behaviour trust elements from the point of view
of a provider. The last behaviour trust is mainly relevant in the academic environment
where a fair-share operation of Grid resources is practised.
To allow users to weight the different sources for the total trust differently in dif-
ferent situations, the model provides a profile vector of all trust sources an interaction
partner A may use for the rating of another interaction partner B. Using this trust pro-
file vector, partner A can calculate the resulting normalised trust to put into partner B.
The resulting normalised trust value is only used in the decision to interact with a cer-
tain partner B. It does not affect the experience value, because this value only depends
on the outcome of the subsequent interaction.
6.8.4 First-Trust Problem
A new Grid user has no personal experience with any of the other solution producers or
resource providers. The usual strategies for selecting a partner to interact with do not
apply in this situation. There are two different basic strategies for ”initialising” trust.
One is a rather open approach to assign an initial trust value slightly above the minimal
trust threshold to every partner, effectively giving the partner a chance to prove itself
trustworthy without prior verification. This method is refered to as ”warm start phase”.
In contrast, there might be scenarios with a higher demand on dependability in which
a partner is tested by performing validation checks and deriving initial behaviour trust
from these interactions. Obviously, this trust establishment phase through a ”cold
start” comes at a comparably high price.
The problem of establishing first trust can be seen from all sides, customer, solution
producer and resource provider. The trust management environment for an on-demand
Grid must be flexible enough to allow specification of the strategy to be used in either
role and on an application basis. In addition to these two basic strategies, further
strategies for first trust establishment may be specified in the system.
6.8.5 Verification Techniques
To ensure that a given trust value is correct, it is necessary to verify that a particular
interaction partner meets the assumed or previously observed behaviour. The extent
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to which verification is performed may vary depending on application scenarios or
various user requirements. Partners will continuously monitor the interaction process
among each other, and in case of discovered anomalies in the behaviour of the other,
the consumers and/or providers will reorganise their scheduling or access policies ac-
cordingly.
The different aspects of the partners’ behaviour (e.g. availability, response time,
accuracy, etc.) are criteria for developing verification strategies. In the following,
only the accuracy of the responses coming from a service provider is considered as an
example.
The strategy to use for the verification of the accuracy of responses to be expected
from one provider may vary depending on certain constraints such as the additional
acceptable cost for performing the verification operations. The following verification
strategies might be applied:
1. Challenge with known tasks - A service consumer may prepare a particular test
challenge for which it knows the correct result. In this case, the consumer can
directly verify if a service was able to calculate the correct response for this
challenge.
2. Best of n replies - A more feasible verification technique is similar to the one that
is used by SETI@HOME [105]. The validity of the computed results is checked
by letting different entities work on the same data unit. At the end, a majority
vote establishes the correct response.
3. Human in the loop - In some applications, it might be impossible to construct
automatic verification or result rating modules. In such cases, it can still be
helpful to involve human users in the process of verification. This technique
relies on presenting the results to the user, offering the ability to directly express
a value to be taken into the trust calculation.
In the presented approach, it is possible for each of the partners to develop their per-
sonalised trust preferences towards the interaction partners. These preferences include
the initialisation values that the user is willing to assign to each of the new partners,
the selection of sources for getting trust information from (recommendations), the in-
teraction partners the participant collaborates with and verification strategies for all
the trust elements. The consumer may choose between verifying the accuracy of every
single answer coming from the provider (”trust no one”) or to verify the accuracy of
only a part of the responses coming from the provider (”optimistic trust”). In order
to minimise added costs, the frequency of this partial verification technique is coupled
with the behaviour trust associated with a particular partner in the environment. From
the consumer side this means that for a non-trusted provider every single response is
verified and for a fully trusted provider only a minimum of the responses coming from
that specific provider has to be verified. The result of the verification operations will
directly be used to alter the behaviour trust regarding accuracy.
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6.8.6 Trust Transfer
The trust model presented above is not all that different from trust models used in
online shopping sites like Amazon or ebay. However, in one aspect Grid trust dif-
fers significantly. A solution producer can host a service on resources from multiple
providers. A resource provider can host services from multiple solution producers and
a customer using a service interacts with both the solution producer and the resource
provider. These multiple interaction patterns can be used to significantly bootstrap the
initial trust setup in certain cases by transferring trust values based on existing trust
relationships. If a customer has previously successfully used a solution producers ser-
vice on a number of resource from different resource providers and has had a good
experience with the resources providers chosen by the solution producer, a new and
unknown resource provider selected by the solution producer can be given a higher
initial trust value based on the trust in the solution producers skill in selecting good
resource providers. The same principle can be applied to the case where a customer
has used multiple services hosted by a single resource provider. If a new service is
added, a customer can choose to give a new service hosted by that trusted resource
provider based on the previous good experience with that resource providers choices.
Another example of trust transfer is that if a customer has had good experience with
a number of services from a particular solution producer, a new service offered by
that same solution producer can be initialised with a higher initial trust value. Since
a solution producer’s software runs on a resource providers node, the trust values in a
resource provider and a solution producer can be combined to form the trust in a partic-
ular instance of a service. Figure 6.18 shows a trust network with some possible trust
transfer. A measured trust value is presented in a single colour, a transferred/combined
trust value is marked by a mixed colour showing the origin of the transferred trust val-
ues. Based on existing trust in solution producer A and resource provider A, service
A’s trust value is combined from the trust in solution producer A and resource provider
A. Based on observed behaviour of services B and C, a trust value for solution pro-
ducer B is created by combining the trust values of service B and C. Based on the trust
in providers A and B, the trust in service A can differ depending on where it is hosted
since the trust value is combined with the trust value of the resource providers A and
B respectively. The new Grid node D can be initialised through a combination of the
trust values of Grid nodes B and C from the same resource provider. Service D can be
initialised by combining the trust values of B and C.
6.8.7 Trust Results
In this section, a flexible trust model and a system architecture for collecting and man-
aging multidimensional trust values have been presented. Both identity and behaviour
trust of the interaction partners were considered, and different sources are used to de-
termine the overall trust value of an interaction partner. A proposal for establishing the
first trust between interaction partners has been made, and the possibility to monitor
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Figure 6.18: Grid Trust
the partners’ behaviour trust during an interaction has been provided. The trust system
can be configured to the domain specific trust requirements by the use of several sepa-
rate trust profiles covering the entire lifecycle of trust establishment and management.
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6.9 Micro-Workflows
6.9.1 Introduction
The final component in the on-demand Grid environment is the workflow engine which
enables the user to combine a number of services into a single application. While on
the surface the adoption of the service-oriented computing paradigm has been wide-
spread, with most major Grid solutions offering service-oriented capabilities, an actual
paradigm shift in the applications has not be realised yet on any significant scale. Most
Grid applications still are the monolithic job farming and massively parallel number
crunching applications previously deployed as stand-alone cluster applications. The
extent of service-oriented design is often reduced to the execution of a legacy shell
script through the WS-GRAM (Grid Resource Allocation Manager) interface. While
there are some applications which attempt to utilise more fine grained services con-
nected via a workflow, the practical adoption is very limited. The author believes this
is mainly due to the fact that these two paradigms clash when executed on the same
resources. The traditional monolithic Grid applications utilise the Grid infrastructure
to enqueue in the cluster scheduling systems. The cluster scheduler then schedules the
job onto a number of nodes and starts the specified executable. The execution is not
necessarily instantaneous since the resources are shared and there can be a number of
jobs from different users in the queue which will executed beforehand. On the other
hand, the service-oriented approach usually requires that a service is present when it
is called. In the business environment where service-oriented architectures were pio-
neered, the resources on which the services are installed are dedicated to serving these
services. As such they can be called at any time and will return a result interactively
(an example is a flight booking service for an airline). This stands in contrast to the
time delayed shared use execution of batch jobs.
The reason why these two paradigms clash is that while the service-oriented appli-
cations require their services to be present and working when called, the batch process-
ing applications require a first-come-first-served or priority based scheduling of jobs.
If the worker nodes of a cluster would allow direct interactive service invocation, the
cluster scheduler would be circumvented, creating a unfair situation for the batch jobs
and would make accounting and billing of the cluster resources much more complex.
Thus, the current approach to using application services in the Grid is to install coarse
grained services on the Grid headnodes which then internally call the cluster scheduler
to submit traditional cluster jobs. This does not fulfill the vision of service-oriented
Grid computing with fine grained services and reuse, since the services offered are
only wrappers around traditional batch job applications.
In this chapter, a cluster scheduler compliant approach for fine grained application
service execution using a Grid enabled BPEL engine is presented. A secure execution
environment which can be staged into an existing batch job environment to offer in-
teractive fine grained application services is created. A Grid enabled workflow engine
to create complex application workflows which are executed in the virtual environ-
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ment is provided. This enables new fine grained service-oriented Grid applications
to be securely executed in shared use environments without colliding with traditional
batch jobs. A security concept is introduced allowing cluster worker nodes to expose
services to the BPEL engine outside of the private cluster network and thus enabling
multi-site workflows in a secure fashion.
Parts of this section have been published in [54, 55].
6.9.2 Problem Statement
Figure 6.19 shows a traditional Grid setup with two user applications: A batch job
is submitted directly to the cluster scheduler via WS-GRAM, and a job consisting of
three services A, B and C is orchestrated into an application service using a workflow
engine. While the batch job can simply be installed on the worker nodes of the cluster
and started via WS-GRAM, a service-oriented application is currently more complex
to schedule properly.
Figure 6.19: Batch Jobs vs. Service Workflow
The worker nodes usually do not have a service hosting platform installed, and
even if they did, the cluster scheduler would not be able to schedule services since it
only works with shell scripts. The most common approach to this problem is to com-
bine the functional components into standard applications and have a wrapper service
installed on the headnode. The wrapper service then internally calls WS-GRAM and
schedules the appropriate application. There are several problems with this approach.
First, it creates the need for a further interface design and communication implemen-
tation, since all information must be passed from the service running on the headnode
to the programs running on the worker nodes. Although this is not difficult to do,
it creates further unnecessary complexity. Second, and more importantly, using this
approach it is extremely difficult to create flexible fine grained workflows, since the
actual execution of the functional code is started by the scheduler.
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Figure 6.20: Simple Service Workflow
For example, consider the simple workflow shown in Figure 6.20 in which service
A is the first to be called. Depending on the result, A calls a number of instances of
service B (1). Depending on its computation, service B can consult a further service
C or D (2) and incorporate the result (3) into its own computation. If this workflow
were to be executed using the traditional approach of headnode based services, the
following would occur: First, service A is called and an appropriate job is enqueued in
the cluster scheduling queue. When the cluster scheduler executes the job and returns
the result, the right number of service B calls can be made. The corresponding jobs
are enqueued and at some time later executed. If during the course of the execution
of B service C or D need to be called, these jobs must be enqueued and the result
will not be available until the cluster scheduler schedules the jobs. In the meantime,
the calling job B cannot continue. Even if the services are mostly long running, this
is far from optimal from the point of view of a service workflow. Considering that
fine grained applications will tend to have shorter running services and can easily have
more complex workflows, this mode of operation is not an option. One workaround is
to schedule a dummy job through the scheduler which does nothing, and write custom
scripts which call the service without going through the scheduler. While this fulfils
the functional requirements, it requires a great deal of manual work and is neither com-
pliant with the service-oriented paradigm nor with the batch scheduling paradigm. If,
on the other hand, the worker nodes permanently offer the services and the workflow
engine can call them directly without going through the scheduler, the scheduler can-
not account or bill the services, since it would not know that the nodes are currently
taken, which would also lead to collisions with the batch jobs. One simple option is
to partition the cluster and run two separate setups, one for batch processing and one
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for service workflows. This is undesirable since it waists resources unnecessarily. In
the following, a scheduler compliant approach to service workflows will be introduced
which allows the workflow engine to reserve a virtual secure working environment via
the cluster scheduler in which it can then directly call services, and the services can
interact freely in a purely service-oriented manner.
6.9.3 BPEL Security Extension
The Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) is the de-facto standard for busi-
ness process modeling in today’s enterprises. However BPEL currently has no way
of dealing with Grid security concepts such as authentication using proxy certificates
and the GSI based message protection schemes GSISecureMessage, GSITransport and
GSISecureConversation.
Therefore, a Grid-enabled process execution environment is presented which al-
lows the use of plain web services as well as GSI secured Grid services. To allow the
invocation of different operations of the same Service using distinct security methods,
the security settings have to be modeled per-operation in BPEL and cannot be config-
ured per-partner link. Therefore, a <security> sub-element in the activity’s XML
definition is introduced. The syntax is described in listing 6.1.
Listing 6.1: Syntax of the security settings for invocation
1 <gridInvoke ...>
<security
3 method="GSITransport |
GSISecureMessage |
5 GSISecureConversation"
level="privacy | integrity"
7 authz="none | self | host | anyString"?
peer-credentials="filename"?
9 anonymous="true | false"?
delegation="full | limited"?
11 />?
</gridInvoke>
Since the user’s proxy certificate is needed in secure workflows (for encryption,
signing and credential delegation) there is a need to make the user’s proxy certificate
available to the engine. There are two mechanisms with which the proxy certificate
can be passed to the workflow engine: the client creates a proxy certificate locally and
attaches it to the initial SOAP header sent to the workflow engine. It is then retrieved
from the header, stored to a file and used by the process. The second solution does
not require the user to generate a proxy certificate. It makes use of the MyProxy
Credential Management Service [125]. MyProxy is a software for managing X.509
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security credentials. It allows the generation of proxy certificates from stored user
credentials via a TLS secured network connection. From time to time, the user has
log on to the machine where it is installed and create a proxy certificate within pre-
configured intervals (since proxy certificates expire). The generated proxy is then
stored in a repository and is then accessible via (username, password) combination
whereby the password is chosen by the user when generating the proxy.
Since the run-time of a process might be not be known when the process is started
and therefore longer than the proxy’s lifetime the presented solution offers automatic
renewal of proxy certificates. The workflow engine monitors both the run-time of the
process and the proxy’s lifetime. If the proxy’s lifetime is about to expire the engine
will renew the certificate if desired by the process’ user.
This extension to BPEL allows the secure execution of Grid workflows, however in
a traditional Grid setup the actual worker nodes to not carry a service hosting environ-
ment and as such the workflow would be restricted to calling services on the headnode
which in turn schedule a job for execution on the cluster.
6.9.4 A Service-Oriented Virtual Grid Environment
To enable fine grained service-oriented applications to run side by side with traditional
batch job applications in a secure fashion, the virtualisation of worker nodes presented
in section 6.4 is utilised. Figure 6.21 shows how the presented Grid setup executed
batch jobs and workflows in the same environment. The batch user uses WS-GRAM
to submit his/her job (A) which is then entered into the cluster queuing system (B).
When the job is scheduled, the required number of virtual machines are started and
the job is executed in the virtual environment (C). A user wishing to use a fine grained
service workflow creates one or more images containing a service hosting environment
and the required services using the ICS. The service user then calls his/her workflow
service hosted by the workflow engine (1). The workflow engine when executing the
user’s workflow submits a special workflow job to the cluster scheduler requesting the
specified amount of nodes needed for the workflow (2). The workflow engine then
pauses waiting for notification from the Grid site. When the workflow job is sched-
uled (3) the users service hosting image is started and the services then register their
service endpoints with the workflow engine (4) and the engine can then call the com-
ponent services. All four services are now available and registered with the workflow
engine. Service A’s result leads to the execution of two service B calls (5). One of
the service B instances incorporates a call to service C (6) whose result is incorporated
into B’s execution flow (7). One of the critical issues is handling the location and time
uncertainty in dealing with services which are not hosted on dedicated servers but are
started on-demand in a Grid environment.
Since the actual hosts on which in which the service hosting images are started
are selected by the cluster scheduling algorithm of the presented Xen Grid Engine,
the workflow engine does not know in advance when and on which nodes it will be
operating. To deal with this, the workflow engine creates a WS-Resource for each
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virtual machine which represents the virtual machine in the service layer. It returns a
unique identifier for the machine as soon as the Xen Grid Engine informs the workflow
engine of the machine’s IP address. The workflow may not proceed with the execution
before all required XenU instances and the hosted Globus container have been started.
To check whether Globus is running, the workflow engine tries to load the WSDL
document of the ”Version” service which comes with every Globus distribution. As
soon as all required Globus instances are up and running the workflow can resumes
and is able to invoke services on the worker nodes.
Figure 6.21: Batch Jobs and Service Workflow
6.9.5 Multi-Site Workflow Security
Using the new Grid setup, the workflow architecture presented above can be extended
to also allow direct workflow control from outside of the private cluster network. To
protect Grid and cluster systems, section 6.5 introduced a Grid enabled demilitarised
zone (DMZ) where the private Grid network is completely locked down, disallowing
direct access even from the Grid headnode. To enable direct workflow control without
endangering the rest of the Grid and cluster system, some modifications to the DMZ are
required. Figure 6.22 shows the proposed architecture for external workflow control.
As above, case A is the traditional batch job and case B is the new externally controlled
service workflow. The nodes started for A are not changed in any way, they still receive
private IP addresses which are not routed to, thus they cannot be reached from outside
of the private cluster network. The nodes started for B, however, receive public IP
addresses and as such could be accessed from the Internet. The two firewalls protecting
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the Grid and cluster must now be modified to allow connections to the services running
on the worker nodes. Since the rest of the traditional Grid and cluster system should
not be endangered, the firewall is configured to only allow connections to specific IP
addresses instead of simply opening ports for the entire cluster network. While this
may seem contrary to the idea of a DMZ, the new Grid setup, which gives each user
his or her own virtual environment, allows this to be done securely, since only those
users who wish to accept connections from the Internet are reachable. A compromise
of a user’s virtual environment does not pose a threat to other virtual environments,
since it is contained by the virtual machine monitor. This yields a novel extension to
the Grid and cluster paradigm, since the worker nodes are no longer confined to being
hidden compute nodes, but can offer user accessible services, without endangering
other traditional Grid and cluster users.
Figure 6.22: Workflow Firewall Architecture
If this approach is combined with advanced reservation, the possibility for cross-
site workflows is created. This is currently not possible, since the current version of
cluster scheduling system SGE does not support advanced reservation yet. The up-
coming version of the SGE will include this feature which can then be used without
any adaption of the XGE. Using advanced reservation, it would be possible to request
the service images to be scheduled at a predefined time, thus enabling the user to start
a service workflow across multiple Grid sites simultaneously. Figure 6.23 shows how
a single workflow engine can directly access and control services running on two dif-
ferent cluster sites, which were started using advanced reservation to make sure that
they run at the same time. The workflow can span services running on both sites
controlled both by the workflow engine or directly by the services themselves. The
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workflow shown in Figure 6.23 follows the same pattern as the workflow introduced in
Section 6.9.2, with the extension that the output of service A can be utilised by service
B instances running on two different sites synchronously. It should be noted that the
communication time between two clusters is of course larger than local communica-
tion, and the workflow design must take this into account.
Figure 6.23: Multi-Site Secure Workflow
6.9.6 Workflow Results
In this chapter, a cluster scheduler compliant approach for fine grained application
service execution using a Grid enabled BPEL engine was presented. A secure virtual
execution environment was presented with the ability to create fine grained service
workflows in cluster environments without disrupting existing cluster scheduling and
traditional cluster jobs. A Grid enabled workflow engine to create complex application
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workflows which are executed in the virtual environment was introduced. This enables
new fine grained service-oriented Grid applications to be securely executed in shared
use environments without colliding with traditional batch jobs. A security concept was
introduced which allows cluster worker nodes to expose services to the BPEL engine
outside of the private cluster network and thus enables multi-site workflows in a secure
fashion.
6.10 Summary
In this chapter, a novel Grid environment was introduced which offers advanced secu-
rity mechanisms to enable users to safely install and use custom software on-demand.
An image creation station is used to create user specific virtual machines in which
a user can install software with root privileges. An automated dynamic firewalling
mechanism offers a Virtual Organisation and user based network security setup and
creates secure user network regions on-demand. In addition, the Grid environment
was separated into several zones to protect local cluster resources from the Grid mid-
dleware. The Grid headnode and the image creation station are both confined into sep-
arate compartments in the Grid demilitarised zone. To enable the secure integration
of this Grid environment into existing business workflows an extension to the BPEL
language and workflow execution engine was presented which allows the execution of
GSI secured Grid services in combination with existing business web services. The
workflow engine transparently deals with the issues of proxy certificate creation and
in the case of long running jobs certificate renewal. The presented system allows both
fine grained service-oriented applications and legacy Grid applications to be run side
by side through a novel integration of the security mechanisms into existing cluster
scheduling solutions.
7
Implementation
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, selected implementation details will be presented focusing first on the
three types of Grid applications previously introduced and the network setup. This is
followed by a discussion of rotating server, intrusion detection and workflow imple-
mentation.
7.2 Type 1 Grid Applications
Secure and non-disruptive service deployment is an important requirement for an on-
demand Grid. Since solution producers can install software and services autonomously,
it is essential that service deployment is secure and non-disruptive, since it is not ac-
ceptable that every time a new service is installed or an existing service is updated,
all other services running in that environment are endangered and restarted as well -
possibly losing substantial amounts of work in progress. It would be just as undesir-
able as to restart an entire web server every time a web page is added, but currently
this is common practice in service-oriented Grid environments. If the Grid is to be-
come the next-generation Internet, hot deployment is indispensable. The deployment
of a service currently requires a Grid service archive (GAR file) containing the needed
classes, schema files and deployment descriptors that make up a service. Users of GT4
are supplied with Ant tasks that handle the distribution of the contents of this GAR
file into the local standalone GT4 environment. The Ant tasks extract and copy the jar
files containing the class files of the service into the local web application directory.
Schema files are copied into the schema repository. The current deployment strategy
of GT4 requires the restart of the entire WSRF web application, thereby killing every
other Grid service currently running. Furthermore, direct access to the machine run-
ning the GT4 application and write access to GT4 is required because the Ant tasks
perform all copy operations locally.
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Neither the first nor the second property of the deployment mechanism is feasible
for an on-demand Grid environment. As described in section 6.2, an on-demand Grid
must enable autonomous and secure deployment of services.
To enable this, the Axis web service engine utilised by GT4 was modified to al-
low dynamic loading and unloading of Grid services in secure containers. The hot
deployment service (HDS) provides applications with the capability to remotely de-
ploy, undeploy and redeploy services onto a running node. The operations have the
following semantics:
Deploy adds a service to the set of available services on the Grid node. The service
is identified by its service name. The operation will not deploy the service if there is a
service with the same name already present on the node.
Undeploy removes a service from the node, based on its service name. Running
service instances already created are unaffected by the operation.
Redeploy is the chaining of undeploy and deploy. Running service instances are
not changed by the redeploy operation, subsequent requests to create new instances
will, however, use the newly supplied implementation of the service. In the current
implementation, access to the HDS is restricted by using the security mechanisms
offered by GT4.
The basic steps the HDS needs to perform to deploy a service are:
• Register the service description with the AXIS/WSRF request handlers.
• Register the service naming description with the JNDI registry.
• Make the schema files available to the WSRF environment.
• Make the service class files available to the class loader.
Currently, the need to load additional classes and dynamically replace them was
not anticipated or governed by the WSRF specification or the GT4 implementation. To
enable this functionality, a class loading mechanism is introduced into the realisation
of the HDS, as described in the following.
Grid services in GT4 are separated into three classes: The service resource class,
a service home class and the service implementation itself. The service home class is
used to load resources attached to a service and the service classes themselves. The
class HotResourceHomeImpl is provided as the implementation of the ResourceHome
interface in order to leverage the required loading mechanism into GT4. The Resource-
Home is responsible for creating the ClassLoader hierarchy which will be used to load
the service classes. It distinguishes between different instances of the ClassLoaders by
acquiring the service context from the AXIS engine inside the GT4 web application.
It also registers all ClassLoaders created by it at a central DisposableClassLoader-
Manager and the Axis ClassUtils ClassLoader cache, so they can be accessed later
during undeployment. The code snippet in listing 7.1 shows the main operation of the
HotResource-HomeImpl. First, the service name is extracted from the current message
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context. Then, the path where the jar files of the service are stored is generated based
on the container configuration and an arbitrary path extension. In this case the path
basePath/WEB-INF/lib/serviceName/ was chosen. Based on that, a JarClassLoader
capable of loading all classes contained in all jar files in that directory was created.
The JarClassLoaderManager also informs the Axis ClassUtils that it is now responsi-
ble for this service.
Listing 7.1: The setResourceClass Method in HotResourceHomeImpl
p u b l i c vo id s e t R e s o u r c e C l a s s ( S t r i n g c l a z z )
throws C l a s s N o t F o u n d E x c e p t i o n {
S t r i n g se rv iceName =
AxisEngine . g e t C u r r e n t M e s s a g e C o n t e x t ( ) .
g e t T a r g e t S e r v i c e ( ) ;
S t r i n g b a s e P a t h =
C o n t a i n e r C o n f i g . g e t C o n f i g ( ) . g e t I n t e r n a l W e b R o o t ( ) ;
S t r i n g r e l P a t h = b a s e P a t h + s e r v i c e P a t h + l i b P a t h ;
C l a s s L o a d e r c l =
J a r C l a s s L o a d e r M a n a g e r . c r e a t e L o a d e r ( serviceName ,
r e l P a t h )
r e s o u r c e C l a s s = c l . l o a d C l a s s ( c l a z z ) ;
}
This is a non-intrusive way to integrate the presented class loading mechanism into
GT4, since the ResourceHome implementation can be specified for each individual
service. A service wishing to be hot deployable merely must use the HotResource-
HomeImpl instead of the standard ResourceHomeImpl. This is the only change re-
quired to make a service hot deployable and reloadable. Hot deployable and standard
services can be run side by side by using the different ResourceHome implementa-
tions. Figure 7.1 shows the relationship of the ResourceHome implementations and
class loaders.
The process of loading a service class is as follows. When a service is first re-
quested, the org.globus.wsrf.jndi.BasicBeanFactory loads the HotResourceHomeImpl
class in the standard Axis WebAppClassLoader. The HotResourceHomeImpl is re-
sponsible for creating the disposable ClassLoaders which will later load the service
classes and the attached resources. When the setResourceClass method is called by
the BasicBeanFactory, the CurrentMessageContext from the Axis engine is parsed to
discover on behalf of which service the method is being called, thus allowing the cre-
ation of one and only one ClassLoader for each service. The JarClassLoaderManager
and the modified Axis ClassUtils are informed of the service to ClassLoader map-
ping. Once the ResourceHome is in place, the BasicBeanFactory informs the home
object which class is the main service class. As mentioned above, the HotResource-
HomeImpl attaches a disposable ClassLoader to the service. Class and ClassLoader
are then used by the org.globus.axis.providers.RPCProvider to instantiate the actual
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Figure 7.1: Relationship of the ResourceHome Implementations and ClassLoaders
service object. The HotResourceHomeImpl makes sure that the class is loaded in the
proper ClassLoader. Now everything is in place and the service can be accessed via
the JavaProvider.
To remove a service, the in-memory registry entries are deleted from the JNDI
and Axis system registries. Once the service information has been removed, no new
service instances can be created. Running instances of a service previously created are
untouched by this process. To deploy a new version of a service, no explicit unloading
of the old service classes is required, since the new version of the service will be
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created using a new ClassLoader. If in addition to the service information the service
instances are to be removed, the central manager used by the JarClassLoaderManager
can be used to access the ClassLoaders of the separate services to free the resources
and unload the classes. Only then can the jar files be deleted, since otherwise active
services might try to lazy load classes after the containing jar files have already been
removed.
The hot-loading mechanism can also be used to ensure the safety of the loaded ser-
vices. To ensure that service classes are only loaded by the sandboxed class loader, the
ClassUtils were modified to retrieve the current message context and checked whether
the current loader request was triggered by a service or by the container itself. If it
was triggered by a service, it checks whether it is a service which is registered with the
ClassLoaderManager and should be protected. If that is the case, the class is loaded us-
ing the appropriate service ClassLoader and Axis is prevented from loading the classes
in its WebAppClassLoader and thus breaking the sandbox. Otherwise, the Axis class
loading is unmodifed, allowing all normal operations to proceed unhindered. The
second place where Axis could try and load the service classes into its own WebAp-
pClassLoader is the JavaProvider. Listing 7.2 shows the modification to the loading
process needed to protect the service classes. Similar to above, it is checked whether
the service is registered with the framework and if that is the case the Axis loading
mechanism is preempted and the service ClassLoader is used instead.
Listing 7.2: The Modified getServiceClass Method in the Axis JavaProvider
p r o t e c t e d C l a s s g e t S e r v i c e C l a s s ( S t r i n g clsName ,
SOAPService s e r v i c e , MessageContex t msgContext )
throws A x i s F a u l t {
i f ( J a r C l a s s L o a d e r M a n a g e r . i s R e g i s t e r e d ( s e r v i c e . name ) ) {
C l a s s L o a d e r c l = J a r C l a s s L o a d e r M a n a g e r .
g e t C l a s s L o a d e r ( s e r v i c e . name )
re turn c l . l o a d C l a s s ( clsName )
} e l s e {
/ / s t a n d a r d A x i s b e h a v i o u r
}
}
}
Through these modifications to Axis, inter-service communication is now confined
to using web service calls and thus ensures that proper authentication between services
must be observed. In many cases, this approach suffices to protect the service being
deployed while still allowing unhindered operations within the service.
The modified service loading mechanism allows services to be installed in sep-
arate sandboxes on-demand on nodes running the HDS. It has to be noted the hot-
deployment mechanism is not compatible with the rotating server technique introduced
154 7.2. TYPE 1 GRID APPLICATIONS
to protect the Grid headnode. If the rotating mechanism is used, solution producers
should use the standard WS-GRAM as the service-oriented interface to their applica-
tions. It is of course still possible to use hot-deployment on a user’s worker node if
that is required. The service sandboxing mechanism is not affected by the rotating
mechanism, so service security can still be ensured.
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7.3 Type 2 Grid Applications
To protect against threats form type 2 applications, the native part of the service which
is called using the Java Native Interface (JNI) must be separated from the JVM pro-
cess. The Java Native Interface specification defines the interface between the JVM
and native methods implemented in C/C++. It enables invocation of native method im-
plementations from Java classes and callbacks to Java methods from the native code.
The JNI specifies a mapping from names of Java methods declared as native to
C/C++ method names as well as mappings between Java types and native types. A
sample method native int intTest(int i); in the class test.A would be
mapped to the native method: Java test A intTest. The first two arguments of
this method are used to pass pointers to the JNI interface and the object’s self-reference
(this) to the native implementation, followed by other parameters defined in the Java
class for the native method.
The JNI interface is organised like a C++ virtual function table. It is passed by ref-
erence to the native implementation and managed by the JVM per thread (i.e. a native
method may be invoked from different threads and therefore receive different JNI inter-
face pointers, invocations from the same thread are guaranteed to pass along the same
pointer). The structure itself contains a reference to an array of function pointers to im-
plementations of the JNI interface methods. Besides passing an invocation result with
return, the native method must use those JNI interface functions for access to any
method or field in Java classes and objects managed by the JVM. The native methods
are compiled into shared libraries and Java code using native implementations loads
those shared libraries using System.loadLibrary. Native code is then executed
in the process space of the JVM which leads to the serious threats described before.
The native code cannot be further constrained on a fine-grained per-service level, only
confinement based on the JVM process owner is possible.
When a Java thread requests access to a native method, the transparent proxy im-
plementation of this method will first of all check whether an I-Process has already
been created for the Java thread. If a new I-Process has to be created for the current
invocation, the group ID of the service is determined from the service class loader or
its parent group class loader. This information can then be used to obtain the security
policy that was specified for the service group by the hosting provider from the policy
manager. This policy is passed along with the thread ID to the process manager that in
turn creates either a new sandbox and an I-Process for the Java thread or only a new
I-Process within an existing sandbox for the service group.
Creation of the sandbox environment is delegated to a sandbox connector. This
component allows the isolation environment to be implemented for different underly-
ing operating systems or different sandboxing techniques. It handles initial setup of the
sandbox, inclusion of all necessary dependencies for a native library, installation and
possible mediation of policies. The process manager also uses the sandbox connector
for creation of new I-Processes as child processes of the sandbox connector, when such
a new I-Process is requested by a Java thread calling into the transparent proxy. The
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hosting provider can specify the sandbox connector to use along with an access policy
for a service group. Attachment of a security and sandbox policy to a service group
may happen based on the user ID of the user that initially created the service group.
Users may also be grouped allowing the application of a default policy to all service
groups created by deployment of services by unknown users.
As already mentioned, the WSRF introduces the notion of a so called Web ser-
vice Resource (WS-Resource) into the web service framework. A WS-Resource is
the combination of a stateless web service and a state capturing Resource Property
Document. A client receives a resource address upon creation of a WS-Resource for
later reference in subsequent interactions with the WS-Resource. Service instances
may attach to the resource property document in order to change the state data starting
off from the current state of the WS-Resource. Isolation of the native service compo-
nents connected to individual WS-Resource instances from each other would require
the transparent proxy to identify the WS-Resource corresponding to the Java instance
emitting the native call to the transparent proxy. There are many cases that prohibit
the identification of the corresponding WS-Resource from the native side if no special
precaution has been taken in the original library wrapper.
Such a fine granularity of confinement is only needed if the service implementation
is untrusted and there is real concern that the service implementation could be used to
exchange data between resource instances created for different users. A solution to
this problem is the use of distinct service groups (and the corresponding class loaders)
for different instances of the service. In this case, the proposal automatically isolates
the I-Processes corresponding to different WS-Resources since they originate from
different class loaders.
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7.4 Type 3 Grid Applications
To protect type 3 applications, an operating system level virtualisation solution was
implemented using Xen [19]. First, the user creates a custom image using the im-
age creation station. Then, when the user submits a job, the Xen Grid Engine (XGE)
implemented during the course of this work schedules that user’s image sets the ap-
propriate firewall rules and then executes the job. This section presents at selected
implementation issues of these components.
7.4.1 Image Creation Station
The front-end of the ICS is a website implemented in PHP and is hosted by an Apache
web server. A PHP MySQL connector is used to communicate with a MySQL database
in which the user’s data (email address, the SSH public key, preferences and possibly a
PGP public key) and information about virtual machine images are stored. The back-
end consists of several scripts calling the xen tools package which is a set of tools
published by the University of Cambridge to ease the Xen image creation process.
The MySQL database is used for the persistent storage of all meta-data concerning
the user image files. When a user starts a virtual machine on the ICS (to modify the
image), a MAC address, a private IP address and a port to traverse the outer firewall
is assigned dynamically (and must be stored for further use as long as the image is
running). To traverse the outer firewall of the DMZ, in which the ICS is located,
the back-end interacts with the firewall and calls the necessary iptables commands to
activate (and deactivate) the port forwarding to the running virtual machine allowing
the user to log in to the image from outside the demilitarised zone.
For the dynamic IP- and MAC-assignment, a DHCP-server is used that binds IP-
addresses to (virtual) MAC-addresses provided by the virtual network interfaces of
the virtual machines. To enable this, a pool of private MAC-addresses exist that is
specified by the ICS’ administrator. When a virtual machine is booted, the ICS checks
whether a private MAC-address is available. If so, a MAC will be assigned to this
virtual machine’s network interface and the image will be powered up. When the
DHCP-client within the virtual machine requests an IP address, the server will provide
the IP address assigned to the machine’s MAC address. After that, the ICS will choose
a free port on the firewall and set up a forward from this port to the virtual machine’s
SSH port so that the user can log in with his provided public SSH key.
Listing 7.3 shows how a virtual machine is created by the use of the xen-create-
image script provided by the xen-tools software package.
Normally, Xen uses configuration files describing the configuration of a virtual
machine. Since the data of the virtual machines on the ICS is stored in the database,
the command line is used to create the images when to boot the image on the ICS (on
the cluster a static configuration files is used to enable the XGE to boot these images).
Listing 7.4 shows the command line that is executed on the ICS to bring up a virtual
machine:
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Listing 7.3: Image Creation Script
xc = ” / u s r / b i n / xen−c r e a t e−image ”
# [ . . . ]
$xc −−f o r c e −−hostname $1 −−s i z e $5Mb \
−−f s $4 $swap −−d i s t $2 −−m i r r o r $3 −−a r c h ${12} −−d i r = / tmp /
xen / domains / $7 / −−image=${14} ${15} ${16} −−dhcp
Listing 7.4: ICS Image Startup Command
cmd=”xm c r e a t e / dev / n u l l k e r n e l = ’ / boo t / vmlinuz −2.6.18−5−xen
−686’ ramdi sk = ’ / boo t / i n i t r d . img−2.6.18−5−xen−686’ memory
= ’128 ’ r o o t = ’ / dev / hda1 ro ’ ”
cmd=”$cmd d i s k = ’ f i l e : $ 1 d i s k . img , hda1 , w’ ”
i f [ $swap == ” swap ” ] ; t h e n
cmd=”$cmd d i s k = ’ f i l e : $1swap . img , hda2 , w’ ”
f i
cmd=”$cmd name= ’ $2 ’ v i f = ’mac=$3 ’ dhcp = ’ dhcp ’ o n p o w e r o f f = ’
d e s t r o y ’ o n r e b o o t = ’ r e s t a r t ’ o n c r a s h = ’ r e s t a r t ’ vcpus
= ’2 ’”
It should be mentioned that the amount of main memory given by the command
line above is not equal to the amount of main memory that is made available to the
virtual machine on the cluster. This is done to enable multiple users to operate on the
ICS concurrently.
7.4.2 The Xen Grid Engine
The execution of user jobs (and the corresponding images) is handled by a novel,
transparent extension to the Sun Grid Engine (SGE) cluster scheduling environment.
The main reason for transparently extending an exiting cluster scheduling environment
is that existing scheduling algorithms like back-filling and advanced reservation do not
have to be re-invented or re-implemented. The XGE is divided into three modules: Job
Watchdog, Job Handler and VM Handler.
The Job Watchdog is the core component watching for new jobs announced by the
XGE prolog script. If a new job is detected, it is registered within a global job list.
If a job is finished, the Job Watchdog is also notified by the XGE epilog script. The
Job Handler manages all aspects of a job, e.g. registering, deleting, changing etc. It
also offers a network interface for VMs and a special client program for the user. The
VM handler is responsible for the VM management. This includes deployment of VM
images, starting, stopping and deleting VMs.
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7.4.2.1 VM Deployment
Before the SGE can execute a job on the nodes its scheduler has chosen, the XGE must
deploy the user VM image to all compute nodes scheduled to execute the job. The XGE
has a hook in the SGE where it can see which nodes are chosen for scheduling. The
XGE then pauses the SGE and deploys the user image to the chosen nodes. Currently,
the XGE supports three different types of image deployment:
• Local images: If all images reside on the local hard disk of the XGE node, the
XGE can copy the required images from the local disk to the chosen compute
nodes.
• SCP deployment: Images created using the ICS are stored in an image pool
which is accessible via SSH. The required image is copied onto the chosen com-
pute node using Secure Copy (scp). The overhead created by the encryption
process is necessary since the image can contain sensitive data which needs to
be protected.
• Pre deployed images: Before deploying an image, the XGE checks if the re-
quired image is already on the compute node and skips deployment if that is the
case. This mechanism is mainly used for testing purposes to save the deploy-
ment time. It can, however, also be used for image caching if consecutive jobs
require the same image.
7.4.2.2 Placeholder VMs
To make the XGE extension to the SGE transparent, the SGE should not realise that
it is operating on VMs, since it would then see worker nodes appearing and disap-
pearing. This would break SGE’s ability to properly schedule jobs, since the nodes
allocated to the job queues would change all the time. When nodes disappear for a
while, the SGE believes the nodes have crashed and cannot be used for further jobs
and thus reschedules everything. To prevent this from happening, the presented so-
lution uses placeholder VMs which are registered with the SGE job queues. Every
placeholder VM has a SGE execution daemon installed to let the SGE know about a
number of compute nodes and make scheduling decisions. When a job is scheduled,
the scheduling threat of the SGE is briefly halted while the placeholder VM is trans-
parently exchanged with the user VM, so that the SGE does not notice any change and
the existing schedule remains intact.
7.4.2.3 Virtual Job Execution
The execution of a job with the SGE is as follows: A new job is registered at the
sge qmaster, which choses a number of appropriate nodes to execute the job. When
the nodes become available, a job script is delivered to the sge execd running on the
worker nodes. The sge execd starts a sge shepherd executing the actual job. The
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SGE supports prolog and epilog scripts to allow convenient setup and cleanup of the
execution nodes. Both scripts are executed by the sge shepherd on the execution nodes.
Unfortunately the prolog script cannot be used to call the XGE to prepare the user
based virtual machines since the script is executed by the sge shepherd which runs
on the chosen compute nodes. If the scripts were used the XGE would shutdown the
VMs (the placeholder) where the shepherd running and then start the user image. The
new VMs which would have a new sge exed and shepherd which would not have any
information about the job and would not do anything. After a timeout the sge qmaster
would then detect that the shepherd is not responding and would consider the job as
failed and would reschedule it.
To enable the XGE to manage the VMs without hindering the SGE, some modifica-
tions of the source code of the SGE were necessary. The SGE scheduling mechanism
needed to be interrupted after the decision which nodes to use was made, but before the
sge qmaster called the sge execd. Here, a special XGE prolog script was introduced.
This script calls the XGE and waits until all placeholders VMs are shutdown and the
user VMs are running. After that, the control is handed back to the SGE and the proper
sge execd is instructed to execute the job. After the execution of the job, the epilog
script on the execution host calls the XGE epilog script on the cluster headnode. This
indirection is needed, since if the execution node shut itself down, the sge qmaster
would mark the job as failed.
This leads to the following execution flow when a job is submitted to the cluster
scheduling system. (1) A Job is submitted to the SGE. (2) The SGE decides based
on its scheduling configuration and the given constrains (required number of CPUs,
RAM, etc.) on which hosts the Job will be executed. (3) Before the SGE notifies the
execution daemons on the chosen hosts, it is interrupted and hands control over to the
XGE. (4) The XGE shuts down all placeholder VMs on the chosen hosts and starts
the user’s own VMs. (5) Every VM reports back when it has started correctly. When
all VMs are up and running, the XGE runs the user specific firewall configuration
scripts and then hands back the control to the SGE. (6) The SGE continues as normal
and executes the Job. (7) After execution, a pre-defined epilog script is called which
activates the cleanup procedure of the XGE. (8) All VMs belonging to the job are shut
down and the XGE boots up the placeholder VMs. When all placeholder VMs are
back, the control is passed back to the epilog script, which terminates itself.
The integration of virtual machine staging and the transparent exchange of place-
holder and user VM images, allows the combination of years of development put into
cluster scheduling system such as the Sun Grid Engine as well as the security and de-
ployment advantages of virtualisation. However, it should be noted that there is also a
disadvantage to utilising existing cluster infrastructures instead of using a clean slate
approach. It is common to use NFS version 3 as the cluster network filesystem with a
single mount point for all the worker nodes. In a such an environment Linux user ac-
cess control mechanisms are used to isolate the users’ data and consequently NFS will
grant full access to all files to the root user of any machine legally in the NFS network.
Since, with the presented new virtualisation solution all users have a root account, this
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sort of NFS configuration would circumvent all the presented security mechanisms.
There are two solutions to this problem. The cleanest solution is to replace NFS with
a more security aware network filesystem such as SAMBA or NFS version 4. In cases
where that is not possible, multiple NFS mount points and firewall rules should be put
in place to separate the root users from each other. Both solution fall within standard
administrative capabilities and will not be discussed here.
7.4.3 Custom Firewalling
Prior to the generation of a complete firewall rule set, the user’s level of trust must be
determined, as described in the following.
7.4.3.1 Classifying the Level of Trust
In the presented environment, all incoming jobs are submitted through the Globus
Toolkit. This involves an authorisation step in which a X.509 certificate is presented.
The Distinguished Name (DN) of the certificate is compared with the local grid-
mapfile representing the mapping of all valid users against their VO.
Globus hands over the job to the local batch system, SGE. Besides the job data,
Globus also passes information about the job including the username of the job owner.
Since the XGE is closely coupled with the SGE, the username is also visible to the
XGE.
In conjunction with the already mentioned grid-mapfile, the XGE can gain the
required information about the VO from the user’s local username. Due to his or her
membership in a certain VO, it is possible to classify the user’s level of trust.
Every Globus headnode has a grid-mapfile to map X.509 certificate Distinguished
Names (DN) to their associated Unix usernames. A special D-Grid script for polling
the resource and VO management server is used to get information about all valid users
and their membership inside the VOs. The script creates a a valid grid-mapfile for all
current D-Grid users.
The schema of the used Unix usernames encodes the VO as well as a continuous
number. A sample username is dgin0007. Here the user is registered in the in VO
as user number 0007; in is short for InGrid [46] and represents the engineering VO
within the D-Grid.
It is theoretically possible that a user is a member of multiple VOs, thus one X.509
DN maps to several usernames. The current implementation only uses the first VO in
this case. Once multiple VO memberships become a reality in the D-Grid, a mecha-
nism for selecting the desired VO mapping will need to be implemented.
7.4.3.2 Firewall Rule Sets
Rule sets are generated by use of a template. The firewall template is an XML file
representing all firewall settings according to a specific level of trust.
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An example template is shown in listing 7.5. All users can access several ports of
the Globus headnode in the test Grid (10.0.0.1) from all participating compute nodes
(10.0.0.100/30). Access involves normal Globus container operations as well as Secure
Shell (SSH) Login. Additionally, SSH access to 10.0.0.2 is granted. Connections to
the user’s participating VM is permitted, but connections to other nodes or resources
are denied.
Listing 7.5: Common Firewall Ruleset Template
<fw name=” s c r i p t . sh”>
<p o l i c y name=”common” v a l u e =”DENY” />
<p o l i c y name=”INPUT” v a l u e =”DENY” />
<p o l i c y name=”OUTPUT” v a l u e =”DENY” />
<p o l i c y name=”FORWARD” v a l u e =”DENY” />
<s r c >domUs</ s r c >
<d s t >common</ d s t >
<s e t name=”common”>
<h o s t i p = ” 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 ” p r o t o =” t c p ” p o r t =”22 , 2119 , 8443”
/>
<h o s t i p = ” 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 ” p r o t o =” t c p ” p o r t =”22” />
</ s e t >
<s e t name=”domUs”>
<h o s t i p = ” 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 0 ” />
<h o s t i p = ” 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 1 ” />
<h o s t i p = ” 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 2 ” />
<h o s t i p = ” 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 0 3 ” />
</ s e t >
</fw>
Every template starts with <fw name=""> entry. The attribute name of a tem-
plate is initially empty and will be replaced with a unique name when the actual firewall
rule set is generated. This step is important, since it is necessary to explicitly identify
a given rule set. This is necessary to be able to remove the firewall rules after the end
of the computation.
Every template supports default rules for iptables-chains with the
<policy name="" value="" /> tag. Normally, the default policy for all stan-
dard chains (INPUT, OUTPUT, FORWARD) is deny all packets. Default policies for
user defined chains are also supported.
To ease the parsing and the complexity of the template, support for sets is provided.
A set starts with a <set> tag and contains one or more <host> entries. The host tag
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supports various attributes. It contains at least an IP address, a complete IP range or a
specific hostname. The rules currently support the TCP and UDP protocols. A port is
either a single port, an enumeration of ports or a complete port range.
Two tags are particularly important. The <src> tag points to a set representing
all VMs in which the current job is executed. And the <dst> tag points to a set
representing all hosts which can be accessed from the <src> VMs.
Four different XML templates corresponding to the four levels of trust curently
defined are used to generate the firewall rule sets. A template has to be filled with
appropriate values before it can be deployed on the actual compute nodes. First, the
list of compute nodes on which the job is executed is gathered from the SGE. This list
is handed over to the XGE, converted and inserted into the actual template, namely
into the <src> tag.
7.4.3.3 Generating the Firewall Rule Set
Based on the VO of the user, the XGE fetches the correct template for this VO from
the database. An additional database query will check if there are any extension rules
available for the user in question. If there are user specific extensions, they are con-
verted into XML and inserted into the template.
A firewall rule set generator, connected to the XGE, parses the template and creates
a shell script which contains iptables commands which can be executed. The Expat
XML parser [64] and Python are used. All entries of the XML file are converted to
an internal object representation. The representation consists of one ore more trees
representing the firewall rules. Figure 7.2 shows the tree based representation of a
firewall template.
To generate the shell script, the trees are traversed in a special order:
1. The first entries represent the default-policy-tree.
2. The second entry represents the network source and destination hosts.
3. The third entry represents all allowed connections to one or more hosts (includ-
ing protocol and ports)
During the traversal, every object has a special method which outputs the correspond-
ing rule. The rules are all connected to an iptables-chain uniquely named after the
username and the job id. This step is necessary, because a set of rules must be matched
to a specific job.
All rules are inserted into a temporary shell script. Finally, a static, pre-defined
number of rules are also added. These rules are standard rules for instance to prevent
spoofing and a number of other well known attacks.
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Figure 7.2: Tree Based Representation of the Firewall Template
7.4.3.4 Firewall Actions
To actually protect the network with the generated shell script, the XGE has to deploy
the script to the privileged domains 0. As already mentioned in the previous section,
the XGE already has a list of hosts on which the job is executed, so the deployment is
not a problem. Based on this list (which only contains VMs), the host machines are
determined. The script is now copied to all these machines. Afterwards, the scripts are
executed and all firewall rules become active. It is indispensable to install the firewall
rules on the host machine, not on the virtual machine itself. All users are superusers
inside their VM, so they could easily remove the rules and thus bypass the protection.
Figure 7.3 shows how the firewalls protect the infrastructure and shield the users from
each other.
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Figure 7.3: Multiple Dynamic Firewalls Installed in the Domain 0
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To match all packets originating from a VM, the physdev-module from the Linux
kernel is used. This module allows the traffic to be filtered on the data link layer, which
is needed due to the fact that Xen uses a bridge to connect the VM to the network.
The default policy of all of templates is deny, so everything which is not explicitly
permitted is forbidden. The exception is that connections between the hosts in the
<src>-Tag are allowed.
After the job is finished, the XGE is also responsible for the deactivation of the
firewall rules. It will reset the node into its factory setting. The described procedure is
autonomous and does not require any repeated work from the resource provider.
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Figure 7.4: Steps Required for Job Computation with VO-based Firewalls
To summarise, figure 7.4 gives an overview of all steps needed to deploy VO-based
firewalls. Every valid Grid user can use the Image Creation Station (ICS) to create
his/her own customised virtual machines (VM). The user can login to his/her created
VM and install and customise the VM to his/her needs. The VM is then deployed onto
the cluster. After a job is submitted by this user, the XGE chooses the user’s own VMs
and boots them.
1. The user creates a fully customised Xen image at the ICS. This image represents
the base for the desired computations.
2. The image is transferred to the cluster headnode. The connection is initialised
from the cluster network. This ensures maximum security, because no open
incoming port towards the cluster network needs to be open.
3. The user launches a Globus GRAM call to start the job.
4. The Globus Toolkit hands over all job information to the cluster scheduler, which
schedules the job to a number of compute nodes.
5. The XGE interrupts the scheduler and queries a database to get the required
templates and extensions suited for this user.
6. The database answers the query.
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7. Based on the template, a firewall-script is generated and installed onto the privi-
leged domains 0 of the chosen compute nodes.
8. The firewall script is executed on the domain 0.
9. The XGE starts the images created in the first step and hands over the control
flow to the resource manager.
10. The job is executed.
11. The results are copied back.
12. The scheduler extracts the results and hands them over to the Globus Toolkit,
which is responsible for user notification. Furthermore, the XGE shuts down all
VMs.
13. All generated firewall rules used by this job are flushed and the firewall is reset
to factory settings.
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7.5 Network Security
In the following, some details on the implementation of the demilitarised zone are
presented.
7.5.1 Demilitarised Zone
The restrictions on the outer border firewall have to be minimal so as to not impede
standard Grid operations. The Globus Toolkit uses a large dynamic port range thus
requiring large open port ranges. The outer firewall is mainly responsible to filter
invalid or detectable malicious network traffic (e.g. unrouteable packets, port scans,
packets outside of the Grid port range).
The rules for the inner firewall are more restrictive. Connections initiated from
the border network towards the cluster headnode are denied entirely, except for one
port needed to transfer job data, which is handled by Fence. Connections towards this
port are only allowed from the Globus headnode. Connections from the subnet where
the ICS resides are also forbidden. Internet connectivity for the cluster headnode is
provided via Network Address Translation (NAT).
7.5.2 End-to-End Encryption
Due to the separation of the Grid headnode from the cluster headnode, GSI is no
longer capable of offering end-to-end encryption since the decryption process of GSI
is executed on the Grid headnode. To offer end-to-end encryption which does not
decrypt user data in the potentially unsafe DMZ, a new DMZ and virtualisation aware
job encryption mechanisms was implemented. The following steps are required for
end-to-end encryption.
• Session key generation and job submission: First, the session key is generated.
The software encrypts the job, data with this key. Furthermore, the session key is
encrypted with the XGE public key and appended to the GRAM-RSL file. Then,
a GRAM call is sent to the Globus machine, and GridFTP is used to transfer the
encrypted job data.
• New job arrives: After a new job arrives at the Globus headnode, Fence transfers
this job to the cluster headnode. All transferred data remains encrypted at all
times.
• New job arrives at the cluster headnode: After the XGE recognises a new job
it extracts the session key from the job description and decrypts the job with
the private key and starts the corresponding user image. XGE then starts the
computation.
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• Computation finished: After successful computation, the results are encrypted
within the secure virtual environment and are then handed back to the Globus
headnode.
To handle the integration of session keys into Globus, the RSL extension field was
used and two new tags were introduced: <inputArchive> and <ID>. On the
client-side, the job data is stored inside a Zip-archive (named by the first tag), which
is encrypted with the session key. The second tag holds the encrypted key. Encrypting
the session key with a public key ensures that the key can be transferred over insecure
channels and stored on an untrusted storage device e.g. the Grid headnode. The secret
key is stored securely on the cluster head node and is not accessible by any users.
7.5.3 Job Submission, Transfer and Execution
The separation of the cluster network into two networks developed the need for a new
software to transfer job data from one headnode to another.
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Figure 7.5: Interaction of Fence and the XGE
Figure 7.5 displays the interaction of Fence and the XGE. After a customer starts a
job, via Globus GRAM, Globus starts the dhnc. It announces the new job via a message
to the chnd. To get the related job data, the chnd initiates a connection to the dhnd from
within the cluster network. All data is exchanged over this connection. When all data
has been transfered, the chnd notifies the XGE about the new job. The XGE starts the
user image, transfers the job data into the image and starts the computation. When the
computation is finished, the XGE transfers the results back to the Globus headnode.
The user can get the results with either GridFTP or SSH.
All components, except for the Job Manager, are written in C. This enables a high
performance and a small memory-footprint. Due to the nature of C, a careful source
code audit was necessary to avoid the common pitfalls, e.g. buffer overflows or format
string vulnerabilities. The two daemons, chnd and dhnd, need special attention due to
their prominent position. Thus, these two daemons run as unprivileged users and in a
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chroot environment. Chroot is an operation on Unix operating systems that changes
to root directory. An application inside a chroot ”jail” cannot name directories outside
this jail. This provides a convenient way to create a sandbox-like environment. Never-
theless, it is possible to escape from such a environment [37]. To minimise this risk, it
is recommended to install a kernel hardening patch, e.g. [184] or [167].
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7.6 Rotating Servers
A number of different systems were implemented to achieve virtual server rotation.
The first idea was to utilise existing technology for hot failover. The Linux UCARP
daemon together with a very simple script shown in listing 7.6 was used. UCARP hot
failover works by monitoring the heartbeat of an active server. If the heartbeat stops
(when the Rotation Manager shuts down the VM), the waiting backup server takes
the active role. Since this is done automatically, the rotation script is very simple, the
active VM just has to be destroyed and the backup will take over. Then, a new backup
server is started. However, due to the polling nature of UCARP and no built-in state
rescue mechanisms, the delay between one server going down and the other serving
requests with the correct state, is a few seconds. In the meantime, clients trying to
connect to the server get an error message.
Listing 7.6: UCARP
echo ” S w i t c h i n g from \$VM RUNNING t o \$VM WAITING . . . ”
xm d e s t r o y \$VM RUNNING # No need f o r a c l e a n shutdown
echo ”Done . ”
/ / d e l a y
xm c r e a t e −c / dev / n u l l k e r n e l = / boo t / vmlinuz−2.6−xenU name=head
memory=280 d i s k = f i l e : / v a r / xen / images /
head . img , hda ,w r o o t = / dev / hda i p = 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 2 0 1 netmask
= 2 5 5 . 2 5 5 . 2 5 5 . 0 gateway = ” 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 0 1 ” v i f =” i p = 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 2 0 1 ”
To avoid the polling delay of existing hot failover mechanisms, it was decided to
use an active component for the rotation and utilise dynamic routing to switch between
the Xen instances. To avoid having to utilise network address translation (NAT) and
the problems involved with it, and to minimise the security risk to the Xen0, the two
Service Host XenUs both receive public IP addresses for their eth0/vifx—y.0 device.
This means that the Xen0 does not need to rewrite any packets or offer any complex
services, it simply acts as a router to the outside world. Since only one of the XenUs’
eth0 is connected to the physical eth0 network device, both XenUs were given the same
IP address for their eth0s. The VMs are started in routed mode instead of the standard
bridged mode, since this way the virtual interfaces are immediately connected and
there is no collision. It is convenient to give both VMs the same IP, since the Globus
Grid middleware requires a host certificate for secure communication. This Grid X.509
certificate is bound to a distinguished name (DN) and the DN is bound to an IP address.
When Globus starts, it does a reverse lookup on its IP address, compares the name with
its certificate and fails to start if there is a mismatch. If different IPs were to be used,
two entries would need to be made in the reverse lookup table of the DNS server, so the
same DN would be returned for two different IP addresses. This is not a real problem,
but since both XenUs can be given the same IP address, it is not necessary to contact
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the DNS administrator and thus create a more portable system. It is also important to
configure the Xen0 as an ARP proxy, so the Xen0 can respond to ARP requests for the
Service Hosts and receive and forward packets addressed to them. The second virtual
network interface eth1/vifx—y.1 is started with different IP addresses, so both images
can be connected to the Storage Host at the same time. The eth1 network is not routed
outside of the Xen0 and does not connect the Service Host X to the Service Host Y.
Listing 7.7: Rotation Manager
p r i v a t e vo id i n i t i a l i z e ( S t r i n g p l u g i n ) {
C l a s s c l = C l a s s . forName ( p l u g i n ) ;
j a v a . l a n g . r e f l e c t . C o n s t r u c t o r con =
c l . g e t C o n s t r u c t o r ( new C l a s s [ ] {
S t r i n g . c l a s s , S t r i n g . c l a s s } ) ;
G u a r d i a n P l u g i n p = ( G u a r d i a n P l u g i n )
con . n e w I n s t a n c e ( new O b j e c t [ ] {
vmRunning . g e t I P ( ) ,
vmRunning . ge tNetmask ( ) } ) ;
}
p r i v a t e i n t r o t a t e ( )
{
dropSyns ( t r u e ) ;
vmWaiting . l o a d S t a t e ( ) ; / / t h r e a d e d
i f ( ! p . v a l i d a t e S w i t c h ( p a r s e C o n n t r a c k ( ) ) )
{ dropSyns ( f a l s e ) ;
r e t u r n p . i n t e r v a l ( ) ; }
w h i l e ( ! vmWaiting . i s S t a t e L o a d e d ( ) ) {
Thread . y i e l d ( ) ;
Thread . s l e e p ( i n t e r v a l l ) ; }
runCommand ( new S t r i n g [ ] {” i p ” , ” r o u t e ” ,
” d e l ” , vmRunning . g e t I P ( ) , ” dev ” ,
vmRunning . g e t V i r t u a l I n t e r f a c e ( ) } ) ;
runCommand ( new S t r i n g [ ] {” i p ” , ” r o u t e ” ,
” add ” , vmWaiting . g e t I P ( ) , ” dev ” ,
vmWaiting . g e t V i r t u a l I n t e r f a c e ( ) } ) ;
d ropSyns ( f a l s e ) ;
r e t u r n 0 ;
}
172 7.6. ROTATING SERVERS
The Rotation Manager and the Guardian Plugins are written in Java. A simple Ro-
tation Manager using a Bash script for better peformance was also implemented, how-
ever, the greater flexibility and security of Java outweighed the performance deficit.
Listing 7.7 shows an excerpt of the Rotation Manager. The first method is used to
load the Guardian Plugin which implements a method validateSwitch to parse
the /proc/net/ip conntrack file and checks whether a rotation is safe or not
and whether the rotation should take place anyway. The method rotate is called at
the end of every time slice to initiate rotation. The first statement sets the iptables to
drop all SYN packets, thus it does not accept any new connection any more. This is
the start of the critical part. A separate thread is then tasked to load the state for the
waiting VM while the Guardian Plugin checks whether to rotate or not.
The critical part under typical connection patterns is roughly 350ms long and has
not caused any problems outside of the stress tests. A secure programming language
like Java is desirable since the Rotation Manager is one of the few components running
on the Xen0. A compromise in this code compromises the entire system. While the
attack possibilities are slim, it is conceivable that parsing of the IP conntrack file at
/proc/net/ip conntrack could be used as an attack. If the Guardian Plugin
allows the rotation process to continue, the waiting VM is queried if the state has
been successfully loaded. Once that is the case, the old network route is deleted and
the new network route is created. The last command is to tell iptables to accept new
connections again. If the Guardian Plugin denies the rotation, new connections are
accepted again and the rotate method returns the number of milliseconds after which a
new rotation attempt is to be made.
During the critical part, no new connections are allowed, thus if a connection at-
tempt is made within these 350ms, the connection will fail. Since the TCP/IP protocol
is fault-tolerant, this does not lead to an application error but to a TCP retry. The
TCP/IP timeout is usually 30 seconds. This is not a problem for automated applica-
tions, since package loss occurs naturally and Grid execution time is usually hours or
days and thus 30 seconds are not an issue. If, however, the connection is due to human
interaction, 30 seconds is too long as a response time. The current implementation
simply drops the SYN packets. A more efficient solution is to delay the SYN packets
by 400ms instead of dropping them. This is within the tolerance for TCP/IP packets
and would not be noticed by the user. At the end of the critical part, the delay is turned
off again. The latter solution, however, is not implemented yet. Since none of the real
world applications ran into this problem, it was not a priority. This issue will discussed
further in the experimental results section.
A simple example of a Guardian Plugin is shown in listing 7.8. The first command
checks whether the number of times this Guardian has consecutively aborted is higher
than the maximum number of allowed failed rotations, then it allows rotation no matter
if there are active connections or not. Otherwise, it loops through the Conntrack entries
to check for TCP/IP connections. If it finds TCP/IP connections which are not in the
CLOSED or TIME WAIT state, it increments the number of aborted rotations and
returns false. If the Guardian allows rotation, it resets the number of aborted rotations.
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Listing 7.8: Guardian Plugin
i n t i n t e r v a l = 1 0 ; / / s e c o n d s
i n t maxRot = 3 ; / / maximum f a i l e d r o t a t i o n s
p u b l i c b o o l e a n v a l i d a t e S w i t c h (
C o n n t r a c k E n t r y [ ] ce ) t h r ow s
S w i t c h V a l i d a t o r E x c e p t i o n {
i f ( n r O f R e t r i e s >=maxRot ) {
n r O f R e t r i e s =0 ;
r e t u r n t r u e ; / / f o r c e d
}
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < ce . l e n g t h ; i ++ ) {
i f ( ( ce [ i ] . g e t D s t I P ( ) . e q u a l s ( g e t I P ( ) )
| | ce [ i ] . g e t S r c I P ( ) . e q u a l s ( g e t I P ( ) ) )
&& ce [ i ] . g e t P r o t o c o l ( ) .
e q u a l s ( C o n n t r a c k E n t r y . TCP)
&& ! ce [ i ] . g e t T C P S t a t e ( ) .
e q u a l s ( C o n n t r a c k E n t r y . TIME WAIT )
&& ! ce [ i ] . g e t T C P S t a t e ( ) .
e q u a l s ( C o n n t r a c k E n t r y . CLOSE) )
n r O f R e t r i e s ++;
r e t u r n f a l s e ; / / d e l a y e d
}
n r O f R e t r i e s =0 ;
r e t u r n t r u e ; / / a l l o w e d }
This is a very simple Guardian Plugin and should only be seen as an example which
allows three failed rotations and specifies a ten second delay for retrying the rotation.
One of the most important services for the operation of the Grid is the WS-GRAM
service. The modifications to the this service are relatively small. The standard WS-
GRAM uses the Globus class PersistenceHelper to store and load its state. The
service was configured to use the developed PersistenceDBHelper with the same in-
terface to load and store the state in the remote database. Listing 7.9 shows an excerpt
from the Database Persistence Helper. First, a connection to the database is fetched
from the connection store. Then, if no table exists for the object to be stored, a new
table is created. Then, an ObjectOutPutStream is created for all values to be stored,
and the values are inserted into the database.
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Listing 7.9: Database Persistence Helper
c = d a t a s t o r e . g e t C o n n e c t i o n ( ) ;
i f ( ! t a b l e E x i s t s ( tableName ) ) {
ps = c . p r e p a r e S t a t e m e n t ( ”CREATE TABLE”
+ tableName +” ( key t e x t , s t a t e s b y t e a ) ; ” ) ;
ps . e x e c u t e U p d a t e ( ) ;
ps . c l o s e ( ) ;
}
/ / S e r i a l i z e
t r y {
baos = new B y t e A r r a y O u tp u t S t r e a m ( ) ;
oos = new O b j e c t O u t p u t S t r e a m ( baos ) ;
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i<v a l u e s . l e n g t h ; i ++)
oos . w r i t e O b j e c t ( v a l u e s [ i ] ) ;
oos . f l u s h ( ) ;
} c a t c h ( IOExcep t ion e ) {
th row new S e r i a l i z a t i o n E x c e p t i o n
( e . ge tMessage ( ) ) ;
}
ps = n u l l ;
i n t c o u n t = countRowsWithKey ( tableName , key ) ;
i f ( c o u n t == 0 )
ps = c . p r e p a r e S t a t e m e n t ( ” INSERT INTO ”+ tableName+
” VALUES ( ? , ? ) ; ” ) ;
e l s e i f ( c o u n t == 1 ) {
ps = c . p r e p a r e S t a t e m e n t ( ”UPDATE ”+ tableName+
” SET key =? , s t a t e s =? WHERE key = ? ; ” ) ;
ps . s e t S t r i n g ( 3 , g e t K e y S t r i n g ( key ) ) ;
} e l s e
throw new R e s o u r c e E x c e p t i o n ( ” M u l t i p l e e n t r i e s
wi th same ResourceKey found ; ” ) ;
ps . s e t S t r i n g ( 1 , g e t K e y S t r i n g ( key ) ) ;
ps . s e t B y t e s ( 2 , baos . t o B y t e A r r a y ( ) ) ;
ps . e x e c u t e U p d a t e ( ) ;
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7.7 Intrusion Detection
The S-IDS system was implemented using the PIPES library [14], the JPcap library
[79] and Snort [166]. Snort is used to leverage existing single node NIDS capability
into the S-IDS. JPcap which provides an interface to capture raw network traffic in
Java is used as the main sensor information source for the PIPES detection queries.
PIPES is used to connect the different sensor sites and perform distributed temporal
queries on the sensors.
7.7.1 Snort Integration
An important design requirement was that existing IDS tools should be easily inte-
grated so as not to have to implement everything from scratch. As an example Snort
was chosen. Snort is placed in the DMZ between the border firewall and the bor-
der network. Snort analyses all incoming traffic and compares it against its signature
database. To better suite the Grid environment, the Snort signature database was ex-
tended with Globus specific attack signatures for single node attack detection. An ex-
ample of a proof-of-concept single host DoS attacks detection rule for attacks against
GridFTP is shown in listing 7.10.
Listing 7.10: Snort DoS Detection Rule
a l e r t t c p $EXTERNAL NET any −> $HOME NET \
2811 ( msg : ” Globus GridFTP DoS a t t a c k ” ; \
f low : s t a t e l e s s ; f l a g s : S ; t h r e s h o l d : t y p e \
both , t r a c k b y s r c , c o u n t 1000 , s e c o n d s 3 0 ; \
c l a s s t y p e : d e n i a l−of−s e r v i c e ; )
The rule logs the message ’GridFTP DoS attack’, if more than a 1000 TCP packets
arrive within 30 seconds. The threshold needs to be adjusted to each site’s expected
usage. Since the attacking packets try to establish a connection, the SYN flag must be
set. The classification of the rule is set to DoS. If an attack is registered, there are three
responses: First, a log entry is written, solely for documentation purposes. Second, the
Grid and cluster administrators receive an alert message.
The integration into PIPES is achieved by writing a custom AlertSource. Listing
7.11 shows the source code of the SnortAlertSource, that was implemented to attach
a Snort instance to the PIPES graph. The field br contains a BufferedReader, that
reads from the stdout of a Snort instance and is created within the constructor. The
ShutdownHook in line 26 is used to cleanly exit Snort when the S-IDS sensor is shut
down. A custom PIPES source only has to provide the next() method to be a valid
source. In line 38, the reader is queried for a new line with the blocking readLine()
operation. When a new alert is delivered by Snort, it is fed into the IDMEFAlertFactory
which creates an IDMEF alert object from the string read. This alert is packed into an
AlertOrObjectBean which is then packed into a temporal container with a default time
window, based on the systems current time. If no reader is set, there is a problem
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Listing 7.11: Excerpt from SnortAlertSource
p u b l i c c l a s s S n o r t A l e r t S o u r c e e x t e n d s A b s t r a c t T e m p o r a l S o u r c e <
Ale r tOrOb jec tBean > {
B u f f e r e d R e a d e r b r = n u l l ;
p r i v a t e S t r i n g s n o r t E x e c = ” s n o r t −dq −c / e t c / s n o r t / s n o r t .
con f −A c o n s o l e ” ;
p u b l i c S n o r t A l e r t S o u r c e ( S t r i n g p a t h T o S n o r t ) {
i f ( ! p a t h T o S n o r t . e q u a l s ( ” ” ) ) s n o r t E x e c = p a t h T o S n o r t ;
Runtime r t = Runtime . ge tRun t ime ( ) ;
t r y {
P r o c e s s p = r t . exec ( s n o r t E x e c ) ;
r t . addShutdownHook ( new ShutDownHook ( p ) ) ;
b r = new B u f f e r e d R e a d e r ( new I n p u t S t r e a m R e a d e r ( p .
g e t I n p u t S t r e a m ( ) ) ) ;
} c a t c h ( IOExcep t ion e ) {
e . p r i n t S t a c k T r a c e ( ) ;
}
}
p u b l i c Tempora lObjec t<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean > n e x t ( ) t h ro ws
NoSuchElementExcept ion {
i f ( b r == n u l l ) th row new NoSuchElementExcept ion ( ) ;
l ong s = System . c u r r e n t T i m e M i l l i s ( ) ;
S t r i n g i n ;
t r y {
i f ( ( i n = br . r e a d L i n e ( ) ) != n u l l ) r e t u r n new Tempora lObjec t<
Ale r tOrOb jec tBean >(new A l e r t O r O b j e c t B e a n (
IDMEFAler tFac tory . g e n e r a t e A l e r t F r o m S n o r t I n p u t ( i n ) ) , new
T i m e I n t e r v a l ( s , s +1) ) ;
e l s e throw new NoSuchElementExcept ion ( ) ;
} c a t c h ( IOExcep t ion e ) {
th row new NoSuchElementExcept ion ( ) ;
}
}
}
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reading the input or no input could be found, a NoSuchElementException is thrown. If
the data flow has to be debugged PIPES’ sink/source architecture allows easy access to
the stream. An intermediate sink that logs all objects passing through the graph can be
attached within the query graph, without influencing the rest of the graphs behavior.
7.7.2 Custom Pipes Queries
Figure 7.6: Aggregator PIPES Queries
The use of PIPES allows distributed attacks to be detected. Figure 7.6 shows a de-
tailed view of the PIPES based aggregation and detection logic with two active rules:
distributed portscan and DDoS detection. An aggregator receives objects via multiple
streams from the SocketSource ((1)). There are two streams arriving from each child
attached to an aggregator, identified by a sourceID. One stream contains alert objects
and the other stream contains raw data (e.g. the packet header data). The streams are
grouped by their sourceID and passed from the SocketSource into an initial Union,
which unifies the incoming streams ((2)) for rule application/alert forwarding. Their
incoming information is then passed through an IdentityPipe ((3)). This is necessary
because of PIPES ONC-mechanism: during runtime new child nodes can be attached
and therefore the union has to be recreated. Without the identity pipe as connection
point for downstream rules, PIPES would assume the query graph was closed and as a
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result shutdown the rule graphs. The red arrows of figure 7.6 denote the flow of alert
objects, the light blue ones denote the flow for non-alert objects. The blue box contains
the graph parts for the detection rules based on non-alert information. In the upper part
of the figure are two unions ((4)), unifying the corresponding output of all alert and
non-alert analysis parts before piping them to the SocketSink ((5)).
The distributed TCP portscan detection rule is shown in the orange box in figure
7.6. First, the TemporalFilter (σ ) filters all objects that do not represent TCP packets.
Then, a TemporalWindow (ω) operator is applied to the data stream, setting the va-
lidity of objects to a configurable window size, for instance 5 seconds. This operator
is followed by a TimeGranularity (g) operator that rounds the validity intervals of the
stream objects to a configurable base, for instance to the full second. This is necessary
for the following aggregation operator, since the granularity of validity-timestamps
controls the intervals in which aggregation results are propagated. This mechanism is
used to reduces the number of messages that need to be processed. Next, the Tempo-
ralGrouperAndAggregator (γ) groups relevant TCP packets by their incoming IP and
port number before counting the number of packets per time window. Finally, the ag-
gregation output is packaged for shipping, using a TemporalMapper operator (µ) using
the sources IP Address as the key. Listing 7.12 shows the corresponding Java code for
this process.
Listing 7.12: PIPES Portscan Detection
/ / F i l t e r non−SYN P a c k e t s
P r e d i c a t e <Tempora lObjec t<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean >> p o r t S c a n P r e d =
new P r e d i c a t e <Tempora lObjec t<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean >> ( ) {
p u b l i c b o o l e a n i nv ok e ( Tempora lObjec t<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean > o ) {
i f ( o . g e t O b j e c t ( ) . g e t E l e m e n t ( ) == n u l l ) r e t u r n f a l s e ;
i f ( ! ( o . g e t O b j e c t ( ) . g e t E l e m e n t ( ) i n s t a n c e o f TCPPacket ) )
r e t u r n f a l s e ;
TCPPacket p = ( TCPPacket ) o . g e t O b j e c t ( ) . g e t E l e m e n t ( ) ;
r e t u r n p . syn && ! p . ack ;
}
} ;
F i l t e r <Tempora lObjec t<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean >> f i l t e r P o r t S c a n = new
F i l t e r <Tempora lObjec t<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean >>( s r c ,
p o r t S c a n P r e d ) ;
/ / Apply Temporal Window
TemporalWindow<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean > tw = new TemporalWindow<
Ale r tOrOb jec tBean >( f i l t e r P o r t S c a n , D e t e c t i o n C o n s t a n t s .
PORTSCAN WINDOWSIZE) ;
/ / G r a n u l a r i t y
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T i m e G r a n u l a r i t y <Ale r tOrOb jec tBean > t g = new T i m e G r a n u l a r i t y <
Ale r tOrOb jec tBean >(tw , D e t e c t i o n C o n s t a n t s .
PORTSCAN TIME GRANULARITY) ;
/ / Grouper and A g g r e g a t o r − group by s r c i p
Func t i on <Ale r tOrOb jec tBean , I n e t A d d r e s s > de tGroup = new
Func t ion <Ale r tOrOb jec tBean , I n e t A d d r e s s >() {
p u b l i c I n e t A d d r e s s i nv ok e ( A l e r t O r O b j e c t B e a n o ) {
r e t u r n ( ( TCPPacket ) o . g e t E l e m e n t ( ) ) . s r c i p ;
}
} ;
/ / custom p i p e s−a g g r e g a t o r c o u n t s t h e syns and c o l l e c t s t h e
p o r t s / t a r g e t s
P o r t s c a n C o u n t agg = new P o r t s c a n C o u n t ( ) ;
TemporalGroupAndAggregator<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean , I n e t A d d r e s s ,
P o r t s c a n A g g r e g a t i o n I n f o > t g a = new
TemporalGroupAndAggregator<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean , I n e t A d d r e s s ,
P o r t s c a n A g g r e g a t i o n I n f o >( tg , detGroup , agg ) ;
/ / map agg o u t p u t t o g e n e r i c s u b m i t t a b l e bean , s i n c e s o c k e t s i n k
has t o be t y p e d and on ly one p o r t s h o u l d be used .
Func t i on <Tempora lObjec t<Entry<I n e t A d d r e s s ,
P o r t s c a n A g g r e g a t i o n I n f o >>, Tempora lObjec t<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean
>> mapFunc = new Func t ion <Tempora lObjec t<Entry<I n e t A d d r e s s ,
P o r t s c a n A g g r e g a t i o n I n f o >>, Tempora lObjec t<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean
>>() {
p u b l i c Tempora lObjec t<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean > i n vo ke (
Tempora lObjec t<Entry<I n e t A d d r e s s , P o r t s c a n A g g r e g a t i o n I n f o
>> argument ) {
r e t u r n new Tempora lObjec t<Ale r tOrOb jec tBean >(new
A l e r t O r O b j e c t B e a n ( new S e r i a l i z a b l e E n t r y <I n e t A d d r e s s ,
P o r t s c a n A g g r e g a t i o n I n f o >( a rgument . g e t O b j e c t ( ) ) ) , a rgument
. g e t T i m e I n t e r v a l ( ) ) ;
}
} ;
TemporalMapper<Entry<I n e t A d d r e s s , P o r t s c a n A g g r e g a t i o n I n f o > ,
A l e r tOrOb jec tBean > map = new TemporalMapper<Entry<
I n e t A d d r e s s , P o r t s c a n A g g r e g a t i o n I n f o > , A l e r tOrOb jec tBean >(
tga , mapFunc ) ;
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The DDoS attack detection rule is shown in the purple boxes in figure 7.6. Unlike a
traditional single node solution, simple SYN counting or traffic volume measurement
is not sufficient in a Grid scenario. In a service-oriented Grid, a single node will re-
quest results from many other nodes and the answers depending on the volume could
be misidentified as a DDoS attack. To prevent this kind of false positive, the detection
query must take Grid job submission into account to filter out wanted from unwanted
traffic. For this reason, the DDoS rule is divided into two parts. The smaller box on the
left detects job-submission patterns and adds matching senders to a list of IPs that may
send large amounts of traffic from the monitored nodes. Employing the same approach
as with the distributed portscans query shown above, the input object stream is filtered
for TCP packets, then TimeGranularity and TemporalWindow operators are applied.
In combination with a TemporalGrouperAndAggregator, grouping by source IP and
counting distinct destination IPs, every IP that contacts a number of distinct nodes in
a certain time window at a given number of Grid specific ports is added to an IP white
list. Here, the temporal aspect of PIPES offers a natural advantage since the white list
automatically expires at the end of the time windows. Listing 7.13 shows the simple
approach of writing a custom data sink. GoodIPs is a global field, containing the IP’s
whitelist. The processObject method is the only method necessary for a PIPES-sink
implementation. If a traffic source is not yet known, a GoodIPs entry is created con-
taining a set of hosts targeted. Otherwise, the current target hosts are added to the set
of the existing entry. These target-host sets are used for validation of outgoing traffic,
which is only considered benign if the set of hosts generating the traffic is a subset
of the afore mentioned target-host set. The second part of the DDoS detection query
shown on the right counts the connections to the same hosts. A TemporalFilter checks
if a corresponding entry exists in the IP white list for the corresponding host and raises
an alert if the count reaches a certain threshold of non white listed connections. The
alert is then piped into the alerts channel (red arrows).
The initial part of the master resembles the aggregator (see figure 7.8 and the sec-
tion above). After the first union, the master does a final application of the portscan
recognition logic, shown in the blue box. If the aggregation value does not exceed
the threshold, the object is discarded or otherwise mapped into an alert. In the alert
channel, a TemporalMapper (µ , (1)) unpacks the alerts from their AlertOrObjectBean.
After the union ((2)) with alerts created by the portscan logic, all alerts are delivered
to the user GUI through a custom AlertSink ((3)). Figure 7.7) shows the detection of
two distributed portscans.
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Listing 7.13: The Custom Sink Used for DDoS Detection
A b s t r a c t T e m p o r a l S i n k <Entry<I n e t A d d r e s s , DDoSAggregat ionInfo>>
s i n k = new A b s t r a c t T e m p o r a l S i n k <Entry<I n e t A d d r e s s ,
DDoSAggregat ionInfo >>( t g a ) {
@Override
p u b l i c vo id p r o c e s s O b j e c t ( Tempora lObjec t<Entry<I n e t A d d r e s s ,
DDoSAggregat ionInfo>> in , i n t s o u r c e I D ) th ro ws
I l l e g a l A r g u m e n t E x c e p t i o n {
Entry<I n e t A d d r e s s , DDoSAggregat ionInfo> o = i n . g e t O b j e c t ( ) ;
i f ( o . g e t V a l u e ( ) . g e t C o u n t ( ) > D e t e c t i o n C o n s t a n t s .
DDOS CON COUNT THRESHOLD) {
/ / t h i s s r c i s n o t y e t known , add i t
i f ( ! goodIPs . c o n t a i n s K e y ( o . getKey ( ) . g e t H o s t A d d r e s s ( ) ) ) {
goodIPs . p u t ( o . getKey ( ) . g e t H o s t A d d r e s s ( ) , o . g e t V a l u e ( ) )
;
}
/ / s r c i s known − add more t a r g e t h o s t s
e l s e
goodIPs . g e t ( o . getKey ( ) . g e t H o s t A d d r e s s ( ) ) .
g e t T a r g e t H o s t s ( ) . ad dA l l ( o . g e t V a l u e ( ) . g e t T a r g e t H o s t s
( ) ) ;
}
}
} ;
Figure 7.7: Recognised Portscan in First Row
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Figure 7.8: PIPES Setup of the Master Node
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7.8 Trust
A system architecture supporting trust management in service-oriented Grid applica-
tions is presented in Fig. 7.9. The system consists of two main components, the trust
engine and the verification engine. The trust engine manages trust values and offers
partner discovery and rating functionality to higher level applications, such as work-
flow engines or job scheduling systems. The verification engine handles the verifica-
tion of Grid service results and generates the necessary feedback for the trust engine
regarding the partner. For brevity, the discussion will be focused on the service con-
sumers use of those platform components.
Figure 7.9: Architecture of a Grid System Supporting the Presented Trust Model
The user starts with specifying his or her trust requirements along with the input
data to a trust enabled Grid application (1), which in turn uses the workflow engine of
the local service-oriented Grid platform (2). To enable the selection of trusted services,
the decision is made based on a rated list of potential partner services that is obtained
from the trust engine (3). The trust engine uses its service discovery component to dis-
cover individual services (4) and to collect recommendations from other trust engines
(5). These values are stored in the local trust pool to be used in subsequent interac-
tions. The user specified trust profile is also stored in a trust pool for later reference
and use by other components in the trust engine. The information gathered by the trust
engine is now processed according to the user’s trust profile specification and passed
on to the workflow engine which then can use the partner services according to the
rating generated by the trust engine.
Invocation of external services is then delegated to an invocation handler (6). The
invocation handler consults the verification engine (7) to determine whether a call has
184 7.8. TRUST
to be replicated or redirected (e.g. to perform the best of n verification strategy). The
verification engine considers the trust profile managed by the trust engine (7), allowing,
for example, cost-trust-ratio relations to be taken into account. The resulting invoca-
tion is carried out at the selected partner services and results - both synchronous and
asynchronous (notification) results - are then collected by the invocation handler (8)
and verified through the verification engine, using a strategy and verification module
consistent with the user supplied trust profile (9). The overall result of this process is
then passed to the workflow engine that collects results for the application to present
them to the end user.
The configuration of the trust engine by use of trust requirement profiles influences
three phases during execution of an application workflow. These main phases are
addressed by the three arrows in Figure 7.10.
The initialisation profile determines the influence and scope of factors used for the
initialisation of trust values to be used in an interaction. It allows to manually assign
trust values to certain interaction partners, as well as specifying how trust recommen-
dations of partners are handled and weighted. This profile specifies the behaviour of
the local platform in a situation that requires the establishment of first trust.
Figure 7.10: Trust Profile
The source selection profile determines the selection of behaviour trust dimensions
(e.g. availability, accuracy) as well as trust sources (e.g. personal experience, recom-
mendations from directly known partners) to determine a partner ranking according
to the application needs. This allows a user to take accuracy trust recommendations
from known partners into account with a higher weight than, for example, availability
values (which might be caused by the different network locations) coming from the
same partner.
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The verification profile specifies which verification strategies are to be applied to
the results of partner service invocations and the feedback parameters into the trust
engine. In this profile, the user specifies how breaches of assumed service level agree-
ments should influence the future interactions with a partner since they are fed back
into the trust store for this application and partner service. This profile also dynami-
cally determines the frequency of verification to allow a fine grained control over costs
incurred by result verification. The user may reference custom verification module
implementations that are instantiated as a plug-in to the verification engine in order
to allow a high flexibility and result content specific verification. Similarly, the ver-
ification frequency strategy may be a simple one supplied with the trust engine (e.g.
verify every n-th result) or a custom strategy implementation supplied as a plug-in by
the application developer (e.g. start with a high verification frequency, back off af-
ter successful interactions, fall back to frequent verification after a failed verification).
Verification can be handled in a trust dimension specific manner; thereby it is possible
to penalise a partner more severely for failed accuracy verification than for availability
problems.
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7.9 Workflow Support
The presented workflow approach is based on ActiveBPEL 2 and makes use of the pre-
viously developed WSRF-specific extensions [52] to BPEL. The extensions cover the
creation and destruction of WS-Resources and the invocation of operations on WSRF-
based services. Another extension is the GridForEach construct which allows to
invoke operations on previously discovered resources in parallel.
Figure 7.11: Architecture of ActiveBPEL Engine
For the sake of compatibility, the Globus Toolkit 4 (GT4) implementation of GSI,
was integrated into ActiveBPEL. However, GT4 uses Axis version 1.2.1RC2, Ac-
tiveBPEL 1.2.1 which are incompatible. Therefore, a lot of minor changes to the
BPEL engine had to be made so that it runs with Axis 1.2.1RC2. Figure 7.11 shows
the architecture of the new Grid BPEL engine. Modified components are marked in
red. In figure 7.12, a process’ lifecycle in the BPEL engine along with implementing
classes is shown. AeReaderVisitor is responsible for parsing the process’ XML
description. Whenever, a security descriptor is found, the method public void
visit(AeSecurityDescriptorDef aDef) is invoked, parses the XML and
stores the retrieved parameters in an instance of AeSecurityDescriptorDef
which is then attached to the object representing the corresponding activity. The imple-
mentation of the validation step works quite similar. AeDefValidationVisitor
does not operate on the process’ XML, but on the *Def objects.
When a process is invoked, the SOAP message is passed to a newly developed
SOAP handler. The SOAP handler examines the SOAP header for the element ”soap-
proxycert”. If ”myproxyuser”, ”myproxypasswd” and ”myproxyhost” are set, it con-
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Figure 7.12: Process Life Cycle and its Implementing Classes
nects (MyProxyConnector) to MyProxy using the given credentials and retrieves
a proxy from it. If autoRenewal is enabled, the proxy’s lifetime is extracted from the
certificate, and a thread which monitors the lifetime of the certificate is started. Shortly
before it expires, the proxy gets renewed. Otherwise, it is assumed that the proxy has
been passed as a binary in the SOAP element and is extracted. In both cases, the cre-
dential is initialised as GlobusGSSCredentialImpl object and then stored in a
HashMap.
When the developed SOAP handler has finished, implementation objects like Ae-
ActivityGridInvokeImpl are created for all *Def objects. They contain con-
crete runtime information like endpoint addresses of services. The execute method
had to be extended to pass the security descriptor to AeBusinessProcess via
queueInvokemethod. AeBusinessProcess creates an instance of AeInvoke,
sets all runtime data and retrieves the corresponding proxy certificate from the Proxy-
Manager’s credential HashMap if the current operation has a security descriptor. The
proxy is then attached to the AeInvoke object which gets executed as soon as it is
dequeued. The execution is done by AeInvokeHandler which required the most
extensive extensions. The method handleInvoke(IAeInvoke obj, String
query) receives the abovementioned AeInvoke object and creates the SOAP call.
Thereby, the security descriptor is used to determine the security settings. All set-
tings are passed to the call via call.setProperty(key, value), for instance
call.setProperty(Constants.GSI SEC MSG, Constants.SIGNATURE) for SecureMes-
sage with message integrity. Then, the call is executed, which means that it passes
the Axis handler chain defined in the Axis deployment descriptor ae-client--
config.wsdd. Globus’ message and security handlers were added to the chain so
that they automatically encrypt and sign messages if the aforementioned properties are
set in the call. The response is also handled by the Axis handler chain so that the
presented implementation does not need to take care of decryption and verification.
The Virtual Workspace service makes use of the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI)
to authenticate and authorise creation requests. Therefore, the workflow engine must
support GSI to be able to create virtual machines. This necessitates the extension of
the BPEL engine so that all WSRF-related operations can use GSI. To achieve this,
the XML-syntax of these elements had to be extended by client security descriptors.
The workflow engine’s parser and validator needed to be adapted to the new syntax.
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The execution module is now able to deal with proxy certificates and to set Globus-
specific properties in outgoing SOAP messages which are then passed to the Globus
GSI libraries via the Axis handler chain of the BPEL engine.
On the BPEL level, the aforementioned extensions are utilised to manage Xen in-
stances with Virtual Workspaces. The Virtual Workspaces factory service is invoked
(createResource) using the gridCreateResourceInvoke operation which passes
all required configuration settings to VWS. The createResource operations returns a
WorkspaceReferenceKey containing a unique identifier for the resource which
is then passed to the discovery service which resolves the IP address and returns it to
the BPEL process as soon as the virtual machine has finished booting. The workflow
can then invoke services on each of the virtual nodes.
7.10 Summary
This chapter presented a Java ClassLoader implementation to protect hot-deployed
Java services, a jailing based native code security and the Xen based sandboxing en-
vironment the Xen Grid Engine. The end-to-end encryption of job data across the
demilitarised zone was shown. The implementations of the novel Grid server rota-
tion strategy, intrusion detection software and workflow engine were presented. This
concludes the work on the on-demand Grid run-time environment. In the following
chapter, the design time issues of secure development of Grid services will be pre-
sented.
8
Development of Secure Services
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, a secure Grid environment was introduced which allows new
service-oriented applications to run side by side with traditional batch jobs in separate
user specific secure sandboxes. This prevents malicious users from attacking others but
also protects users from unintentional flaws in each others’ software. However, it does
not do much to protect from flaws in the user’s own software. Since the software must
be accessible to a certain extent, it is desirable that those parts which are accessible
(usually the service components) are also secure. However, since programming Grid
services is a complex task, this is not always easy. As a consequence, a model driven
development process is presented to ease the development of secure Grid services.
This is the final issue which will be discussed in this work.
Parts of this chapter have been published in [161, 76, 53].
8.2 Service Development
Notwithstanding its potential benefits, service-oriented Grid application development
based on WSRF is a complex issue. Currently, developers are often engineers or scien-
tists who have to cope with their application logic as well as the Grid service program-
ming details. Most developers have a high learning curve ahead of them when they
start using Grid middleware like Globus Toolkit 4, gLite or Unicore/GS, especially if a
secure Grid environment is targeted. Dave Thomas [186] argues that the complexity of
modern software systems is rapidly growing because there is ”too much stuff” leading
to a situation where ”things are so complex you need a M.Sc. to program crud” Things
are further compounded by the fact that security is usually added as an afterthought
and that there are no automated mechanisms for enforcing security policies (Eckert
and Marek [56] and Eckert et al. [57]). Raepple [138] also states that current web
service security solutions couple security code to business logic quite tightly, creating
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problems in the ever-changing web service environment. For instance, if the service
provider changes the authorisation method from username/password combinations to
X.509 certificates, it can be necessary to make code changes to client software. This
makes an automated adoption of changes to the security environment difficult. These
problems are particularly relevant for the development of service-oriented Grid soft-
ware. In its basic form, the typical service-oriented Grid middleware consists of the
Globus Toolkit 4.0 (GT4), Tomcat 5.5 and Axis, three large scale software projects
implementing dozens of standards and encompassing thousands of Java classes each,
not to mention half a dozen of third party support libraries for GT4 alone.
To make matters worse, currently middleware, security and business code are
tightly coupled, requiring both business and middleware developers to have knowl-
edge in all areas. It is desirable that solution producer, that is the engineers, scientists,
bankers, etc. only need to deal with the application logic, leaving the middleware
and security concerns to the domain experts. An environment is needed which facili-
tates collaborative development for the different actors involved in realising a service-
oriented Grid application.
There are several roles involved to get an application running in a service-oriented
Grid environment: (1) a resource provider who sets up the Grid middleware on the
Grid resources and configures the security settings, (2) a middleware developer who
extends the functionality of the middleware if required and implements new standards
as they emerge, (3) a solution producer/service developer who designs and implements
the services and specifies their security requirements and (4) a Grid customer that
uses the offered services. In the academic world, security issues are often ignored
to reduce the complexity of setting up the Grid. To adopt Grid computing in non-
academic environments, e.g. industry, manufacturing, medicine or finance, a model
driven software development process which automates the security setup is required.
The development of the first Grid service by hand can take up to a week even
for computer scientists and significantly longer for non-IT specialists. Furthermore,
implementing Grid services is tied very tightly to the chosen Grid middleware, that is
a GT4 service will not run in a Unicore environment and vice versa. Thus, the heavily
specialised knowledge is not necessarily transferable to all parts of the Grid. And since
most Grid middlewares have their own security implementations, creating secure Grid
services is a time consuming and difficult task.
Consequently, to facilitate the adoption of the Grid in non-academic environments
– a clear decomposition of the areas of responsibility and – for each area – adequate
tool support is needed.
Each of the actors must have a clear area of responsibility. A customer should
not have anything to do with setting up Grid middleware, security configuration and
developing services. Customers should be able to use the Grid with full security as
easy as using local applications. A solution producer should be able to develop a
service without considering the Grid middleware which is being used. Ideally, the
development of application logic should be possible without considering that a Grid
service is being developed at all. On the other side of the fence a resource provider
CHAPTER 8. DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE SERVICES 191
must be able to easily sign certificates for users and manage the Grid service security
configuration without getting in touch with middleware specific configuration files and
without requiring complex interaction with the solution producers. The situation must
be dealt with under the assumption that not all participants are in the same enterprise.
In this chapter, the process of Grid service creation is decomposed into different
areas of responsibility, which are related to different roles. In addition, the tools de-
veloped distinguish between design and runtime concerns. The duties will be analysed
to identify which steps can automated to ease the development burden. Furthermore,
the development/deployment/usage cycle will be considered by discussing which tools
are needed for which role. Finally, a prototypical implementation of the approach is
presented.
8.3 Areas of Responsibility
Splitting the development and deployment process of Grid services into distinct areas
of responsibility requires that the scopes of these areas match organisational structures
and the roles of persons in charge. The actors do not necessarily belong to the same
enterprise since it is quite common that enterprises purchase or rent services (e.g. the
development of a Grid service) from another company.
There are several distinct areas of expertise to be mastered for Grid service devel-
opment and deployment:
(1) Grid service development (middleware-specific code, WSDL, WSDD, etc.)
(2) Application domain development (application logic)
(3) Grid security development (middleware-specific security code, etc.)
(4) Grid middleware security configuration (middleware-specific configuration) ac-
cording to security policies
Areas (1) to (3) are design time tasks, whereas area (4) is a runtime task. Currently,
developers need to deal with all areas to successfully create and deploy a new Grid
service. Furthermore, during development, installation specific security configurations
of the targeted Grid environment must be taken into account, creating a feedback loop
between design time and runtime concerns.
Tasks (1) and (2) lie in the domain of the solution producer. As already stated, the
solution producer should not have to take care of middleware specific code – instead,
this should be done automatically by a software development environment.
Tasks (3) and (4) concern the resource provider. The task is to implement security
requirements placed on the Grid environment. These tasks require detailed knowledge
about middleware-specific configuration and sometimes even programming. There-
fore, the administrator should be supported by hiding complexity via visual configu-
ration tools. These tools should support the administrator while creating certificates
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for users, customers and infrastructure components like Grid resources and services,
hosting environments and additional software.
In the following, support mechanisms are presented to help the different actors
create a secure Grid computing environment.
8.4 User Support
The following section can apply both to customers as well as to solution producers.
8.4.1 Certificate Requests
The invocation of Grid services requires that users be in possession of a valid X.509
certificate. The user passes the X.509 certificate in the SOAP call of the invocation
to identify him- or herself. The subject of the certificate is then used to identify the
calling user. Depending on the configuration of the Grid middleware, the user is then
mapped to the personal image or a default image.
To obtain a certificate, the user must send a certificate request to a Registration
Authority or for direct access to the resource provider. To easily generate a certificate
request, a Certificate Request Creation Tool (CRCT) shown in figure 8.1 was devel-
oped. This tool allows the creation of certificate requests as well as the import of
generated certificates.
8.4.2 Workflow Support
Since real world service-oriented Grid applications often consist of several subtasks, a
user needs a tool to easily model these processes as a workflow. To make the devel-
opment of Grid-enabled workflows as convenient as possible, an Eclipse-based BPEL
designer application was developed.
The workflow composition tool provides the ability to adapt to the needs of differ-
ent groups of developers, allowing Grid middleware experts to inspect and manipulate
Grid processes while hiding complicated details from application domain experts. To
fill the gap between the two, a collection of wizards assigns values to the hidden prop-
erties in the model elements, based on certain patterns and heuristics defined for the
overall system.
Furthermore, the workflow tool allows interactive collaboration between customers
and solution producers by sharing the process model over the Internet. Every change
is instantaneously sent to all participants so that real-time collaboration is possible.
An integrated chat allows discussing the development process. Not only does this
allow solution producers to adapt applications for their customers interactively, it is
also possible to integrate security specialist when needed.
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Figure 8.1: Certificate Request Tool
The workflow composition tool has been implemented as a plugin for the Eclipse
platform. It consists of three layers: the presentation layer, key core layer and the
target system layer (see fig. 8.2). The presentation layer displays workflows as directed
graphs and allows for drag-and-drop based modifications. It offers several wizards to
assist the user in common tasks like, for instance, importing a Grid service into the
workflow which can then used as invocation target. The internal model is held at the
core layer which also consists of event handlers and the collaboration component.
The workflow collaboration implementation uses facilities provided by the Eclipse
Communication Framework (ECF). In order to collaborate, the users of the process
editor join a collaboration channel. The node of the collaboration initiator also acts
as a coordinator of the collaboration. After joining the collaboration, a new editing
partner requests the model from the channel. The initiating partner then serialises the
model and transmits it to the newly joining party. The model is then deserialised and
used as input for the graphical editor of the new collaboration partner. The third layer
transforms the internal model into valid BPEL code. Another wizard guides the user
through this process and collects required deployment information. Fig. 8.3 shows a
screenshot of the developed collaborative workflow composition tool.
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Figure 8.2: Architecture of the BPEL Editor
Figure 8.3: Eclipse-Based BPEL Editor
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8.5 Resource Provider Support
8.5.1 Certificate Management
Generally speaking, the resource provider is responsible for setting up the middleware
and configuring security settings. Once the environment is set up, an ongoing task is
to provide users access to the Grid. For this purpose, user accounts have to be created
and mapped to Grid identities using e.g. the gridmap file in the Globus Toolkit. Users
authenticate themselves by using X.509 certificates. The configuration which specific
certificates or certificates signed by which authorities are allowed access to which re-
sources and images is also a recurring task of the resource provider. Furthermore, an
administrator creates a security descriptor for every service demanding security, which
defines the security settings of a service. To ease these demands a tool is provided to
handle certificate requests, configure trusted CAs and create X.509 compliant certifi-
cates. The resource provider uses the Certificate Request Signing Tool (CRST) to sign
requested created by solution producers or customers who should be allowed onto the
system.
8.6 Solution Producer Support
One of the most complex tasks is faced by the solution producer namely developing the
Grid services which give the Grid its functionality. Model driven architecture (MDA)
[118, 25] has been proposed as an approach to deal with complex software systems by
splitting the development process into three separate model layers and automatically
transforming models from one layer into the other:
1. The Platform Independent Model (PIM) layer holds a high level representation
of the entire system without committing to any specific operating system, mid-
dleware or programming language. The PIM provides a formal definition of an
application’s functionality without burdening the user with too much detail.
2. The Platform Specific Model (PSM) layer holds a representation of the soft-
ware specific to a certain target platform such as J2EE, Corba or in this case the
service-oriented Grid middleware.
3. The Code Layer consists of the actual source code and supporting files which
can be compiled into a working piece of software. In this layer, every part of the
system is completely specified.
MDA theory states that a PIM is specified and automatically transformed into a
PSM and then into actual code, thus making system design much easier. The trick, of
course, lies in the development of generic transformers capable of generating the PSM
and code layers from the PIM [68, 187].
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Service-oriented Grid computing is a relatively young field of distributed com-
puting and is currently lacking tool support for a model driven approach to software
development. This is unfortunate since due to its high complexity and the high rate of
churn [67], a MDA approach could prove vital to the adoption of this new technology.
Only if ”business logic” (i.e. application functionality) developers can more or
less effortlessly and securely integrate a new middleware into their system, will a
widespread adoption be possible. Furthermore, the developers responsible for the
integration of the middleware into the overall system should be able to concentrate
on middleware concerns and not have to cope with the business logic as well. This
separation of concerns can be greatly facilitated by an appropriate MDA approach.
In this section, an approach to the model driven development of secure service-
oriented Grid applications is presented. The goal of the approach is to minimise the
necessary human interaction required to transform a PIM into a PSM and a PSM into
secure code for a service-oriented Grid environment, in order to avoid that MDA be-
comes yet another part of ”too much stuff”. To further separate the Grid specific com-
ponents of the PSM from the business specific components of the PSM, a UML Grid
Profile is introduced and a separation of the PSM layer into two parts is proposed which
make the automated transformations from PIM to PSM to code easier to implement
and more transparent for system designers, developers, and users. The separation of
concerns introduced on the PSM layer is mirrored on the code layer by the use of Java
annotations, allowing the same business code to run in different domains simply by
exchanging the annotations and thus decoupling application code and service-oriented
Grid middleware.
8.6.1 MDA Meets the Grid: An Application Example
8.6.1.1 PIM Layer: Business View
Figure 8.4: Unix Crypt Breaker PIM
To illustrate the issues involved in the model driven development of service-oriented
Grid applications, a simple example is used throughout the rest of this paper. Figure 8.4
shows the PIM view of two classes used to break a Unix password. The CryptBreaker
class has two methods: one which does a brute force attack using the whole range
of possible password values, the other does a brute force attack using only part of the
range of values. This second method is used by the CryptClient to break a password on
a number of different remote nodes each containing one instance of the CryptBreaker.
The CryptBreaker class also has two attributes which store previous results and the
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percentage of the current brute force attack which has been completed. This simple
PIM view contains no Grid specific components and thus offers a clear view of the
business concerns. The classes depicted here are not capable of being called remotely.
To enable the distributed breaking of the password, the PIM will now be transformed
into a Grid specific PSM.
Figure 8.5: Simplified Grid Service UML
8.6.1.2 PSM Layer: Grid Service Design
Grid services in GT4 are separated into three classes: a service resource class, a ser-
vice home class and the service implementation itself. The service home class is used
to load resources attached to a service and the service class itself. It is recommended
that each service is accompanied by a factory service used to create the service it-
self. Furthermore, there are four supporting files needed to deploy the Grid service:
a deployment descriptor, a WSDL description of the service, a WSDL description of
the factory and a JNDI configuration file used to locate the components within the con-
tainer. Figure 8.5 gives a simplified overview of the classes and documents comprising
the Grid service. The two methods of the CryptBreaker class are placed in the Crypt-
Service class and the attributes are placed in the resource class. The CryptClient does
not work directly with the service but with its CryptPortType which it receives from
the CryptAddressingLocator, two classes generated by the web service tools used in
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GT4.
The illustration is a simplified view of the PSM. To give a more complete descrip-
tion of the Grid service, the support files should also be modelled completely in UML.
Figure 8.6 shows a WSDL meta model which can be used to represent the web service
part of the WSDL files. Since elements of the WSDL model and the service classes
have fine grained inter-dependencies, this expanded model reaches a complexity which
defies easy understanding. To make matters worse, the business code is contained in
both the service class and the resource class, so the inter-dependencies directly af-
fect the business logic developers. Furthermore, the CryptClient must work with web
service specific generated classes which forces the business logic developer to master
both domains. Clearly, there are tools which can generate general WSDL and Java
Skeletons based on UML diagrams, but these tools are not capable of generating the
Grid specific WSDL in particular the security settings or the Grid specific content of
the Java classes. Thus, everything shown in the figure except for the CryptPortType
and the CryptAddressingLocator must currently be created by hand both on the PSM
and on the code layer.
8.6.1.3 Code Layer: Grid Service Implementation
To illustrate the interweaving of Grid and business concerns at the code level, an
excerpt of the bruteForcePart method is shown in listing 8.1. The parameter of the
method is a generated Axis specific complexType which contains the password to be
broken and the range of parameters to be tried. To set the completed attribute, the ser-
vice needs to retrieve the resource object from the Grid container, read the value and
set the new value using Grid resource specific methods. The return type must also be
wrapped in an Axis generated object. The more complex the business logic and its re-
source gets, the less readable the service code becomes. Listing 8.2 shows what needs
to be done to call the bruteForcePart method in a remote instance of the CryptService.
Only the last method call is business specific, all the rest belongs to the Grid domain.
The tight entanglement of business code and Grid code forces both Grid and business
developers to deal with difficult code which spans at least two domains.
8.6.1.4 Security through Separation of Concerns
As shown above, the business logic is implemented in the service class and the business
data (or state) is placed in the resource class. This is necessary to keep the service class
stateless and web service compliant. The downside of this separation is that business
concerns are spread into different Grid service specific classes and the development
domains overlap. Both on the PSM layer and on the code layer a separation of devel-
opment concerns is required to offer cleaner views to each domain expert and to make
the development of MDA tools for Grid services easier to implement and maintain.
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Figure 8.6: UML Model of WSDL (from [22])
8.6.2 An MDA Approach to Service-Oriented Grid Computing
An MDA approach to service-oriented Grid computing must deal with all three layers
of the MDA model: PIM, PSM and code. The PIM layer is free of Grid concerns and
thus does not need to be dealt with directly. Only the transformation logic from PIM
(Figure 8.4) to PSM (Figure 8.5 and 8.6) must be supplied. This transformation is not
trivial and developers from the PIM layer should not come into contact with its full
complexity. In the next section, the PSM layer is split into two parts to simplify the
transition from PIM to PSM and enable clearer views on the separate concerns of the
PSM layer.
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Listing 8.1: Crypt Breaker Service Code
p u b l i c B r u t e F o r c e R e s p o n s e b r u t e F o r c e P a r t (
B r u t e F o r c e P a r t complexType ) th ro ws RemoteExcep t ion
{
S t r i n g pwd = complexType . g e t E n c r y p t e d P a s s w o r d ( ) ;
i n t [ ] upperRange = complexType . ge tUpperRange ( ) ;
i n t [ ] lowerRange = complexType . getLowerRange ( ) ;
l ong runLeng th = ca lcRunLeng th ( lowerRange , upperRange ) ;
b o o l e a n d e c r y p t e d = f a l s e ;
w h i l e n o t d e c r y p t e d do f o r each p a r a m e t e r i n r a n g e
{
/ / b u s i n e s s l o g i c f o r d e c r y p t i n g password
/ / . . .
C r y p t R e s o u r c e c r y p t R e s o u r c e = g e t R e s o u r c e ( ) ;
c r y p t R e s o u r c e . s e t C o m p l e t e d ( ( c r y p t R e s o u r c e . ge tComple t ed ( )
+1) / runLeng th ) ;
}
r e t u r n new B r u t e F o r c e P a r t R e s p o n s e ( ) .
s e t B r u t e F o r c e P a r t R e t u r n ( d e c r y p t e d P a s s w o r d ) ;
}
8.6.2.1 PSM Layer: Grid Profile
The main issue on the PSM layer is the complexity of the UML diagram, if all aspects
of the business and Grid logic are modeled in one layer. Figures 8.5 and 8.6 introduced
in section 8.6.1.2 show such a complex view. The PSM layer is divided into two
sublayers, one containing the business view with only a few selected Grid concerns
and the other containing the pure Grid view. The business PSM sublayer contains a
similar view to the PIM layer but with some Grid specific stereotypes to mark where
Grid concerns affect the business logic and Grid wrapper classes which simplify the
access to Grid components on the Grid PSM sublayer. The Grid PSM sublayer holds
the detailed view of the Grid specific components and is a close representation of what
will be implemented in the code layer. This refined MDA architecture is shown in
Figure 8.7.
To facilitate the separation of the PSM layer, a UML Grid Profile is introduced
to model the Grid concerns in the business layer. Figure 8.8 shows the Grid Profile
metamodel. The profile consists of three stereotypes: GridClass, GridMethod and
GridResourceAttribute. GridClass can be used to mark a class, GridMethod an opera-
tion and GridResourceAttribute an attribute. This is similar to the process of marking
PIM classes to prepare them for transformation to a PSM suggested by the OMG [118].
But unlike the OMG approach, the developer does not place the marks in an invisible
PIM add-on layer, but into the upper PSM layer. This leads to greater clarity, because
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Listing 8.2: Client Code to Call the CryptService
S t r i n g i n s t a n c e U R I = ” h t t p : / / xxx . xxx . xxx . xxx : 8 0 8 0 / ws r f / ” +
” s e r v i c e s / U n i x C r y p t B r e a k e r I m p l S e r v i c e ” ;
S t r i n g f a c t o r y U R I = ” h t t p : / / xxx . xxx . xxx . xxx : 8 0 8 0 / ws r f / ” +
” s e r v i c e s / C r y p t F a c t o r y S e r v i c e ” ;
C r y p t F a c t o r y A d d r e s s i n g L o c a t o r f a c t o r y L o c a t o r =
new C r y p t F a c t o r y S e r v i c e A d d r e s s i n g L o c a t o r ( ) ;
E n d p o i n t R e f e r e n c e T y p e fac toryEPR , in s t anceEPR ;
C r y p t A d d r e s s i n g L o c a t o r l o c a t o r =
new C r y p t B r e a k e r A d d r e s s i n g L o c a t o r ( ) ;
f ac to ryEPR = new E n d p o i n t R e f e r e n c e T y p e ( ) ;
f ac to ryEPR . s e t A d d r e s s ( new Address ( f a c t o r y U R I ) ) ;
f a c t o r y P o r t = f a c t o r y L o c a t o r .
g e t C r y p t B r e a k e r F a c t o r y P o r t T y p e P o r t ( f ac to ryEPR ) ;
i f ( u s e S e c u r i t y ) {
( ( j a v a x . xml . r p c . S tub ) f a c t o r y P o r t ) .
s e t P r o p e r t y ( o rg . g l o b u s . ws r f . s e c u r i t y .
C o n s t a n t s . CLIENT DESCRIPTOR FILE , CLIENT DESC ) ;
( ( j a v a x . xml . r p c . S tub ) p o r t ) .
s e t P r o p e r t y ( o rg . g l o b u s . g s i . G S I C o n s t a n t s . GSI TRANSPORT ,
org . g l o b u s . ws r f . s e c u r i t y . C o n s t a n t s . SIGNATURE) ;
}
C r e a t e R e s o u r c e R e s p o n s e c r e a t e R e s p o n s e =
f a c t o r y P o r t . c r e a t e R e s o u r c e ( new C r e a t e R e s o u r c e ( ) ) ;
i n s t anceEPR = c r e a t e R e s p o n s e . g e t E n d p o i n t R e f e r e n c e ( ) ;
C r y p t B r e a k e r P o r t T y p e p o r t = l o c a t o r .
g e t C r y p t B r e a k e r P o r t T y p e P o r t ( i n s t anceEPR ) ;
i f ( u s e S e c u r i t y ) {
( ( j a v a x . xml . r p c . S tub ) p o r t ) . s e t P r o p e r t y ( o rg . g l o b u s . ws r f .
s e c u r i t y . C o n s t a n t s .
CLIENT DESCRIPTOR FILE , CLIENT DESC ) ;
( ( j a v a x . xml . r p c . S tub ) p o r t ) . s e t P r o p e r t y ( o rg . g l o b u s . g s i .
G S I C o n s t a n t s .
GSI TRANSPORT , org . g l o b u s . ws r f . s e c u r i t y . C o n s t a n t s .
SIGNATURE) ;
}
p o r t . b r u t e F o r c e P a r t ( ” somePassword ” , lowerRange , upperRange ) ;
202 8.6. SOLUTION PRODUCER SUPPORT
Listing 8.3: Security Descriptor CryptService
<?xml v e r s i o n = ” 1 . 0 ” e n c o d i n g =”UTF−8”?>
<s e c u r i t y C o n f i g xmlns =” h t t p : / / www. g l o b u s . o rg”>
<gr idmap v a l u e = ” / e t c / g r i d−s e c u r i t y / gr idmap ”/>
<run−as>
<c a l l e r − i d e n t i t y />
</ run−as>
<a u t h z v a l u e =” gr idmap ”/>
<!−− BEGIN d e f a u l t au th−method f o r any o t h e r method −−>
<au th−method>
<G S I T r a n s p o r t />
</ au th−method>
<!−− END d e f a u l t au th−method f o r any o t h e r method −−>
</ s e c u r i t y C o n f i g >
no invisible components influence the transformations, and the PIM layer stays truly
system independent. Figure 8.9 shows the business view of the service from Figure
8.5 which has been marked with stereotypes from the Grid profile. A wrapper class is
also generated which make interacting with the Grid specific classes easier, since only
the bare minimum of Grid concerns are exposed there. In this case, a simplified class
is generated for the CryptClient which wraps the CryptPortType and CryptFactoryAd-
dressingLocator to access the remote Grid service and thus shields the business logic
developer from Grid specific concerns.
All the developers need to do to move from the PIM to both the upper and lower
PSMs is to mark which classes, methods and attributes should be exposed via the Grid
and specifiy the target namespace. The transformation tool will then automatically
generate all required Grid classes and supporting configuration files.
Figure 8.10 shows both sublayers of the PSM layer separated by a dotted line. The
business concerns lie almost entirely in the upper layer and the Grid concerns entirely
in the lower layer. The remaining overlap should not be removed from the models,
since otherwise it would no longer be possible to understand the connection between
the Grid middleware and the business logic.
A wizard-driven approach was chosen to configure the per service security settings.
Figure 8.11) and 8.12) show the wizards for the service and client configuration. The
gathered information can later be used for the automatic generation of security code
and configurations for the Grid service and the client. As shown in the figures, almost
all service security descriptor options, as described in section 3.4, can be set by the
wizard page, even custom policy decision points (PDPs, parts of the authorization
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Figure 8.7: Refined MDA Model
Figure 8.8: Grid Profile
chain). Only per-operation security can not be configured with this wizard. The per-
operation security must be configured by adding additional parameters to each of the
operation annotations.
The automatic generation of the Grid PSM sublayer represents a great benefit for
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Figure 8.9: Annotated Service
service-oriented Grid computing, since up to now the entire PSM layer had to be cre-
ated by hand, involving both business logic and Grid developers. Now, only the busi-
ness specific concerns need to be dealt with. The automatic transformation allows
non-Grid domain experts to create Grid services simply by marking their PIM UML
model with Grid specific stereotypes. This also frees the Grid domain experts, since
they do not need to be involved in every step of the business logic development. Any
advances in Grid design made by the domain experts can be integrated into the trans-
formers and thus will automatically be integrated into all relevant areas of the business
logic. Through the introduction of two sublayers within the PSM layer, separation of
concerns for business and Grid designers on the PSM layer is ensured.
8.6.2.2 Code Layer: Java Annotations
In the previous section, the PSM layer was divided into a business and a Grid part to
facilitate the separation of development concerns. As section 8.6.1.3 showed, the stan-
dard Grid service code is quite tangled, forcing developers in the code layer to deal
with business and Grid concerns at once. The transformation from PIM to the first
and second PSM sublayers already simplifies the code development process some-
what, because the Grid configuration files and support classes can now be transformed
into code quite simply. Three tricky cases remain: the service class itself, the ser-
vice resource class in listing 8.1 and the client in listing 8.2 (note the security code
in the two if clauses). The latter is dealt with by using the generated RemoteCrypt
class (introduced in section 8.6.2.1) which wraps the Grid specific CryptPortType and
CryptFactoryAddressingLocator. The simplified client is shown in listing 8.4. All the
client needs to do is instantiate the RemoteCrypt class with the IP and port number of
the node where the service is located. The RemoteCrypt class has the same interface
as the CryptBreaker class from the PIM layer and thus allows a Grid free view of the
client, freeing the business logic developer from dealing with Grid specific code. The
matching security configuration files such as the security-descriptor (see listing 8.3)
are also all generated an need not be dealt with manually.
The tangled code problem of the service class and its resource class is solved by us-
ing Java annotations. The AnnotatedCryptBreaker class from the upper PSM sublayer
can be transformed into a pure Java class by exchanging the Grid Profile stereotypes
CHAPTER 8. DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE SERVICES 205
Figure 8.10: Grid Service UML
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Figure 8.11: GDT Wizard for Service Security Descriptor Creation
for Java annotations. Listing 8.5 shows this class. The class has been annotated with
@GridClass, the methods which need to be exposed to the Grid are annotated with
@GridMethod and the class members which comprise the service resource are anno-
tated with @GridResourceAttribute. The actual functionality of the class (i.e. breaking
the password) is either created using traditional UML and MDA techniques (not cov-
ered here), or by filling in the functionality into the generated classes by hand, as it
was done in this example. The functionality of the class consists of pure, Grid code
free Java. The class can be compiled and used outside of a Grid environment with-
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Figure 8.12: GDT Wizard for Client Security Settings
Listing 8.4: Simplified Client Code to Call a Service
S t r i n g nodeIP = ” h t t p : / / xxx . xxx . xxx . xxx : 8 0 8 0 ” ;
RemoteCrypt r e m o t e C r y p t = new RemoteCrypt ( nodeIP ) ;
r e m o t e C r y p t . b r u t e F o r c e ( ” somePassword ” ) ;
out any modifications. By exchanging the annotations, the same business logic can
be tied into a different platform (e.g. pure web services). To tie the class into the
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Listing 8.5: Annotated Service Code
@GridClass p u b l i c c l a s s A n n o t a t e d C r y p t B r e a k e r
{
@ G r i d R e s o u r c e A t t r i b u t e i n t comple t ed =0;
@ G r i d R e s o u r c e A t t r i b u t e R e s u l t s r e s u l t s = new R e s u l t s ( ) ;
@GridMethod p u b l i c S t r i n g b r u t e F o r c e ( S t r i n g c r y p t )
{
/ / f o r a l l p o s s i b l e pas swords
/ / check i f password matches
/ / d e v e l o p e r s u p p l i e d Gr id f r e e Java code
}
@GridMethod p u b l i c S t r i n g b r u t e F o r c e ( S t r i n g c r y p t ,
i n t [ ] lower , i n t [ ] uppe r )
{
/ / f o r a l l p o s s i b l e pas swords w i t h i n upper and lower
/ / check i f password matches
/ / d e v e l o p e r s u p p l i e d Gr id f r e e Java code
}
p r i v a t e b o o l e a n matches ( S t r i n g e n c r y p t e d P a s s w o r d ,
S t r i n g e n t e r e d P a s s w o r d )
{
/ / d e v e l o p e r s u p p l i e d Gr id f r e e Java code
}
}
Listing 8.6: Service Method Redirection
p u b l i c B r u t e F o r c e R e s p o n s e b r u t e F o r c e ( B r u t e F o r c e complexType )
th ro ws RemoteExcep t ion
{
A n n o t a t e d C r y p t B r e a k e r c r y B r e a k e r =
g e t R e s o u r c e ( ) . g e t A n n o t a t e d S e r v i c e ( ) ;
B r u t e F o r c e R e s p o n s e r e s p o n s e = new B r u t e F o r c e R e s p o n s e ( ) ;
r e s p o n s e . s e t B r u t e F o r c e R e t u r n ( c r y B r e a k e r
. b r u t e F o r c e ( complexType . g e t C r y p t ( ) ) ) ;
r e t u r n r e s p o n s e ;
}
Grid service, custom GridAnnotationProcessors were implemented and can be used to
generate Grid service code which redirects calls to the Grid service into the annotated
class. The same works for calls to the service resource. By redirecting all calls appli-
cable to the @GridMethods and @GridResourceAttributes from the Grid service and
its resource, the Grid developers are spared from integrating business logic into their
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code and the business logic developer are spared from dealing with Grid specific code
in their business logic. The only interaction the Grid developer needs to cope with is
the redirection of the business method calls. Since this is generated by the Annotation-
Processor, it should not pose any significant burden on the Grid developer. Listing 8.6
shows such a redirected call. The method call getAnnotatedService() returns
the instance of the annotated class containing the business logic and is the only cross-
domain concern the Grid developer is required to deal with. The BruteForceResponse
is wrapped and converted back to the pure Java view by the RemoteCrypt wrapper. The
same approach is taken for the service resource. The slightly higher overhead of the
additional indirection is negligible in comparison to the benefits of cleaner code and
fewer cross-domain concerns. All other generated classes which are part of the gen-
erated Grid service have the same performance characteristics as the manually coded
Grid service. To see the code layer benefits, compare listing 8.5 with 8.1 and listing
8.4 with 8.2.
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8.7 Implementation
In this section, the implementation of the GDT for the Eclipse platform is described.
The current implementation of the GDT includes target system mapping implemen-
tations for the Globus Toolkit 4 and the Marburg Ad-hoc Grid Environment (MAGE)
[176].
The entire Eclipse platform is implemented as a small core runtime environment
for plugins and a large collection of plugins that provide the functionality of the plat-
form. Plugins define so called extension points and implement extension points defined
by other plugins to contribute their functionality to each other. The Eclipse platform
supports a headless mode, i.e. running a so called Eclipse application without the
graphical workbench user interface. A standard headless application of the Eclipse
platform provides Ant functionality on the command line. In this mode, the Eclipse
platform acts like a standard Ant distribution taking a build file as input and making
all build tasks defined by plugins in the Eclipse installation available to the build file.
The GDT’s functionality is provided to the Eclipse platform through a number of
different plugins. These plugins implement the different extension points provided by
the platform or external plugins. Figure 8.13 shows the plugin hierarchy implemented
in the GDT. The core functional components are separated from user interface com-
ponents to ease the re-use of the core functionality in headless mode of the Eclipse
platform.
Figure 8.13: Hierarchy Graph Showing the Internal Dependencies of the GDT Plugins
As a first step towards an implementation of the GDT, the meta-model for the upper
layer Grid PSM was devised. The resulting meta-model is shown in figure 8.14. The
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basic components of this meta-model are a Grid project that can contain many Grid
services that in turn has a number of Grid attributes and Grid methods. Following
the WSRF definition of a WS-Resource as the union of a stateless web service and a
corresponding resource property document capturing the state data of the resource, the
Grid attributes are the elements of a service forming the resource property document.
Every attribute, method parameter, return type or exception thrown by a method has
an associated type that can either be a simple type or a complex type. The Eclipse
Modeling Framework (EMF) is used to automatically generate a Java implementation
of the meta-model. Instances of this representation are used throughout the GDT for
representating concrete upper layer PSMs.
Figure 8.14: Meta-Model for the Upper Layer Grid PSM
We defined several Java annotations to represent the connection between applica-
tion logic carrying code and the upper layer PSM of a Grid service. These annotations
are GridService, GridMethod and GridAttribute and can be used to an-
notate Java class or method definitions and field declarations. The Java annotations
can be used to define additional meta-data such as the target namespace for the Grid
service. The annotations are intended to be used by developers in their applications
in order to mark certain logical elements for inclusion in a Grid service. In terms of
the GDT, a Java class carrying the GridService annotation is called an annotated
service class and may be interpreted as a model source for the upper layer PSM.
The Eclipse platform follows a workspace concept for organisating user resources.
A user’s workspace contains several projects that in turn contain a number of resources.
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Each project has a so called nature assigned that is used to filter the user interface and
the collection of plugins that act on the project and the resources contained in that
project. As a first extension to the Eclipse platform, a project nature for Grid projects
(the GDTNature) was defined and implemented that can be assigned to any Java
project in the user’s workspace to allow associating the GDT plugin with the project.
Apart from the project nature, the Eclipse platform assigns an ordered set of project
builders to a project. These builders are invoked whenever the change of one or many
resources forces an incremental or full build of the project or when the project should
be ”cleaned”. When a new service is added to a Java project, the GDT assigns the
GDT nature to the project and a GDT builder which is running after the Java builder
of the Java Development Tools (JDT) plugin.
The GDT builder is the central component handling the internal transformation
between the upper and lower layer PSM of a project and the central contribution of
the GDT core plugin to the Eclipse platform. The builder receives a so called delta
set from the Eclipse platform. This delta set contains a reference to all resources that
were changed since the last build was performed on the project. For an incremental
project build, this is the set of resources actually touched by the user (or an action by
the user induced on the project). The GDT builder now performs two operations in
sequence. First, a delta visitor is used to check every resource in the delta set for the
project whether it is a model source. Second, the model transformations and emitters
are invoked to push changes in the model into the actual resources.
To perform these operations, the GDT builder needs to make a connection between
resources and the elements of the project model. Figure 8.15 shows the internal binding
model used for this purpose. The binding model defines a binding element that is
directly connected to a workspace resource and holds references to a service model
element, a resource emitter and a resource interpreter. Binding elements are collected
by the GDT plugin in a binding registry that can be used to look up bindings for a given
service model or a given resource. To decide whether a resource is a source of model
information, all resource interpreters defined for the GDT must implement a method
isSource that is invoked on resources that have no binding information attached
to them. Based on the result of this heuristic part, a binding between the resource
and the particular resource interpreter is constructed and registered for the project.
Apart from this heuristic part, all resource interpreters implement a transformation
part handling the transfer of information from a resource into the corresponding model
representation.
The GDT uses the annotation processing component of the standard Java Devel-
opment Tools (JDT) to process annotations in Java classes. For this purpose, the GDT
registers an annotation processor with the JDT. The JDT Java builder is invoked on the
resources of a project prior to the GDT builder, and the annotation processing compo-
nent of the Java builder hands any annotations to the GDT annotation processor. This
processor registers the annotation information for every resource in a Grid annotation
registry. Information in the annotation registry is managed on a per project basis. This
registry is then queried by both the heuristic as well as the transformation part of a
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Figure 8.15: Internal Binding Model Between Service, Resources, Emitters and Inter-
preters
resource interpreter to decide whether the resource is an annotated service class or to
actually fill the service model from the definition of a class. The resource interpreter
makes direct use of the structural information of the Java class under inspection. The
JDT offers the ability to easily access structural information reflecting the declaration
of a Java class through the document object model for Java elements. Other resource
interpreters use internal models for other kinds of resources such as XML schema files
and WSDL files provided to the Eclipse platform by other plugins such as the Web
Tools Project [59] or the EMF [58].
Most code emitters of the GDT are implemented using Java Emitter Templates
(JET) technology, a part of the Eclipse Modeling Framework. JET uses a syntax simi-
lar to Java Server Pages, allowing to use regular Java code within special code sections
of the template. Everything outside of the special code tags is literally copied into the
output. Since there is a trivial mapping between the lower level PSM and the actual
source code for the application, the GDT can directly emit source code from the upper
layer PSM. This is also true for non-Java resources such as deployment descriptors
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and WSDL files for the target service. JET is supplemented by JMerge, an EMF com-
ponent allowing to merge newly generated versions of a Java resource with previous
versions that might contain user modifications. JMerge transfers the user modification
into the newly generated resource preventing loss of user source code. Apart from the
template based code emitters, the GDT implementation relies on existing code gener-
ators for the GT4 framework.
The generators are implemented as a combination of Ant build scripts and small
code generators implemented as Java programs that get called from the Ant build files.
These tools are used to generate, for example, stubs for the resulting Grid service. They
perform their work in a rather long running process (around 20 seconds) that is hard to
include in an automatic and incremental project build. Fortunately, those long running
generation steps target only automatically generated platform binding code a human
developer is unlikely to ever modify. Developers will rather focus on changing the
application logic or the code corresponding directly to the lower layer PSM generated
by this template based approach. Since the stub generation process is such a long
running operation, the developers are given the opportunity to manually start the stub
generation process for a service as a last development step prior to service packaging
and deployment or when they see substantial changes in the service model that requires
(re-)generation of the stubs. The resulting source code of the stubs is automatically
added to the project and can be modified by the developer within the workbench. The
second long running operation that can directly be triggered by the user is the final
packaging of the Grid service for deployment. The packaging operation for both target
systems which were implemented also uses existing Ant scripts and integrates them
into the workbench.
All transformation components of the GDT are split between the GDT core plugin
and so called target system mapping modules (TSM). The core plugin provides the
meta model for representation of Grid services as well as common and generic services
such as annotation processing and model registries, while the TSMs contribute their
interpreters and emitters to the core plugin.
Developers are supported in the creation of new services by a multi-page wizard.
The GDT user interface component queries the platform for all available TSM con-
tributions. The first page of the wizards queries common information about the new
service such as its target namespace, name, the package and class name of the anno-
tated service class to be created. The GDT user interface queries the Eclipse platform
for all available TSM contributions and collects a set of TSM identifiers that the user
may select a concrete target system from. This selection determines additional wizard
pages that are contributed by the individual TSMs and may allow the user to spec-
ify additional choices and values. After finishing the wizard execution, the service
model is created and all necessary project settings are changed according to the user’s
choices. Most importantly, the TSM to be used for transformation is associated to the
service in the project. This TSM is then used to generate all service artifacts including
a base implementation of the annotated service class that the user may fill with his/her
application logic.
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The addition of a service to a project does not rely on the graphical user inter-
face components. The GDT contributes a custom Ant task gdt.generator and a
headless application de.fb12.gdt.Generator to the Eclipse platform that can
be used without the graphical workbench user interface. Their basic intention is to
enable the user to automatically create a Java project for an annotated class or add the
service to an existing project, generate the target system specific artifacts and package
the service. They also offer the ability to initialise a new workspace, and to automat-
ically import any number of Java libraries and Java source files into a service project.
This functionality is intended for use in automated build or test environments that are
very common for large Grid applications. Both components can be regarded as differ-
ent user interfaces to the core components of the GDT. Therefore, the implementation
of both components is part of the GDT UI plugin. It relies on functionality for project
creation and modification that is provided by the core plugin.
8.8 Summary
This chapter introduced a number of tools and concepts to ease the development of
secure Grid applications. For the development of services, a separation of concerns al-
lows solution producers to concentrate on their domain specific coding. The Grid spe-
cific code and configuration files in particular security code is generated by the MDA
GDT tools. If the solution producer is allowed autonomous installation of services a
security configuration tool allows easy configuration of the different GSI options. In
the more traditional Grid setup, this step is executed by the resource providers. Once
all the services are in place, the customer can create a user certificate and then define
a workflow in collaboration with the solution provider if necessary. The presented
solutions take much of the Grid specific burden from the none Grid experts, thus re-
ducing the complexity of designing Grid applications and consequently improving the
security of the applications.

9
Experimental Results and Evaluation
9.1 Introduction
In the following chapter, selected measurements of the developed components are pre-
sented to evaluate the overhead introduced by the security measures introduced in this
work. Furthermore, an evaluation will be given to summarise the benefits the presented
Grid environment offers and highlight the new potential on-demand Grid computing
can achive.
9.2 Service Security
Isolation of pure Java service implementations is realised using a changed class loader
delegation scheme. Since classes also need to be loaded by the standard implemen-
tation and the disposable and secure class loaders introduced in this work follow the
implementation pattern of the regular class loaders, they impose only a minimal over-
head for loading of the classes. This security scheme also does not influence regular
and repeated service invocations. No measurable difference could be detected.
A more significant overhead is created by the isolation scheme for native code
fractions of a service, described in section 7.3. In this scheme, execution of the native
code fractions of a service are performed in a process space separate from the JVM and
sand-boxed by means of the underlying operating system. The solution is specifically
aimed at isolation of native code that gets called from the Java service implementation
via the JNI. Two main factors govern the performance of this solution for individual
calls to native methods: The overhead imposed by the native sandbox of the operating
system and the overhead imposed by the process dislocation technique that requires
local inter process communication. Cost analysis for native code sandboxing is subject
to evaluation by the creators of the various techniques offering a solution in this area.
The following experiment was conducted to assess the overhead of transparent
process dislocation for native code used in a Java service implementation through the
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JNI. A Java test class was created that uses a native method implemented using C.
The absolute time before and after an invocation of the native method in the Java
class was measured in a loop of 500 invocations. In the first case, the original native
library compiled using gcc 4.0.1 was used. Then, the native library was replaced by a
transparent proxy library that used RPC communication to perform method invocation
on the original library in a process separate from the JVM. Again, the runtime of the
native method invocation in the Java class was measured.
The regular call took 3 microseconds on the average while the call using separate
process spaces took 566 microseconds. This increase in time required to perform
a native call by a factor of 182 is only acceptable if relatively few native calls are
required from the Java code into native libraries. This situation is often met when a
Grid service implementation is used as a front end to functionality provided by a long
running native application. In this case, methods provided by the library are used on
a macroscopic level, and the service will typically spend substantial amounts of its
runtime in the native code alone instead of requiring many native method invocations
in the Java implementation.
A benefit of the micro jailing technology lies in the small memory overhead created
by the solution. The native process manager and all RPC related components require
less than 1 megabyte of main memory. This is a small overhead compared to process
isolation by use of dedicated Grid service container instances for different services
and users. Using these dedicated Grid service containers, a complete JVM must be
instantiated, requiring at least 20 megabytes of memory.
9.3 Image Creation
The Image Creation Station (ICS) is hosted on a Dual-Core 2.4 GHz AMD Opteron
Server, with 16GB RAM and a 250 GB S-ATA HDD. The machine is running Xen
3.0 on Debian 4.0. Images were created in the sizes 512, 1024, 2048, 4096 and 8192
MB in both full and sparse mode. The base linux image which was installed in the
512MB image was roughly 400MB in size. For all other images a larger installation
encompassing roughly 1GB was chosen. This installation also included IA32 support
and some additional compilers, which were commonly requested by the D-Grid users.
The image creation process tests were run 30 times for each image size and type.
Figure 9.1 shows the measured user, system and wall clock time. It is evident that
the user and system time do not differ greatly for the different image sizes and types.
However, the wall clock time is affected by the image size in the full image mode,
since even the empty space of the image, which is not immediately needed, is written
onto the hard disk.
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Figure 9.1: ICS Benchmark
9.4 Xen Grid Engine
The XGE is responsible both for VM management and VM deployment. Figure 9.2
shows the deployment time of a 1024 MB image onto ten nodes using a sequential and
a tree deployment pattern. Using the tree deployment, the image deployment takes
less than 250 seconds and as such does not represent a significant overhead compared
to the run time of the average Grid job. Once the images are deployed, they must
be booted and when the job is completed, the images must be shut down. Figure 9.3
shows the performance of the XGEs virtual machine handling over 50 trial runs. The
blue bar represents the XGE prolog: The placeholder VM is shut down and the user
image is started. The average time for the XGE prolog was 119 seconds. The red
bar presents the XGE epilog where the user image is shut down and the placeholder
is started again. The average time was 20.3 seconds. The total job handling overhead
was 139.3 seconds on average, which is small compared to the average runtime of Grid
jobs. The prolog takes longer to execute than the epilog since the XGE must wait for
all VMs to be ready before continuing the execution, while the shutdown process can
be executed asynchronously.
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Figure 9.2: Image Deployment
9.4.1 Xen
The performance overhead created by Xen depends both on the specific installation/-
configuration of Xen on the physical machine and the application which runs in Xen.
To evaluate these two factors, two generic benchmarks and two application tests were
run. The applications both stem from the engineering project InGrid. The applica-
tions from the medical and banking projects are classified and could not be used for
measurements and the mobile ad-hoc emulation framework has no metric by which
to compare it to a standard system since virtualisation must always be used. The ma-
chines used for the tests were Dual-Core AMD Opterons with 2.4 GHz connected
via a Gigabit ethernet network. Both the Xen0 and the XenU are assigned 4GB of
RAM. Figures 9.4.1 and 9.5 show the results of the generic networking (iperf [188])
and CPU (nbench [116]) benchmarks. Figure 9.4(a) shows the network performance
benchmark results for native to native, native to VM, VM to native and VM to VM data
transfers. This reflects the three transmission scenarios which can occur in the virtual
environment, namely transmission from the client to the worker node (native to VM),
transmission from the worker node to the client (VM to native) and inter-worker-node
communication (VM to VM). The native to native transmission measurement is added
as a baseline comparison. The measurements were gathered over a period of one hour,
recording the average bandwidth each second. The y-axis shows the distribution of
the average bandwidth which is listed on the x-axis. The overall distributions do not
differ greatly, the variance stemming more from background network noise than from
the virtualisation technology (the VM to native transmission actually had a higher av-
erage bandwidth than the native to native transmission). Table 9.4.1 shows the average
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Figure 9.3: XGE Performance
transmission rate in MBit/s.
Figure 9.4(b) shows the distribution of the transmission speeds with and without
the firewalling solution on the Xen0. The transmission rates were measured with and
without firewalls for the VM to native and VM to VM cases. As above, the overall
transmission speed distribution does not differ greatly.
Figure 9.5 shows the CPU benchmark results of nbench which was used to test the
integer performance of the virtual XenU CPU. The x-axis shows the number of trials
and the y-axis the performance index. The results show that the performance is actu-
ally better in the virtual environment than in the native environment. However, these
results should not be taken at face value. The benchmark for the virtual case was ex-
ecuted entirely in the virtual environment and thus used the virtual clock which is not
absolutely accurate. When the network trials were measured with the virtual clock, the
network performance also seemed better for the virtual case. Since this seemed suspi-
cious, the network measurements were repeated with an external clock which resulted
in the measurements presented above. Unfortunately, there is no way to execute the
nbench benchmark with an external clock. The application experiments below were
implemented with an external clock and should be used for the performance evalua-
tion.
native-native native-VM VM-native VM-VM
Average MBit/s 940.5 932.8 940.8 938.7
Table 9.1: Xen Networking Benchmark Mean
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(a) Xen vs Native iperf Performance
(b) Xen Firewall iperf Performance
Figure 9.4: Xen Networking Benchmark Performance
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Figure 9.5: Xen nbench Benchmark Performance
Figures 9.6(a) and 9.6(b) show the performance of two of the D-Grid industrial
applications Casts and Fenfloss in a VM compared to the native performance over 30
runs. The metal-casting application CASTS [1] was 3.1% slower in the virtual ma-
chine compared to the native execution and the fluid simulation FenFloss was 11.3%
slower. The 3.1% and 11.3% performance penalties, however, are negligible when
considering the fact that without the installation and security mechanisms of the new
Grid environment the applications could not be run at all in a shared use Grid environ-
ment.
9.4.2 Demilitarised Zone
While the DMZ and Fence are required for effective security in Grid/cluster environ-
ments, they create a certain amount of overhead. The transmission time is extended
due to the extra hop via Fence, and the en- and decryption also consume some time
compared to an unsecured Grid operation.
The test environment consists of 6 machines connected with a 100 Mbit ethernet.
The firewalls run on Pentium III machines with 1 GHz, 512 MB RAM with FreeBSD
installed. The Globus headnode is a Pentium IV with 3 GHz, 1 GB RAM with a Debian
Linux installed. The same configuration applies to the ICS and the client machine.
The Cluster headnode is a Pentium IV with 1.8 GHz, 512 MB RAM with Solaris 10
installed. There are also 4 Pentium IV with 1.8 GHz, 512 MB RAM as worker nodes
running Debian Linux in a Xen environment.
The most important measurement concerns end-to-end encryption. It introduces
improved security, but it also consumes time. To show that the introduced overhead
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(b) Fenfloss Performance
Figure 9.6: Xen Application Performance
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is negligible, two measurements were conducted. The first one measures the time for
an encrypted job from the client to the XGE. The second measurement is the same,
except that the data is unencrypted. The execution time is job dependent and thus is
factored out of the measurements.
Figure 9.7 shows the times for the following steps:
1. Start a job on the client side and encrypt the job data with a 48-byte key
2. Transfer the job data via Fence to the XGE
3. The XGE detects the new job and decrypts the data
The test application is the casting simulation package CASTS. The typical data
volume for a CASTS job is about 290 MB. In total 50 trials were conducted to get a
robust mean, which is about 154 seconds. The chart is divided into three parts. The
bottom part displays the time needed to encrypt the data. The middle part displays the
time needed to transfer the files via Fence from the Globus headnode to the Cluster
headnode. The upper part displays the time needed to decrypt the data. The difference
between the two cryptographic processes results from the diverse hardware (1.8 GHz
CPU vs. 3 GHz CPU). The small variance in the transfer time is due the polling nature
of the XGE scheduling algorithm.
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Figure 9.7: Time for Fully Encrypted Job Submissions in 50 Trials
The second measurement is exactly the same as the first, except no job data is
encrypted respectively decrypted. Figure 9.8 shows the time in seconds on the ordinate
and 50 trials on the abscissa. The mean is about 49 seconds. Due to the watchdog
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Figure 9.8: Time for Unencrypted Job Submissions in 50 Trials
characteristic of the XGE, the same variance can be seen here as already described in
the last case.
The difference between the means of the two trials is 105 seconds, i.e. full end-
to-end encryption doubles the transfer time. Compared with the time this CASTS job
needs to complete (about one hour), the additional 105 seconds is negligible compared
to the security benefits of encryption.
To compare the overhead introduced by the firewalls, data was transfered with
and without the firewalls. To gain a robust mean, the data was transferred 100 times.
The volume of the data is the same as above. Figure 9.9 shows the results of the
measurement. The upper curve displays the transfer time through the firewalls, the
lower curve displays the transfer time without firewalls. The mean of the upper curve
is about 26.7 seconds, the mean of the lower curve is about 25.7 seconds. The resulting
difference is very small, so the measurements indicate that the use of firewalls for a
DMZ helps to improve the security at little cost.
9.5 Rotating Servers
In the following, an evaluation of the rotation mechanism is given. It should be noted
that the performance overhead incurred by the rotation mechanism only affects the
Grid headnode and does not affect the worker nodes and thus not the execution time of
Grid jobs. The main criteria the rotation mechanism must fulfill is that the performance
overhead does not affect the responsiveness of the headnode to user request and that
the state of the server is not corrupted, i.e. the rotation mechanism must not drop any
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user messages during rotation.
The presented state preserving rotation mechanism was tested on an Intel Core Duo
1666 MHz processor with 1024 MB RAM and a Hitachi Travelstar 5K060. The Xen0
domain was allocated 314 MB memory. The following VMs are started in this Xen0:
• The Storage Host running PostgreSQL 7.4.7 and Derby 10.2.1.6 used by the
Grid services for storage. The Derby database is currently needed for the Vir-
tual Workspace (VW) Service. However, future releases of VW will also use
PostgeSQL. The Storage Host receives 150 MB RAM.
• Two Service Hosts running Globus Toolkit 4.0.3, Virtual Workspaces TP 1.2.
Each Service Host receives 280MB memory.
Additionally, there is one machine running the Cluster headnode software Sun Grid
Engine 6.0. This machine has no effect on the performance of the rotating servers. The
network cards are 100 MBit cards. The Xen version is 3.0.2-testing and the operating
system is Debian (4.0) Etch with Kernel 2.6.16-29-xen0.
In the following, an attack evaluation is presented followed by a discussing the
performance impact of the rotation system. Two example attacks against the Grid
headnode were performed. The first one involves the installation and execution of a
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spambot, and the second one installs a botnet slave which sits idle waiting for the bot-
net controller to activate it, for example to participate in a DDoS attack. Both attacks
were executed using a root shell controlled via SSH. To validate the correct functioning
of the Grid middleware and the state preserving mechanisms, a Grid job is submitted
before the attack, and the status of the Grid job is queried after the attack. To visualise
the attacks, the package throughput was measured in intervals of 3 seconds. Figure
9.10(a) shows the spambot attack executed against a system which is not protected by
the presented rotation mechanism; once the spambot is installed and activated, it runs
indefinitely. The first large peak in the package rate seen in the Figure 9.10(a) is the
submission of the Grid job and the transfer of the proxy certificates. The second large
peak is the initial execution of the exploit and the initialisation of the SSH root shell.
The third peak is the download of the spambot software. Once the spambot is started,
the network load goes out of the scale, since roughly 30000 packets are sent per 3
seconds interval. The subsequent job query was executed a little slower than usual, but
the primary function of the Grid middleware was not compromised, thus if no IDS is
installed or the IDS misses the attack, there is no alert for the administrator. The same
attack executed against a system using the presented rotation mechanism is shown in
Figure 9.10(b). Here, the same submission, exploit and malware installation pattern
was followed. The Guardian Plugin was configured to tolerate 9 failed rotations with
an interval of 10 seconds before forcing a rotation. At this point, the malware is re-
moved. The job status query is executed normally. The total time in which the server
was compromised was only roughly 250 seconds compared to the indefinite compro-
mise in the unprotected case.
The second attack is not quite as obvious as the first. In Figure 9.11(a), a botnet
slave is installed in much the same way as the spambot was installed. However, the
botnet slave is a passive component which cannot easily be detected until it is acti-
vated by the botnet master. To enable activation, it opens a port and waits for the
command and control messages from the master. Since the botnet slave does not keep
any open TCP connections, the rotation mechanism is not affected and simply rotates
on schedule and removes the malware. The total time of the compromise was roughly
150 seconds. In the second attack shown in Figure 9.11(b), the attacker is aware of
the rotation mechanism and has reprogrammed the botnet slave to keep a number of
alternating open connections to prevent rotation as long as possible. The Guardian
Plugin in this attack was set to force rotation after 3 failed attempts and then alert the
administrator. Thus, the lifetime of the botnet slave in this attack was extended from
roughly 100 seconds to 130 seconds. Since botnet compromises can be very difficult
to detect until it is too late, especially in the case of a previously unknown botnet, the
window of compromise offered by the presented rotation system is a great advantage,
since the botnet slave will have been removed before the master can activate it. If the
attack is executed and the botnet is activated immediately, the scenario is similar to the
spambot in the previous attack. In all cases, the operation of the Grid was not affected
adversely by the rotation mechanism while the attack code was removed.
To evaluate the performance overhead, the system was tested using an engineering
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(a) Spambot Attack No Rotation
(b) Spambot Attack With Rotation
Figure 9.10: Spambot Attack
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(a) Botnet Installation 1
(b) Botnet Installation 2
Figure 9.11: Botnet Installation
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application for metal casting processes from the D-Grid. However, no noticeable dif-
ference could be detected since the application (like many Grid applications) running
in the new Grid setup only requires minimal effort from the Grid headnode: one job
submission connection to start the computation and one notification connection when
the job is completed. The data transferred goes directly to the worker nodes over a
secured connection. As such, the test were not able to get the application to collide
with the rotation mechanism. To better judge the behaviour of the system, a modi-
fied CounterService was used to bombard the Grid headnode in shorter intervals than
real Grid applications could manage. The CounterService is a standard Globus service
which stores a single number which can be incremented via a service call.
All experiments were done in three different settings: once using the unmodified
CounterService without rotation, once with the modified CounterService which stores
its state on the Storage Host without rotation and once with the modified CounterSer-
vice which stores its state on the Storage Host with the first rotation after 200 seconds
and then a rotation roughly every 300 seconds. The experiments were run for 30 min-
utes each. This visualises the effect of both the externalisation of the state storage and
of the actual rotation mechanism. The Counter client calls the CounterService on the
Headnode once every minute and increments the Counter 100 times. Since the Counter
client only calls 100 times, the likelihood of a critical part collision was very low and
in fact did not occur.
Figures 9.12(a),9.12(b) and 9.12(c) show the results. The big spikes after each
rotation stem from the cloning of the Service Host image. The image is 640 MB and
is currently simply duplicated on the same hard disk which creates both I/O and CPU
load. This high load can be avoided using RAM disks or copy-on-write layers (COW)
to avoid the costly hard disk access.
Figures 9.13(a), 9.13(b) and 9.13(c) show the same but for disk I/O load. The I/O
load for the modified CounterService (b) is lower than for the unmodified CounterSer-
vice (a), since the state is no longer written to disk but to the remote database. The
cloning of the images creates the expected spikes in measurement (c). Since the mem-
ory is pre-allocated to the Xen VMs, the memory consumption remains constant for
all three cases.
Tables 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 show the mean performance values over the 30 minutes.
Even though the rotation is currently very expensive due to the full hard disk copy,
the average load with rotation is only 30% and the machine remains responsive even
during the copy operations, i.e. response times remain stable and no messages are
dropped and the state of server state consistent with the expected value of the client.
In the next test, the client performance was analysed. 100 clients were started
which then incremented the CounterService 100 times at a rate of one call per minute.
The average processing time for the 100 calls are shown in Figures 9.14(a), 9.14(b) and
9.14(c). As before, no collisions took place. The execution time rises from roughly
30s to 50s over the 100 calls mainly due to the remote state transfer.
In the last experiment, the response time was measured from the client side. In
the first measurement, the same frequency as above was used with the modified Coun-
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Figure 9.12: CPU Performance
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Figure 9.13: I/O Performance
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CPU (in %) Memory (in kB) Input/Output (in blocks)
User System I/O Wait Free Used Received Send
Min 0 0 0 2808 309976 0 0
Max 1 1 7 3684 310852 180 456
Avg 0.01 0.01 0.05 3235.37 310424.63 0.24 30.24
SD 0.12 0.8 0.32 230.43 1231.46 4.96 52.16
Table 9.2: Host Performance with the Unmodified CounterService
CPU (in %) Memory (in kB) Input/Output (in blocks)
User System I/O Wait Free Used Received Send
Min 0 0 0 2804 310016 0 0
Max 6 22 5 3644 310856 180 382
Avg 0.01 0.19 0.02 3245.32 310414.68 0.23 24.43
SD 0.15 0.68 0.2 216.61 216.61 4.95 40.20
Table 9.3: Host Performance with the Modified CounterService
CPU (in %) Memory (in kB) Input/Output (in blocks)
User System I/O Wait Free Used Received Send
Min 0 0 0 2820 305944 0 0
Max 42 33 100 7716 310840 31904 46380
Avg 0.19 0.59 31.45 3317.95 310342.05 3814.52 3468.43
SD 2.15 1.76 44.24 561.66 561.66 6407.55 8160.17
Table 9.4: Host Performance with the Modified CounterService with Rotations
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Figure 9.14: CounterService Execution Time.
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Figure 9.15: Client Response Time
terService and rotations, in the second measurement the frequency of the client calls
was increased to the maximum the network would allow to make collision more likely.
Figures 9.15(a) and 9.15(b) show the results. The spikes in response time in (a) occur
immediately after a rotation and do not stem from a collision. They are caused by the
lazy class loading delay due to the initialisation of the Globus toolkit. The request
frequency in (b) was high enough to cause collisions and thus the spikes represent the
TCP/IP retry time plus the lazy loading delay. The collision did not cause any perfor-
mance effects on the service hosts. Considering the many performance optimisations
still possible, the performance figures observed for the rotation system are tolerable
considering the benefits the system offers. Particularly, since the Grid headnode does
not do any of the actual computation in any case, thus making the increased load negli-
gible for the perceived performance, since the overhead does not affect the actual Grid
jobs which run on the worker nodes.
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9.6 Intrusion Detection System
In a single host environment, the IDS only needs to detect attacks target at that host.
The presented S-IDS is setup to detect attacks which are not visible on a single host
but need a global view to be detected. The proof-of-concept solution was geared to-
wards two Grid specific attacks which are not detected by a single host IDS, however
they are correctly detected by S-IDS, through its ability to aggregate data from more
than one node. The first attack is a distributed portscan over multiple hosts, the second
is a DDoS attack which can be differentiated from legitimate traffic where many Grid
nodes respond to a single entity. All test nodes were running on 3 GHz, 1 GB RAM,
AMD64 machines running Debian 4.1.1-21. The nodes were equipped with two sep-
arate Gigabit Ethernet NICs. During all tests, random traffic was generated between
the nodes to simulate an active Grid network. The network environment of nodes used
for testing is based on a 1 GBase-T Ethernet network with a theoretical throughput
of 125 MB/s. An unthrottled data transfer of /dev/zero between two nodes reached a
maximum real throughput of 117 MB/s. In actual application scenarios, like network
file transfers or Grid job submissions, the employed transfer protocols limit the achiev-
able transfer speed, e.g. due to encryption. Testing showed an average throughput of
approx. 42 MB/s for a secure file transfer using the command-line tool scp, which
encrypts data with SSL. To get an idea how much traffic should be expected from a
Grid site, the maximum throughput between two Grid sites was measured. Figure 9.16
shows the speed distribution between the Grid sites of the University of Marburg and
the University of Siegen, which are connected by the X-Win network of the DFN. One
measurement was done during the day, two others during the night. Each test was run
for one hour. The average transmission rates for the different experiments did not vary
significantly with the average speed being roughly 10 MB/s.
The prelude to a specific attack is quite often a portscan to determine which ports
are accessible. A portscan targeting a single host can easily be detected by Snort or a
similar NIDS. In a Grid environment, the situation is more complicated, since many
nodes of the Grid often offer the same services on the same ports, so that an attacker
does not have to scan ports on a single node. The attack is cloaked by running partial
scans on multiple targets using the homogeneity of the Grid layer to get a complete
picture. By aggregating and analysing all network data in a Grid, a distributed portscan
can easily be detected by the S-IDS. The bash script in listing 9.1 periodically scans
4 ports on each node listed (see the script’s output in listing 9.2), so that Snort with a
standard configuration does not recognise the portscan. The S-IDS master, however,
detects the portscan and raises an alert.
The second attack is a DDoS. Characteristic for a DDoS is that a large number of
entities target a single entity with large amounts of traffic. If the number of requests
exceeds the number of requests an entity can handle, the service breaks down. This
is true for all distributed environments, but there are two special issues in Grid com-
puting. In a service-oriented Grid, a single master node may receive data from many
worker services simultaneously which could be misinterpreted as an attack by a single
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Figure 9.16: Inter-Site iperf Results
node IDS. S-IDS tracks which Grid nodes contact which other Grid nodes and auto-
matically creates a temporary white list with which this false detection can be avoided.
It could also be used to offer a certain quality of service during a real DDoS by in-
forming a border router which packets are more likely to be legitimate (i.e. packets
from nodes recently contacted). While this would not allow new nodes to contact the
attacked resource directly, it would prevent nodes returning requested results from be-
ing blocked. Since Grid systems perform delegation, it is important that the decision
which nodes to block is made with a full view of the Grid and not purely on local
information.
The performance evaluation of the S-IDS design was conducted using two exper-
iments. The first test consisted of inducing high network traffic on eth0, the interface
to the external network, of the sensor nodes, while monitoring the output on eth1, the
interface to the S-IDS network, CPU usage of the sensor and the alert latency (time
from the attack to its recognition at the master). In the second test, the behaviour of an
aggregator with five connected sensors was observed. The eth0/eth1 traffic of the Sen-
sors was monitored and the eth0/eth1/CPU usage and alert latency of the aggregator
was monitored. Figures 9.17 and 9.18 show the results for the above test cases, which
are averaged over two minutes.
Network traffic was induced by one node, sending data produced by /dev/zero via
netcat to another node, writing the received data to /dev/null. The speed of the network
stream was controlled by the command line tool throttle, as shown in listing 9.3.
In figures 9.17 and 9.18, it can be seen that at a speed of approx. 1.6 MB/s incoming
traffic at the aggregator’s eth1 or approx. 5 MB/s incoming traffic at the sensor’s eth0,
the output speed of the sensor does not increase further. The reason for this behaviour
was identified in the second test, where the aggregator is observed: At an input speed of
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Listing 9.1: Portscan Script
# ! / b i n / bash
NODES=”86 87 88 89 90”
l o o p s =3000
p o r t =1
w h i l e [ $ l o o p s −ge 0]
do
f o r i i n $NODES
do
echo PORTSCAN FROM $ p o r t TO ‘ exp r $ p o r t + 3 ‘ ON node0${ i }
nc −vz node0${ i } $ p o r t −‘ exp r $ p o r t + 3 ‘
p o r t = ‘ exp r $ p o r t + 4 ‘
done
l o o p s = ‘ exp r $ l o o p s − 1 ‘
s l e e p 120
done
approx. 1.6 MB/s on the aggregator’s incoming interface, the aggregator automatically
throttles its input speed. This is underlined by a CPU usage of around 100% on the
aggregator at this volume of traffic. The reason for this is the slow Java serialisation
process.
Based on this poor performance, some opitimisations were implemented. The main
problem lies in the fact that the object-oriented Java language used by PIPES creates
an object for each piece of data which is streamed through the system. Since object
serialisation and deserialisation of complex objects is quite expensive, measures were
taken to lighten this burden. The AlertOrObjectBean was separated into two entities
to eliminate one object hierarchy and the IDMEF objects were replaced by a minimal
flat storage object. This step reduces the compatibility but increases the performance.
Figures 9.19, 9.20 and 9.21 show the new performance values. Figure 9.19 shows one
sensor and one aggregator. At a speed of 20 MB/s the sensor is at 100% CPU utilisation
through the netcat, libpcap and Java processes. The aggregator does not throttle the
connection at this speed. In Figure 9.20 two sensors are connected to one aggregator
each transmitting up to their maximum capacity and as can be seen the aggregator
starts throttling the input at roughly 40 MB/s combined traffic. In the final figure 9.21
six sensors are connected to one aggregator. Here, the sensor starts throttling the input
at a combined volume of roughly 24 MB/s. This is due to the higher CPU consumption
of the detection logic.
During all tests, attacks were launched at random intervals to test the responsive-
ness and accuracy of the system. Up to the throttle points, all attacks were detected
reliably. The alert latency varied between one and five seconds. Even when the aggre-
gator could not handle any more incoming traffic, it continued to operate, but attacks
were not always detected, due to the fact that not all packets could be analysed.
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Listing 9.2: Output of the Portscan Script
PORTSCAN FROM 1 TO 4 ON node086
PORTSCAN FROM 5 TO 8 ON node087
PORTSCAN FROM 9 TO 12 ON node088
PORTSCAN FROM 13 TO 16 ON node089
PORTSCAN FROM 17 TO 20 ON node090
PORTSCAN FROM 21 TO 24 ON node086
node086 [ 1 7 2 . 2 6 . 6 . 8 6 ] 22 ( s s h ) open
PORTSCAN FROM 25 TO 28 ON node087
PORTSCAN FROM 29 TO 32 ON node088
PORTSCAN FROM 33 TO 36 ON node089
PORTSCAN FROM 37 TO 40 ON node090
.
.
.
Listing 9.3: Network Load Generator
node88 : ˜ $ c a t / dev / z e r o | t h r o t t l e −M 2 | \
nc −v −v node087a 54321
node87 : ˜ $ nc −v −v − l −p 54321 node088a > / dev / n u l l
With the performance optimisation, the S-IDS system can cope with moderate Grid
traffic from a small number of nodes. However, beyond that, the performance overhead
created by the serialisation and object creation of Java stalls the system. As a conse-
quence, the vision of analysing the ”big picture” over a large number of nodes cannot
be realised with the presented proof-of-concept implementation. The Java serialisation
and streaming configuration is the most relevant area for optimization. Nevertheless,
the general concept of using streaming databases for intrusion detection is promising,
but a more efficient implementation is required. A production quality implementation
of the system in a is an interesting endeavor, but lies outside of the scope of this thesis.
9.7 Workflow
In this section, experimental results concerning the performance of the different secu-
rity methods are discussed. The execution times of all three security methods using
both a “hand written” Java Globus client and BPEL processes are compared. A simple
Globus services offering some basic operations has been written for the evaluation.
The service’s operations do nothing but returning the input value. Therefore, the run-
time of the operations can be treated as zero. To obtain reliable results, every run was
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Figure 9.17: Graph of Sensor Test Results
Figure 9.18: Graph of Aggregator Test Results
repeated fifty times and the arithmetic mean of the results was computed.
The machine hosting the Globus environment was a Pentium IV 3 GHz with Hy-
perthreading and 1 GB of RAM running Linux (kernel 2.6). The workflow engine as
well as the Globus clients were installed on a 1.7 GHz Pentium M machine (1 GB of
RAM) running Windows XP SP 2.
The results are shown in table 9.7, 9.7 and 9.7. The GT4 and BPEL columns shows
the time in milli-seconds the number of calls took. The OH BPEL column shows the
overhead caused by the use of the presented BPEL extension. A negative overhead per-
centage indicates that the BPEL invocation was faster than the GT4 client invocation.
It can be seen, that the BPEL processes have a higher initialization overhead compared
to Globus (between 37 and 100 percent depending on the security method used). This
mainly affects runs with only few service calls. Interestingly, GSISecureConversation
has a higher initialization overhead when using Globus clients. Since typical work-
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Figure 9.19: Optimised S-IDS with One Sensor
Figure 9.20: Optimised S-IDS with Two Sensors
flows consist of several invocations, the initialization overhead does not play a major
role. As the results for 50 invocations show, the overhead when using BPEL is between
0 and 19 percent depending on the used security method. This overhead is acceptable
when taking into account that the normal runtime of a service is usually in the area of
hours, compared to milliseconds in for the security initialisation.
Figure 9.22 and 9.23 display the results graphically. One can see that all methods
scale linearly - but with different gradients. GSISecureMessage is clearly the slowest
and GSITransport the fastest method. Only when sending very few messages (in these
tests less than five), GSISecureMessage is faster than GSISecureConversation, but still
slower than transport layer security.
Obtaining a proxy certificate from MyProxy took between 900 to 1000 millisec-
onds. This is independent of the used security method and of the used client (BPEL or
Globus). So, when using MyProxy instead of locally stored certificates, this time has
to be added to every value in the tables above.
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Figure 9.21: Optimised S-IDS with Six Sensor
GSITransport GSISecureMessage
Calls GT4 BPEL OH BPEL GT4 BPEL OH BPEL
1 350 624 78.29% 794 1586 99.75%
10 1805 2488 37.84 % 4305 4755 10.45 %
50 7952 9164 15.24 % 19460 21060 8.22 %
Table 9.5: Experimental Results for GSITransport and GSISecureMessage Using In-
tegrity
9.8 Grid Development Tools
The most time critical element of the GDT is the project builder that gets invoked ev-
ery time the user changes a resource in the Eclipse project that is part of a Grid service
and under control of the GDT. The builder is invoked in a background thread after
the Java builder of the Eclipse JDT feature has been invoked on the set of changes in
the project. A run of the builder has two fundamental phases: first, identification of
Grid service model sources and changes to those sources, then, the (re)-generation of
service artifacts related to the changes. To test the performance of the builder, anno-
tated classes were created containing either 5 or 25 methods or attributes tagged as
GridMethod and GridAttribute. Then, the GDT builder was invoked 10 times
after the start of the Eclipse workbench, each time the annotated class was touched
and saved to force the GDT builder to run. Figure 9.9 shows the average time Tavg,
maximal time Tmax and the standard deviation of the measurements σ observed during
the experiments. Each set of experiments was repeated 5 times to gather performance
data for the GDT builder including the first invocation that requires the Eclipse plat-
form to load and instantiate the classes of the GDT plug-in. The tests were conducted
on an IBM T41p notebook with a 1.7 GHz Pentium M CPU, 1 GB of main memory
and a 60GB 7200 RPM parallel ATA hard drive running under Windows XP (SP2).
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Figure 9.22: Performance of Security Methods Using Integrity
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Figure 9.23: Performance of Security Methods Using Encryption
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GSISecureConversation
Calls GT4 BPEL OH BPEL
1 1615 747 -53.75 %
10 3633 2818 -22.43 %
50 12507 12489 -0.14 %
Table 9.6: Experimental Results for GSISecureConversation Using Integrity
GSITransport GSISecureMessage
Calls GT4 BPEL OH BPEL GT4 BPEL OH BPEL
1 375 622 65.87% 1108 1861 67.96%
10 1838 2167 17.90 % 5803 6483 11.72 %
50 8299 9861 18.82 % 26313 30040 14.16 %
Table 9.7: Experimental Results for GSITransport and GSISecureMessage Using En-
cryption
Experiences with test applications in the D-Grid show that Grid services usually con-
tained less than 25 distinct methods or attributes. After initialisation of the Eclipse
workbench, even the worst case performance requiring 1.5 seconds to perform a GDT
build as a reaction to a manual save operation of the annotated class provide accept-
able performance values to the user, especially since manually writing a Grid service
takes considerably more time and the risk of misconfiguration of the security settings
is present. The workbench remains responsive during the build since the build process
is run in a background thread.
9.9 Final Evaluation
It is difficult to judge the quality and performance of security measures, since secu-
rity often is an intangible feature. Usually, there is a trade-off between security and
performance, and where the balance is made depends heavily on the scenario and the
actors involved. For the case of on-demand Grid computing, the performance overhead
discussed in this chapter is acceptable, in particular due to the fact that without the se-
curity mechanisms, the on-demand usage of the Grid would be significantly hindered.
The security mechanisms presented in this thesis offer the required protection to en-
able stages 1 and 2 of on-demand Grid computing. Solution producers and customers
are protected from each other and the resource providers can protect themselves from
both solution producers and customers. The solution producer and customer protec-
tion is a vital requirement for the adoption of Grid computing in the business sector
and as such represents an important step towards a wider adoption of the Grid com-
puting paradigm. However, it is the resource provider protection enabled through the
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GSISecureConversation
Calls GT4 BPEL OH BPEL
1 1583 808 -48.96 %
10 3335 2693 -19.25 %
50 11182 12602 12.70 %
Table 9.8: Experimental Results for GSISecureConversation Using Encryption
Repeated Invocation First Invocation
Tavg [ms] Tmax [ms] σ [ms] Tavg [ms] Tmax [ms]
5 Methods 666.25 1132.56 114.57 2022.33 3932.26
25 Methods 765.68 1232.69 123.95 2581.94 3076.47
5 Attributes 789.25 1265.52 116.77 2807.52 2980.52
25 Attributes 1013.34 1539.37 233.66 3232.47 3045.05
Table 9.9: Performance of the GDT builder for different numbers of attributes and
methods in an annotated class.
use of operating system virtualisation and dynamic firewalling, which offers the great-
est potential to satisfy the true vision of Grid computing. With the security mechanism
presented in this thesis it becomes possible for resource providers to let unknown users
onto their resources on a pay-per-use basis without endangering themselves. Currently,
all actors in the Grid must possess X.509 certificates to identity themselves. With this
traceable identification, resource providers can, if a malicious act is detected, take le-
gal steps to claim damages. However, it is the certificate overhead which is one of the
first and biggest stumbling blocks currently hindering the widespread adoption of Grid
computing. It took users from the University of Marburg six days from requesting a
certificate to receiving a signed certificate and being registered in one of the D-Grid
VOs. Considering that the RA was in the same building and the VO administrator was
a colleague who could be contacted directly, the six days are probably not represen-
tative for outsiders who will have to travel to receive a certificate. To then actually
do something with the certificate, it was still necessary to contact each Grid site and
personally ask for permission to execute jobs on that site. With the resource provider
protection, it is no longer necessary to have such strict access control in place, since the
resource providers can protect themselves and their customers from malicious entities.
This opens up an entirely new way of using the Grid.
9.9.1 Pay-per-use On-Demand Grid Computing
The acquisition of a valid Grid certificate can be time consuming and is only relevant
if long term Grid use is planned. However, if only sporadic Grid use is planned or
many different Grids are to be used, the effort of registering and getting a working
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account can be quite high. The high initial setup costs can also hinder users with a
casual interest to simply trying out the Grid. There are two main reasons why Grid
certificates need to be reliably bound to a legal entity. First, to ensure that resources
which were used are also paid for, and second, to ensure that malicious behaviour
(e.g. not paying for resources or hacking other users) can be successfully brought to
court. The security mechanisms introduced in this thesis deal with the prevention of
inter-user attacks, thus mitigating the need for legal recourses. The resource provider
can set quotas and restrict access for users’ VMs so that other users are safe and the
resources cannot be harmed. However, without a verified identity, the current practice
of accounting and billing has a certain amount of risk, since resources could be used
and not paid for. To protect the resource provider from financial harm, an instant pre-
paid usage model can be implemented for unverified users, i.e. if the legal identity of
a certificate was not verified by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA). Jobs submitted to
the Grid by such users must be paid for in advance. This simple measure allows the
resource provider to grant immediate access to users without verified Grid credentials.
The privileges granted to these users is tightly controlled by the resource provider. The
root privileges users are not a problem since they only affect their own machine, and
quotas enforced by the Xen0 according to the amount of resources purchased ensure
that no user can misuse the resources. The one area where pre-paid users need to be
restricted significantly compared to verified and trusted users is in the capability to
access the Internet. Since without the accountability created through registration, it
would be possible to pay for resources and then run a spambot or other malicious soft-
ware which harms others without risk of prosecution. Thus, it is advisable to restrict
Internet access to avoid liability on the resource providers’ part. With this restriction,
users can only harm themselves, since they paid for their resources and cannot access
the external network or other users’ resources. This side effect of the security mecha-
nisms needed to gain the trust of business users allows the hassle free testing of a Grid
infrastructure and can be used to ease Grid adoption, since first trial runs can be done
immediately. A user without any credentials opens a pre-payment website of a Grid
site where an anonymous X.509 certificate is created for the user by a Java applet. The
certificate is signed by a special pre-paid CA which automatically signs all certificates
created by the pre-payment mechanisms. The user is prompted if the certificate is to be
imported into the browser, which should be accepted. Then, using a payment service
such as PayPal, a number of jobs can be bought. Each job has a maximum lifetime
which is enforced by the cluster scheduling mechanism. The Grid headnode is notified
about the number of jobs the user has paid for. Then, when a job is submitted, the
proxy certificate used for submission is analyzed for the root certificate and a cross-
check is performed to see whether the certificate was signed by the pre-paid CA and
whether the job has been paid for. If both checks are successful, the job is submitted
to the cluster scheduling system. The pre-paid certificates are not a replacement of the
normal verified X.509 user certificates, but offer a quick alternative when no Internet
access is required on the actual worker nodes.
Figure 9.24 shows how the presented Grid setup affects the first steps of both
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Figure 9.24: On-demand Grid Usage
solution producers and customers in a single site scenario. Using an automatically
generated pre-paid certificate, the solution producer installs the software using full
root privileges. This is all the solution producer needs to do until a customer (also
with a pre-paid certificate) would like to use the software (A), in which case a VM
is linked to the customer’s certificate. (B). The customer then uses the pre-payment
functionality to buy a job and then can use the private VM to execute the job (C).
The provider does not need to do anything. Considering how much work is required
in a traditional Grid setup to acquire valid certificates and install moderately complex
software, the presented solution is far easier and more secure. The presented security
mechanisms enable the installation of software which requires root privileges, which
normally would be possible only in the most trusted environments without endanger-
ing other Grid users. This brings the Grid computing paradigm quite a bit closer to
fulfilling the vision of compute power as easy as electrical power from the socket.
9.9.2 Application Evaluation
The final part in the evaluation of the presented secure on-demand Grid environment
is the analysis of how the applications presented in chapter 2 are affected by the new
Grid usage capabilities. The biggest change can be seen with the commercial engi-
neering and banking applications and the network emulation application, since these
applications could not be run in traditional Grid environments at all for both security
and usability reasons. The modifications to the operating systems kernel the network
emulation application requires could not have been installed due to the negative side
effects they would have had on other users’ applications. Even if security had not been
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an issue, getting multiple resource providers to install kernel patches across multiple
cluster sites would have been a major undertaking. With the presented innovative se-
curity and administrative extension it is possible to install the emulation framework
autonomously in a virtual environment and deploy that environment across multiple
sites with no additional cost or risk.
In the case of the commercial engineering and banking applications, security was
the main issue hindering Grid adoption. The presented security concepts have ad-
dressed the concerns of several companies, including Access e.V., Wasy GmbH, BMW,
Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, who are now evaluating both in-house and out-
sourced Grid usage. In the case of the engineering applications, the pay-per-use Grid
paradigm is also of particular interest. A solution producer like Access can install
their software in a virtual image and offer customers instant access without forcing the
customers to undergo a lengthy registration process at multiple Grid sites.
For the medical and media applications, the possibility of making cluster worker
nodes available to a service-oriented workflow is of great interest. Previously, creating
a fine-grained service-oriented application would have meant setting up a dedicated
hosting environment. With the presented security concepts, service-oriented appli-
cations can be integrated into existing shared use cluster environments by installing
the service hosting software into the user’s image. The novel connection of the worker
nodes to the Internet offers full flexibility for the creation of complex cross-site service-
oriented applications. The automated security setup makes managing the distributed
environment similarly easy to managing a single user environment. Due to the strong
isolation of the different images, confidential data can now be processed in the Grid.

10
Related Work
10.1 On-Demand Grid Computing
There are several projects investigating a more dynamic form of Grid computing than
the standard Grid solutions currently offer. These dynamic Grids are featured under
many names, e.g. ad hoc Grids, personal Grids, desktop Grids, P2P Grids, dynamic
Grids. In the following, the related Grid projects are discussed which focus on a dy-
namic Grid environment and attempt to automate the configuration and maintenance
of such a Grid to enable easy adaptation and use.
Sterck et al. [168] introduce a lightweight Grid environment for solving bioinfor-
matics problems on small, ”privately operated” Grids. An explicit design choice was
made not to use standard Grid middleware solutions like Globus, justified by the rea-
sons that they are too cumbersome and difficult to use in a dynamic environment and
are not flexible enough to facilitate the e-science researchers’ needs. Basic design crite-
ria of the system are decentralisation, provided by an underlying tuple space concept,
and platform independence, provided by an implementation in Java. The following
design issues are dealt with within the framework: scalability, resource allocation and
scheduling, automatic distribution of application code to workers, inter-process com-
munication and resource discovery. Furthermore, the following design issues were
presented but are not yet implemented: secure resource sharing, a user billing system
and quality of service mechanisms. All inter-process communication is done via Java
sockets and serialised Java objects. This makes the configuration of the framework
difficult to manage once organisational boundaries need to be crossed and restricts the
scalability of the framework. Although this is not an issue for the scenario described
in the paper, it limits the usability of the framework for other research projects. The
fact that standard toolkits and protocols were avoided for the sake of usability makes
it difficult to utilise components from this project or integrate new developments from
other projects. No security mechanisms or concepts beyond standard Java security are
introduced.
A desktop Grid computing environment for enterprise solutions is presented by
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Naik et al. [121]. Each Grid node runs a VMware Workstation instance with Linux
as the guest operating system (OS). On each guest OS, IBM’s WebSphere Application
Server AEs 4.0 is run to host web services which are integrated into the Grid applica-
tions. The system is targeted at enterprises which install and manage the virtual PCs
and the application servers to create a small Grid environment. Ease of use and man-
ageability are not dealt with since they are not seen as critical issues and although the
abstract claims privacy and protection are dealt with the paper does not mention any
mechanisms outside of the abstract. The further work of the authors [38, 81] dealing
with virtualisation in Grid environments also does not deal with security issues apart
from stating that passwords are used for access control. Particularly in a desktop Grid
environment, the virtualisation of resources alone is not sufficient to offer a secure
Grid computing environment.
Germain et al. [83] and Glatard et al. [84] both discuss work in the field of med-
ical Grid computing. The work in by Glatard et al. introduces a workflow engine for
medical applications with high data throughput, and Germain et al. introduces a Grid
based image analysis approach. The authors state that the integration of workstation
PCs into a desktop Grid is a growing interest in the medical community. Unlike the
projects mentioned above, the solutions presented in these papers are not based on
lightweight custom developed Grids, but on a standard service-oriented Grid middle-
ware. The papers state that implementing the medical applications on the standard
Grid middleware is far from trivial due to the complex nature of both the application
and the middleware itself. Although the work focuses on medical applications only
standard Grid security is utilised.
Andrade et al. [9] present a peer-to-peer based middleware which operates on a
Bag of Tasks (BoT) in a dynamic environment where nodes can leave and join the
Grid at any time. A BoT is the framework’s unit of scheduling and has the following
characteristics: (i) it does not need any synchronisation between tasks, (ii) it has no
dependencies between tasks and (iii) it can tolerate faults caused by resource unavail-
ability with very simple strategies [8]. This places many restrictions on the application
developer. The peer-to-peer system and the BoT have their own programming API
and do not make use of standards. Although a stated design goal is to protect the
desktop users from malicious Grid applications no ideas are given on how this is to be
accomplished.
Several criteria for ad hoc Grid computing are discussed by Amin et al. [5], and
the need for peer-to-peer integration is explained. A figure illustrates the combination
of the JXTA peer-to-peer infrastructure and the CoG [193] framework. The details
of the realisation of the concepts are not shown, however. In a follow-up paper [6],
the authors describe an architecture for an ad hoc Grid which focuses on the issues
of community control, quality assurances, and spontaneity of service contribution and
invocation, developed as an integral part of the Java CoG Kit. The security issues of
identity management, identity verification, and authorisation control are discussed in
further work by the authors [7]. The issues identified in this work are not examined.
Chakravarti et al. [31] introduce an organically inspired peer-to-peer model to
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facilitate the use of desktop Grids. The organic Grid is meant to bridge the gap be-
tween traditional Grids and centrally managed distributed computation projects like
Seti@Home. The paper concentrates on the autonomic scheduling of simple indepen-
dent tasks and does not describe the Grid architecture in which the applications run.
Bertino et al. [21] present an approach to supporting fine-grained access control
for Grid resources. The authors argue that such a fine-grained policy-based access
control is necessary to enable desktop Grid computing. Giving resource owners a
higher flexibility in controlling access to their resources is seen as a vital requirement
for the adoption of the Grid paradigm to a higher extent into new avenues such as
desktop Grids. Similarly, in the proposal Grid users should get a higher flexibility in
choosing the resources in which their jobs must execute. The actual Grid architecture
is not described.
A lightweight Personal Grid based on a super-node peer-to-peer network is pro-
posed by Han and Park. [91]. A hierarchical scheduling system is used to distribute
different types of applications in the network. The programs are described as services
and are advertised by publishing XML descriptions through the peer-to-peer frame-
work, but service-oriented standards like WSDL or SOAP are not used. Great em-
phasis was placed on creating a light-weight and easy to use system in contrast to the
complex Grid toolkits like Globus or Unicore. No particular security mechanisms are
introduced.
To summarise, the related work can be divided into two categories. The first deals
with application specific research and the second deals with frameworks which aim
to create a generic Grid environment. Developers focusing on an application often
prefer a very lightweight and easy to use Grid environment [83, 84, 168, 154] and
actively avoid heavyweight middleware or draw attention to the development and ad-
ministrative overhead induced by the Grid middleware. The downside of this approach
is that basic functionality like accounting, billing and security are only dealt with in
a rudimentary fashion, and the solutions barely scale beyond the current application’s
scope. On the other hand, the generic Grid environment developers try to offer a
feature rich environment to host many different kinds of applications at the cost of cre-
ating a steep learning curve and high administrative costs. Due to time and resource
constraints, many generic middleware projects still have a specific focus of excellence
[6, 31, 21, 9, 91] although none has security as its main focus.
10.2 Sandboxing
Keahey et al. [101, 102, 74, 103, 24] have identified the need to integrate the advan-
tages of virtual machines in the cluster and Grid area. It is argued that virtual machines
offer the ability to instantiate an independently configured guest environment for dif-
ferent users on a dynamic basis. In addition to providing convenience to users, this
arrangement can also increase resource utilisation since more flexible, but strongly en-
forceable sharing mechanisms can be put in place. The authors also identify that the
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ability to serialise and migrate the state of a virtual machine opens new opportunities
for better load balancing and improved reliability that are not possible with traditional
resources. Virtual Workspaces [179] is a Globus Toolkit (GT4) based virtualisation so-
lution which allows Grid users to dynamically deploy and manage virtual machines in
a Grid environment. The virtual workspaces approach does not offer an image creation
service like the ICS nor does it offer an interface with the cluster scheduling system
which was needed for this work, however a frequent exchange of ideas with the virtual
workspace team occurred on many conferences.
The Virtual Workspaces project mainly focuses on the server side of Grid comput-
ing. Stumpf et al. [170, 169, 171] present a system in which virtualisation is used to
protect client machines. The difficulty of protecting client machines lies in the fact that
users generally want to install and use a lot of software that is not necessary for the pri-
mary business operation, in this case the Grid application. This creates an unnecessary
amount of additional security risks which can lead to a full system compromise. To
counter this threat, Stumpf et al. partition the client system into several virtual environ-
ments: an open and untrusted virtual operating system for general use and a minimal
trusted operating system in which only the minimal client software is installed. To
further protect the system, a virtualised Trusted Computing Module (vTPM) [201] is
introduced. This vTPM has a dual purpose. On the one hand, it is used to protect the
state of the trusted minimal operating system in which the Grid client software is in-
stalled. On the other hand, it allows the remote attestation of the client’s image. Using
a trusted third party, both the server and the client can be sure that the client’s image
has not been tampered with. An extended remote attestation algorithm even prevents
masquerading attacks by including a TPM bound key agreement into the existing TPM
remote attestation procedure [172].
A number of options for the protection of UNIX like operating systems such as
Linux or FreeBSD, OpenBSD and NetBSD with respect to untrusted applications have
been proposed. A very popular mechanism is the virtualisation of the entire hardware,
allowing a guest operating system to run in a virtual machine environment created by
the host operating systems. Such virtual machine systems include Usermode Linux
[51] or the already presented Xen [19]. The latter system has seen a great increase in
popularity for the small performance overhead caused by its virtualisation technology.
Combined with the decent level of security offered by the solution, led to the adoption
of Xen as the basis for the presented security framework.
Another sandboxing approach is Chroot [37] which confines file system access of
a process run in the chroot environment to a different base in the file system. Some
well known mechanisms exist for processes to break out of the chroot environment and
access files outside of this chroot jail. Those vulnerabilities have been addressed by the
BSD implementation of the jail system call. Jails partition a BSD environment into
isolation areas. A jail guarantees that every process placed in it will stay in the jail as
well as all of its descendant processes. The ability to manipulate system resources and
perform privileged operations is limited by the jail environment. The accessible file
name space is confined in the style of chroot (i.e. access is restricted to a configurable
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new root for the file system in the jail). Each jail is bound to use a single IP address for
outgoing and incoming connections, it is also possible to control what network services
a process within a jail may offer. Certain network operations associated with privileged
calls are disabled to circumvent IP spoofing or generation of disruptive traffic. The
ability to interact with other processes is limited to other processes in the same jail.
Systrace [136] has become a popular mechanism for call restriction as well as
privilege elevation on a fine grained scale without the need for running entire processes
in a privileged context, namely in OpenBSD and NetBSD with ports being available
for Linux and FreeBSD as well. It uses system call interposition to enforce security
policies for processes run under the control of systrace. Systrace is implemented in
two parts, an addition to the kernel that intercepts system calls, comparing them to
a kernel level policy map, disabling the call if a negative entry or no entry at all is
present. The kernel level implementation is assisted by a user-level part that reads
and interprets policy specifications to hand them to the kernel level policy map, report
policy enforcement decisions to the user applications and even call GUI applications
for interactive generation of policies.
Janus [88] is one of the first system call interception tools. It uses the ptrace and
/proc mechanisms which are claimed not to be a suitable interface for system call in-
terception, since for example race conditions in the interface allow an adversary to
completely escape the sandbox [194]. Janus has evolved to use a hybrid approach sim-
ilar to systrace to get direct control of system call processing in the operating system
[82].
The ability to set the effective user id of CGI programs to another user than the
user id the calling web server runs under was introduced as the suEXEC capability in
Apache 1.2 [175].
The Progressive Deployment System project (PDS) [4] provides a virtual execu-
tion environment for software deployment. In contrast to a Xen-based virtualisation,
PDS only provides partial virtualisation by intercepting a set of system calls to enable
software deployment on networked machines while enabling management from a cen-
tral location. Additional components required for the system can be loaded on-demand
at runtime. While the PDS system provides a system for software deployment from a
central location, the system does not provide a mechanism for short-lived deployment
of software. In addition, the virtualisation features in PDS are not adequate for the
requirements of on-demand deployment, since the virtualisation methods only affect a
small subset of system calls.
VMPlants [109] is a tool for providing and managing virtual machine execution
environments for Grid computing. It supports automated configuration and creation of
virtual machines that are configured on a single system and subsequently cloned and
instantiated over the Grid. VMPlants is a middleware service that supports various vir-
tualisation solutions; its main focus, however, is not on security, but rather on planning
of production processes in Grids.
The Entropia Virtual Machine [26] provides a system for desktop Grids. Entropia
introduces a binary wrapping software which constrains wrapped applications. Since
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native binaries are wrapped any language that compiles to x86 can be used. No source
code is required, supporting the broadest possible range of applications enabling the
wrapping of cmd.exe, perl, and the Java Virtual Machine inside the Entropia. The
wrapping of the binary is achieved by rewriting the import table of the binary, so
that the Entropia vm.dll is the first dll in the list. When a binary is loaded under
Windows, all of the dlls are loaded in the order in which they appear in the import
table. By ensuring that the Entropia dll is the first dll in the list, it is guaranteed that
the Entropia dll will be loaded first. This means that the dll main inside the vm.dll
will be executed before any non-system code for the programs execution. When the
dll main executes it dynamically modifies the loaded binary and any dynamic libraries
used to intercept system calls. The Entropia sandbox mediates subjob access to all
system APIs that could affect the behavior of the desktop. This includes the file system,
registry, graphical user interface, networking, keyboard, mouse and I/O devices, etc...
Some of the APIs (file system, registry, and network) are mediated others (mouse,
graphical user interface) are disabled. Similar to the Jailing approach presented in
section 6.3 configuring the constraints in a safe manner is far from trivial. Also, the
jailing mechanisms are not based on existing and tested jailing approaches, making a
security audit of the mechanism necessary.
10.3 Grid Demilitarised Zone and Firewalling
The London eScience Centre [183] provides a solution to connect the Sun Grid Engine
to the Globus Toolkit as a backend scheduler. The software is the current state-of-the-
art solution for scheduling Grid jobs to the SGE and is widely used. However, it is
not DMZ capable, since it requires direct access from the Globus headnode to the Sun
Grid Engine. This can either be achieved by installing the SGE locally on the Globus
headnode, or the execution environment must be made accessible via the Network File
System or a similar direct access solution. Both integration options are not acceptable
from a security perspective, which led to the development of Fence.
Globus offers a wide range of remote services, so firewalls rules have to be chosen
carefully in order to avoid disturbing legal users. Welch [199] analyses Globus ver-
sions 3 and 4 in terms of network ports and data streams. Based on that, a fine-grained
firewall configuration can be created, so that authorised users can work without dis-
ruptions, while at the same time blocking most unwanted traffic. A similar study was
done by Baker et al. [18]. The steering committee of the german D-Grid project rec-
ommends a static firewall configuration [43] with about 25000 open ports to guarantee
unhindered communication from the Grid client to the Grid resources. This approach
is not suitable for the presented on-demand environment since it only operates on a per
site bases and thus opens up a great many ports that are not strictly necessary for all ap-
plications and does not allow for user specific settings. Nor does the recommendation
deal with the issue of inter-user protection.
Volpato and Grimmm [192] present an approache to partially overcome the lim-
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itations in Grid computing introduced by firewalls. The first method, based on the
extension of a firewall implementation enables a dynamic behavior of the firewall it-
self to better adapt to the needs of the Grid environment. The second approach creates
a Grid DMZ which aims to minimise the interactions between Grid middleware and
the cluster network. However, since no virutalisation of the worker nodes is present
the following Globus services need to be allowed access from the DMZ into the private
cluster network: GridFTP and a login service which transfers the GRAM calls to the
cluster scheduler. It is also recommended that the Grid middleware in the DMZ and the
cluster headnode share a common filesystem. While the above offers better protection
than no DMZ, the DMZ solution presented in this work has less components crossing
the DMZ, in particular no shared filesystem is needed.
A dynamic firewall named Dyna-fire was introduced by Green et al. [89] for a
Globus Grid middleware environment. It supports VO-based security policies through
a modification of the Globus gatekeeper and enables fine-grained access control to
Grid sites. The focus of Dyne-fire is the protection of Grid resources against attacks
from external users (incoming traffic). In contrast, the firewalling solution presented
in this thesis also focuses on inter-user protection and out-bound traffic control, due
to the new usage model introduces through the user based, Internet capable, virtual
environments.
10.4 Server Rotation
Arsenault et al. and Huang et al. [16, 92, 93] suggest treating all servers as poten-
tially compromised, no matter if an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has raised an
alert or not. Their work focuses on high availability computing where all servers have
redundant backup servers and hardware failover switches. The authors argue that un-
detected attacks do not cause instant harm, but increase damage over time. In Huang
et al. [92], an estimate is shown based on a report by banking security experts that a
theft of $5,000 to $10,000 can be carried out over a few weeks, while larger losses up
to $1 million are likely to take four to six months [146]. To make IT systems resilient
against long lasting attacks, the authors propose rotating backup servers with the pri-
mary servers on a regular basis. The server which is currently offline is then restored
from a secure image. All malicious code (together with the state of the server) is lost
during rotation, thus automatically cleaning the system of attack code. The rotation
is made possible by using the redundant servers and hardware failover switches avail-
able to them in high availability computing. The drawback of the proposed system
is that it only works well for stateless servers. DNS, NFS and static web servers are
given as example applications for the Self-Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT) tech-
nology proposed by the authors. Furthermore, no allowance is made for long lasting
TCP/IP connections which would be terminated with an error state if a rotation inter-
rupted them, making UDP the more viable protocol for the proposed architecture. Grid
servers, like many other server products, are not stateless and show complex stateful
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interaction patterns which make them incompatible with the proposed approach.
The same basic idea using virtualisation technology was later also proposed by
Reiser and Kapitza [140]. The presented VM-FIT system uses the Xen hypervisor
technology for redundant server copies which can periodically be refreshed to increase
the resilience of the server. To achieve this, Domain0/Xen0 runs multiple XenUs con-
taining the actual application and one XenU called Domain NV which is responsible
for passing user requests to the replicas. This makes Domain NV the critical com-
ponent of the system, since a compromise of Domain NV can compromise all repli-
cas, and Domain NV is not protected by the replication mechanism. Critically, the
approach requires that dedicated support for an application has to be integrated into
Domain NV. In the case of the CORBA prototype presented in the paper, this means
that a CORBA middleware must run in Domain NV. In addition, Domain NV must
implement group communication to ensure that the state is updated on all replicas.
This creates a potential for security problems in Domain NV defeating the rest of the
security system before it has a chance to operate. The authors state this problem and
offer two alternatives. First, Domain NV must be made intrusion tolerant. The authors
themselves state that the drawback of this approach is that it requires more complex,
Byzantine fault tolerant group communication protocols, which are not presented in
the paper. However, even a fault tolerant group communication protocol would not
protect the system from an operating system fault or an attack on Domain NV. The
second approach presented in the paper is that the system makes sure that Domain NV
is a protected, isolated entity that cannot be influenced by Domain 0, but no sugges-
tion is presented on how this could be done. The requirement that a Domain U must
be protected against Domain 0 is very difficult to achieve, since it contradicts the par-
avirtualisation technology used, because the distinguishing feature of Domain 0 is that
it can control all hosted domains. Even if this requirement could be met, this approach
would not deal with the risk of an internal compromise due to the heavyweight nature
of the software running in Domain NV. Furthermore, due to the group communication
infrastructure, the presented system does not work for applications with multithreading
and thus excludes almost all modern server applications.
SITAR [196, 197, 195] is an intrusion-tolerant architecture for distributed services
which includes adaptive reconfiguration, heartbeat monitors, runtime checks, and com-
mercial off-the-shelf (COTS) servers mediated by proxies. SITAR relies on hardware
redundancy for intrusion tolerance, but requires a shared memory environment for the
redundant servers and creates a large overhead for the intrusion detection and tolerance
infrastructure. Next to the functional hardware redundancy, SITAR requires a Proxy
Server, a Ballot Monitor and an Acceptance Monitor. Thus, if a server has a single re-
dundant backup, SITAR adds six more servers to the setup for the intrusion tolerance
architecture. Furthermore, SITAR still requires an IDS to successfully detect an attack
for the intrusion tolerance mechanisms to operate, thus making it difficult to defend
against unknown attacks.
The ITUA project [42] relies on intrusion detection and randomised automated re-
sponse. It provides middleware based on process replication and unpredictable adapta-
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tion to tolerate the faults that result from staged attacks. Like in SITAR, the IDS must
successfully detect an attack for the ITUA to operate.
HACQIT [141] uses a primary/backup server architecture which unlike the two
approaches above can cope with unknown attacks, but only works for scenarios with
known users. The basic idea is to mirror servers using different implementations for the
server software, for example for a web server scenario both IIS and Apache would be
utilised. All user requests are sent to both servers, the idea being that an attack against
IIS will not work against Apache. Thus, the two results can be compared, and if they
differ, one of the servers has been compromised. Determining which of the servers was
compromised can be difficult, however according to the authors most attacks lead to
one server responding with 2xx or 3xx (success and redirect codes) and the other with
4xx or 5xx (error codes), thus clearly showing which server was compromised. In the
case of a compromise, the compromised server is taken offline. The approach does not
deal with operating system or cross-server attacks, such as SQL injection or the like. To
fully utilise the proposed system, a fully heterogeneous environment must be created.
Each functional component must be paired with a different implementation offering
the same functionality, e.g. Windows/Linux, IIS/Apache, MySQL/Microsoft SQL, etc.
Apart from the fact that this is not always possible (for instance in Grid computing),
it significantly increases the administrative overhead for the uncompromised system.
Furthermore, HACQIT uses a Mediator/Adaptor/Controller (MAC) to sanitise requests
before passing them on to the redundant servers. This introduces a single point of
failure in a component with a complex functional behaviour which is vital for the
entire system.
Valdes et al. [191] describe a similar system using heterogeneity and redundancy
to cope with attacks. As such, they suffer from the same problems. They assume that
no more than a critical number of servers are in an undetected compromised state at
any given time. Thus, they need an intrusion detection system. They complement this
through an agreement protocol based on heterogeneous redundant components. The
agreement protocol assumes that all non-faulty and non-compromised servers give the
same answer to the same request. Thus, the architecture is meant to provide content
that is static from the end user’s point of view. If an attacker chooses not to change
the expected responses (i.e. the HTML content), (s)he can misuse the resources in an
undetected manner in any number of ways (Spambot, Fileserver, Relay, etc). The work
does not deal with the issue of content update.
Saidane et al. [145] introduce an extension to Valdes’ works to cover SQL storage
queries for web servers. An agreement protocol over a number of redundant SQL
storage query generators is aimed at weeding out malformed SQL queries. Using this
system, a certain amount of state can be stored in a database and can be accessed by
the redundant web servers. The problem with this approach is finding at least three
different web servers that generate the same SQL queries without being vulnerable to
the same attack. Like all other approaches based on heterogeneous redundant servers,
the hardware overhead is quite large: two further alternate servers and three proxies
are required at minimum for one production server. Furthermore, attacks which do not
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target the primary system go undetected, since the agreement protocol does not catch
them.
A number of commercial products, such as Tripwire and Entercept, and non-
commercial products like Snort concentrate on protecting stand-alone web servers with
no redundancy management, but rely on detecting an attack to initiate countermea-
sures. Many of the above intrusion tolerance systems rely on some form of intrusion
detection. If the attackers are one step ahead (which unfortunately they often are),
these intrusion detection products will offer no protection.
Several publications deal with integrating an IDS into a Grid and will be discussed
in detail in the following section. In the context of the intrusion tolerance related work
it should be stated that none of the systems cope well with unknown attacks or stealth
attacks.
To summarise, there are two categories of related work. The first category does
not rely on detecting an intrusion and as such can deal with stealth attacks. However,
this is achieved at the cost of limiting the scope of the system to stateless static content
systems, which excludes it from the area of Grid computing. The second category
requires that the attack be detected one way or the other and often also has the problem
of state reproduction due to the distributed nature of their redundancy mechanisms.
The solution of using heterogeneous servers to validate primary function responses is
not applicable to Grid computing and also does not detect attacks which do not affect
the primary function of a server. This work in this thesis presents a novel approach
which successfully deals with unknown stealth attacks, but also preserves the state of
the Grid servers and can cope with TCP/IP connections.
10.5 Intrusion Detection
Schulter et al. [152] identify different types of attacks against a Grid infrastructure.
Besides conventional attacks against Grids, the paper lists several Grid specific attack
types: unauthorised access, misuse (by authorised users) and exploits (attacks towards
services, protocols or Grid applications). The authors point out that present Grid-
IDS approaches do not fulfil the important qualities (completeness - recognition of all
attack-types, scalability and Grid-compatibility) for protection of Grid systems. Their
proposal is as follows: To prevent costly development of new software, the involved
Grid nodes are equipped with conventional Network and Host IDS (N- and HIDS).
These are able to recognise and report standard attacks and furthermore send their data
to a Grid IDS, which may additionally identify Grid-specific attacks. The Grid IDS
consists of a scheduler, agents, analysers and databases. Data from N- and HIDS is
collected into databases, distributed and than analysed on Grid nodes. While some fo-
cus is given to the global collection of IDS data, no cross-site analysis is done and thus
no new distributed attacks can be discovered. All data is stored locally and analysed
in the traditional way.
Fang-Yie Leu et al. [111] propose an IDS concept, which employs a Grid for
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intrusion detection. The monitored system does not have to be a Grid. The main
design goal of the IDS was that it should be particularly robust against high amounts
of data traffic, as it occurs with DoS attacks. The concept of the Grid IDS is as follows:
a dispatcher collects network traffic from a switch using tcpdump and dispatches the
collected data periodically to a detection node. A scheduler controls which dispatcher
sends data to which detection node to achieve an equal load in the entire system. To
be able to detect attacks with a longer time scope, data analysed by detection nodes
is stored in a database and analysed periodically by a detector. In an extension [110]
to the original system backup brokers are introduced which make the system robust
against malfunctions of detection nodes. Although trace data is distributed, the system
does not correlate the data gained from different network segments and thus it is not
able to detect attacks that take advantage of the distributed nature of the Grid.
Yonggang et al. [36] propose a tree-like structuring of an IDS for distributed net-
works (LDIDS). The leafs of the tree consist of conventional IDSs that generate alerts
in a first step. The nodes on the central levels of the LDIDS tree aggregate alerts as
well as ”data, which cannot be analysed locally” sent by child nodes. Finally, the root
node has an overview of the entire network to be monitored. The paper does not men-
tion what kind of data is shared between nodes besides alerts, if this additional data is
only sent in special cases or how it is later analysed. Although this paper employs a
similar structuring as used by the S-IDS, it does not deal with the problem of handling
the large amounts of data or detection of distributed attacks.
Kenny and Coghlan [104] describe a system that allows the querying of log files
through the Relational Grid Monitoring Architecture (R-GMA), which can be used
to build a Grid-wide intrusion detection system. Their implementation of this sys-
tem, called SANTA-G (Grid-enabled System Area Networks Trace Analysis), queries
Snort log files by using SQL. SANTA-G is composed of three elements: A Sensor, a
QueryEngine and a Viewer GUI. The log files are monitored by the sensor, which, in
case of a change to the log files, inform the SANTA-G QueryEngine. The QueryEngine
then publishes the relevant information to the SANTA-G Viewer to show them in a
GUI. In future implementations, a high-level incident detection, tracking and response
platform is planned which will use custom coded Consumers to filter and analyse the
alerts published in order to detect patterns that would signify an attempted distributed
attack on the Grid infrastructure. Currently, SANTA-G does not provide a functional-
ity that detects distributed attacks. It allows an easy access to Snort log files, but does
not correlate between the different nodes. Additionally, information is queried by SQL
when changes on the log files occur, no other data is monitored.
Choon and Samsudin [34] propose an architectural concept for a Grid-IDS. They
define a number of requirements for an effective Grid-IDS: flexibility, scalability,
reusability, small overhead, speed, autonomy and adaption to Grid environments. They
also suggest that an IDS virtual organisation should be used to offer IDS services to
the rest of the Grid. News of attacks and importantly the vulnerabilities that lead to the
attacks can then be distributed via the VO to help protect the other Grid site.
Silva et al. [155] describe a system named ”Distributed IDS on Grid” (DIDSoG),
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that aims to join heterogeneous Intrusion Detection System over a Grid middleware.
This should be achieved by a two dimensional hierarchy of Sensors, Correlators/Ag-
gregators, Analysers, Monitoring services and Countermeasure services. The infras-
tructure should be used to combine the strengths and reduce the weaknesses of different
existing IDS systems. However, no IDS or Grid systems are used, rather a GridSim
simulation is presented covering the graph construction, thus it is difficult to judge the
capabilities of the system. It is, however, clear that distributed attacks cannot be de-
tected, since the monitoring components consist of standard IDS system and nor raw
data exchange is executed.
Feng et al. [66] argue that traditional Host-IDS systems are not suitable for Grid
systems, since certain information such as Grid user to local user mappings are not
known on the local node. Furthermore, it is argued that since the Grid requires its
computational power for its users, traditional H-IDS systems are to heavyweight. A
Grid H-IDS is proposed specifically targeting Grid specific attacks on a single nodes.
While alerts are passed on to the Grid level, the IDS logic is confined to a single host.
Snort1, the probably most popular open source Network-IDS developed by Source-
fire Inc., offers a large variety of features. Due to its wide diffusion and availability
of platform specific versions, Snort describes itself as ”the de facto standard” of IDS
systems. Snort provides protocol- and signature- as well as anomaly-based intrusion
detection. This tool may be used as a NIDS but also as a packet logger and network
sniffer. Intrusion detection rules are maintained in a simple descriptive language.
Prelude2 is not an IDS in traditional sense, but provides a framework for conflu-
ence of information originating from many different types of sensors and its analysis.
A Prelude-Sensor may be the message stream of a NIDS or HIDS installation, but also
logfiles from arbitrary systems as well as self developed extensions. Prelude therefore
consists of 5 parts: libPrelude, a library that manages communication between sen-
sors and a so called manager; the sensors that have to be installed at network joints
(prelude, amongst other things, contains own NIDS and HIDS sensors); a manager,
that obtains the sensor data by libPrelude, processes and stores the results; Counter
Measure Agents, which may start counter measures for certain attacks; a frontend that
provides an administrator with normalised summary data for the systems status. Pre-
lude joins messages from different distributed sources for recognition of attacks and
launches counter measures. Yet there is no aggregation level to reduce incoming in-
formation in large setups. Commercial solutions pursue a similar approach, but mostly
only integrate their own sensors.
Commercial IDS products denominate themselves often as IPS (Intrusion Preven-
tion System) or IDPS (Intrusion Detection and Prevention System). There is a large
number of products by different companies that basically offer a very similar function-
ality: peripheral sensors report suspicious activities to a central, so called management
console. This console or the reporting sensor itself may immediately undertake counter
1see http://www.snort.org
2see http://www.prelude-ids.org
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measures to repel the attack or report it to an administrator. The Guide to Intrusion
Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) [148], published by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology in February 2007, describes recommendations for us-
age of IDPS in corporate environments, different types of IDPS products (host-based,
network-based, etc.) and their reasonable combination. At the time of analysis, there
seemed to be no commercial product that provides at least basic features of a dis-
tributed IDS. In most cases, the distribution is reduced to peripheral sensors that report
alerts to a central management console. Below, some commercial IDPS solutions are
described exemplarily.
Based on the open source system ”Snort” described above, Sourcefires 3D system3
is a corporate solution that adds sensor orchestration to the snort functionality to pro-
vide extended threat recognition and defense ability. Sourcefire indicates a maximal
throughput of 8 Gbps for a sensor. The threat analysis is only done at the sensors,
alarm-messages are then centrally processed at the Management Console and corre-
sponding counter-measures are initiated for the whole network. The wide spread use
of Sourcefire’s IDS systems is illustrated in the list of corporate partnerships: Nokia,
Symantec, IBM, Nortel und VeriSign are among others service and OEM partners of
Sourcefire.
Nokia, as an OEM partner of Sourcefire, offers hardware IDS solutions4 with the
3D system integrated. On dedicated hardware with specially tailored operating system,
high-performance IDPS functionally is offered to be easily integrated into an existent
network.
Ciscos idea of a secure network5 includes IDPS sensors in all components, start-
ing with border gateways, routers and switches down to every single office PC. Every
known or unknown attack is advertised to be recognisable by intelligently managing
the collected information of the sensors at a central site. The instrumentation is done
by modules added to existing (Cisco-)equipment or dedicated IPS products. A cen-
tral management service (Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis and Response System
MARS, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6241/index.html) governs the coordi-
nation of sensors and the assessment of the current system status. Employing knowl-
edge about the network topology, in combination with NetFlow data (see below) as
well as anomaly-based intrusion detection, the system is ought to be enabled to deliver
a detailed view of the attack vector.
The StealthWatch software6 of Lancope uses a slightly different approach to mon-
itor the network infrastructure. Instead of deploying sensors throughout the entire net-
work, StealthWatch collects information about network traffic at a central site. It uses
a monitoring functionality that most network hardware provides. Most equipment is
able to deliver information about the entire handled traffic to a single monitoring port,
using (partly standardised) data formats (e.g. Cisco/Juniper: NetFlow, HP/Foundry:
3see http://www.sourcefire.com/products/3D
4see http://europe.nokia.com/A4213032
5see http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/index.html
6see http://www.lancope.com/products/
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sFlow). This flow data is handled by collectors whose performance is crucial to the
entire system. These units also launch counter measures. Since, for example, a back-
bone switch may generate a huge amount of flow-data traffic, multiple collectors may
have to be used within a large infrastructure. Lancope therefore offers a management
console to manage and monitor an entire topology of collectors.
Many security software manufacturers offer host-based IDPS, often integrated with
anti virus business solutions. Symantec additionally offers a product7 especially for
critical systems and another one for usual terminal equipment. Both ”only” protect the
system they are installed on and may report detected attacks to a management console.
Anomaly based methods as well as local logfile and network traffic analysis are used
for intrusion detection. HIDS products often offer services for patch deployment, a
personal firewall and AV functionalities.
To summarise, all of the above mentioned work use traditional logging and query-
ing to detect intrusions. The presented S-IDS’s utilisation of the stream based database
system PIPES enables a simple and flexible implementation of information flow and
analysis, employing the temporal context of data, which is not possible using a stan-
dard IDS approach.
10.6 Grid Service Development
Andreozzi et al. [10] measurement theory and the Logic Scoring of Preferences method
are used to select Grid services. The authors describe a formal model for satisfaction
based service evaluation which can be used in MDA based Grid computing. The paper
does not deal with the transformation of PIM models to PSM models or separation of
concerns.
The most interesting related project is Introduce [135] which started up shortly
after the GDT project introduced in this thesis. Like GDT, service security issues
are handled by the development environment reducing the chance for developers to
make mistakes. Provider centric security like CA creation, certificate management,
and trusted CA configuration is not dealt with. However, the biggest drawback of
Introduce compared to GDT is that Introduce is not an integrated development envi-
ronment and does not have roundtrip support. As a consequence, once the Grid service
skeleton has been generated, developers must change to a different development en-
vironment such as Eclipse. There is no convenient way to change security settings or
Grid service specific code, once application developers have made changes.
Since service-oriented Grid computing is an extension of the service-oriented com-
puting paradigm, there are several relevant papers dealing with applying MDA in a
web service environment. They can be grouped into two opposing approaches: A
document/WSDL centric approach and a programming/UML centric approach.
A WSDL centric approach is presented by Mulye [119]. The work discusses which
7see http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/products/category.jsp?pcid=1005
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components of a service belong to which layer of the MDA approach. Definitions,
Operations, Port type(s), Messages, Parts and Part type(s) are placed in the PIM layer.
Service, Ports and Binding(s) are placed in the PSM layer. However, this is in con-
tradiction to the recommended MDA layer separation, since most of the components
placed in the PIM are specific to a service-oriented approach and should therefore be
placed in the PSM layer. The paper goes on to suggest that a document centric view is
better suited to SOA models than an UML centric view.
Three WSDL centric transformation are introduced by Bezivin et al. [22]. The
most relevant one for this work is the mapping from a UML based PSM to web service
code. For the transformation to be applied, a full specification of the WSDL document
must be created in the PSM by the developer.
In a similar way, Patrascoiu [130] describes a mapping from EDOC to web services
using a detailed user created model of the WSDL document.
None of the above approaches deal with the critical transformation from a PIM to
the UML description of the WSDL document, with the separation of concerns on the
PSM or code level or with security issues.
A WSDL free approach is presented by Gromo et al. [90]. A WSDL independent
UML model is proposed because it offers a much clearer view of the system function-
ality. Automatic transformations from UML to WSDL are used to create the actual
WSDL document. Since the UML model is completely free of any WSDL specific
components, the developer is free to concentrate on actual business concerns. The
downside is that an integral part of service-oriented systems is no longer visible in the
MDA models and thus outside of the development scope.
Rakesh et al., Piero et al. and Skogan et al. [137, 73, 156] discuss service-oriented
architectures and MDA in general, but do not address the problem of transforming
PIM to a SOA specific PSM or the separation of concerns in the PSM or code layer.
None of the above approaches deal with Grid security issues.

11
Conclusions
In this thesis, a novel Grid environment which offers advanced security mechanisms to
enable on-demand Grid computing was presented. An analysis of the new threats faced
within such a shared environment for service-oriented on-demand Grid computing was
given. The analysis addressed three different levels of on-demand Grid computing,
based on the decreasing trust requirements between resource providers, solution pro-
ducers and customers and the motivation, risk aversion, skills, knowledge, resources
and access of the actors. A classification of three types of Grid applications currently
used in service-oriented Grid environments was given. It was shown in which ways
the security threats for the three application types in the three different levels need
different security measures to enable on-demand Grid computing for the applications
investigated in this thesis. An attack model was presented and several example attacks
were shown to underscore the different requirements of the applications.
For pure Java service applications, a secure ClassLoading mechanism was pre-
sented to allow services or groups of services to be deployed into a private sandbox.
This protects both the actual service code and the data contained in the services. At-
tackers able to deploy services are no longer able to deploy classes into other service’s
class space, access methods from other services or even see that other classes exist,
ensuring security for service code and privacy for both service data and as service
meta-data. Services wishing to form a group in which classes can be shared can use a
secure grouping mechanism which allows all services within the group to share classes,
but services outside of the group are denied access. Both mechanisms function with-
out disrupting the normal operation of the Grid node. Services already running in the
system are unaffected by the introduction of new services and new security groups.
For Java services which contain native code, a security solution was presented
which can protect the hosting environment and other services against data, meta-data
attacks as well as illegal resource access. The security architecture presented enables
the confinement of native components of Grid applications into a secure environment.
The security framework is based on dynamically created JNI proxies which create a
pipe between the secure Java environment and the secure native environment. The
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security solution is capable of protecting the hosting system as well as services from
each other. Depending on the sandbox capabilities, it is also possible for the process
manager to monitor resource utilisation and constrain e.g. CPU time as well as disk
space or network bandwidth used by individual sandboxes.
For more complex applications, a para-virtualisation solution was presented that
enables users to safely install and use custom software on-demand. The use of a vir-
tualisation environment like Xen offers numerous benefits both from a security per-
spective as well as from the administrative perspective. The sandboxing method used
ensures that the operating system installed in each XenU instance can only be ac-
cessed by the legitimate owner. This principle ensures that different solution providers
are protected from each other and also that customers are protected from other solution
providers and customers.
An image creation station was used to create the user specific virtual machines
in which a user can install software with root privileges. An automated dynamic fire-
walling mechanism offers a Virtual Organisation and user based network security setup
and creates secure user network regions on-demand. In addition, the Grid environment
was separated into several zones to protect local cluster resources from vulnerabili-
ties in the Grid middleware. The Grid headnode and the image creation station are
both confined into separate compartments in the Grid demilitarised zone. To enable
the secure integration of this Grid environment into existing business workflows, an
extension to the BPEL language and workflow execution engine was presented which
allows the execution of GSI secured Grid services in combination with existing busi-
ness web services. The workflow engine transparently deals with the issues of proxy
certificate creation and certificate renewal in the case of long running jobs. The pre-
sented system allows both fine grained service-oriented applications and legacy Grid
applications to be run side by side through a novel integration of the secure system into
existing cluster scheduling solutions. The presented security mechanisms allow clus-
ter worker nodes to expose services to the BPEL engine outside of the private cluster
network and thus enables multi-site workflows in a secure fashion.
A novel intrusion tolerance system based on rotating virtual servers was presented
which does not require attacks to be detected to function. It can deal with unknown
stealth attacks on stateful Grid servers. The server rotation strategy closes attack win-
dows for stateful service-oriented Grid headnode servers by a modified Grid service
resource state storage backend. A flexible plugin based rotation manager deals with
the complex issue of stateful connections to the Grid server, and a database connec-
tor is utilised to detach service state from the rotating functional components of the
Grid server. The Virtual Workspace, WS-GRAM, RFT and Delegation services were
extended to survive attacks through server rotation without losing their state. The
presented approach differs from other work in this area, since it does not require the
intrusion to be detected and can handle both Grid server state and stateful TCP/IP
connections, all vital issues for its applicability to Grid computing systems. Attacks
against the rotation system itself are easily identified due to the necessity of the sus-
tained nature of those attacks. For those attacks which could not be prevented, a novel
CHAPTER 11. CONCLUSIONS 269
architecture for an intrusion detection system for distributed environments was pre-
sented. The system is based on a streaming DBMS which allows querying of network
data in a temporal context. The use of a stream-oriented DBMS facilitates a natural
handling of data produced across multiple Grid sites and holds the potential for perfor-
mance benefits in large scale systems, since data is processed during its natural flow
and only stored as long as necessary for analysis.
The presented novel Grid environment is significantly easier and quicker to use
than traditional Grid solutions, while at the same time offering more functionality and
a higher level of security. From start to finish it now only takes a few minutes to get
access to the Grid and install custom software which can then immediately be deployed
and executed in a safe environment. The novel secure, on-demand and service-oriented
use of computational and storage resources offered by the presented Grid environment
is a key requirement for the upcoming realisation of the Cloud computing paradigm.
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11.1 Future Work
There are several areas of future research to be conducted in the area of on-demand
Grid computing. There are natural extensions to many of the techniques introduced in
this thesis, such as scalability, rotating servers, stream intrusion detection and micro-
workflows which will briefly be discussed here. A highly promising area of future
work, which was not started in this thesis but which could significantly improve the
security of on-demand Grid computing, is the area of trusted computing which will be
presented in more detail as the final suggestion for future work.
11.1.1 Robustness and Scalability
The mechanisms described in this thesis are still in a proof-of-concept stage and as
such there is still much room for improvement with respect to both stability and scal-
ability. In particular, the area of large scale deployment of the described security
mechanism offer interesting research opportunities. For instance, the current image
deployment mechanism using SCP works fine for deploying a couple of images across
two Grid sites but if tens of thousands of images need to be deployed across dozens of
Grid sites, different strategies need to be found.
11.1.2 Rotating Servers
There are several areas for future work, such as modifying the routing mechanism to
enable SYN delays instead of SYN dropping for the critical part to avoid the SYN
retransmission timeout due to critical part collision, introducing COW and RAM disk
mechanisms for efficient image cloning, evaluating other WSRF based servers such as
UnicoreGS, and investigating the remaining data attacks against the database to see if
new strategies can be found to prevent meta-data corruption.
11.1.3 Stream Intrusion Detection
There are several areas where the S-IDS system can be improved. Apart from improv-
ing the performance and scalability of the system there are three areas of particular
interest. The extension of the CQL syntax to include network pipes will enable dis-
tributed attack detection queries to be formulated using the CQL language instead of
requiring the PIPES to be constructed using Java. The use of CQL is desirable for
a number of reasons: a) CQL statements are shorter and thus easier to read and un-
derstand than Java programs, b) a CQL compiler can perform optimisations which
cannot be automated on Java constructed PIPES queries and c) CQL statements are
easier to exchange and integrate into new environments making the detection rules
more portable. Once all relevant PIPES operations for the IDS can be modelled in
CQL, some thought can be given to extending the number of attacks which can be de-
tected by PIPES. Also, an automated mapping of rules from other IDS systems such as
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SNORT to S-IDS CQL rules might be possible. Finally, an anomaly detection frame-
work could be integrated into S-IDS to enable detection of possible attacks beyond a
predefined set of rules.
11.1.4 Micro-Workflows
Future work will include the integration of advanced reservation mechanisms to co-
ordinate multi-site workflows and workflows with known variable computational load
distributions. A study of the integration possibilities with Grid meta-schedulers to
schedule virtual machines for services in addition to the classic cluster schedulers cur-
rently in use will be done.
11.1.5 Trusted Computing
The security mechanisms introduced in this thesis enable stages 1 and 2 of the on-
demand Grid computing paradigm. That is to say they protect customers and solution
producers from each other and they protect the resource provider from customers and
solution producers. However, the security mechanisms do not protect the customers
and solution producers from the resource provider. Since the resource providers have
administrative privileges on the Xen0, they can access and modify all user images at
will. The step from stage 2 to stage 3 on-demand Grid computing sees the removal of
the trust relationship from the customers and solution producers towards the resource
provider (see Section 4.4). This entails that the solution producer and user must be
able to remotely check the integrity of the remote system to ensure that the solution
producer’s software has not been modified and the data is stored securely. It should
be noted here that it is impossible to fully secure a remote system under foreign ad-
ministrative control, since as the last instance the remote administrator can unhook the
system during operation and then perform any number of attacks against both software
and hardware security protocols off-line. Given enough time and resources, it is possi-
ble to break most security mechanisms which protect the system. Therefore, the goal
of level 3 on-demand security is to make the time and effort so prohibitive that it is
no longer a relevant threat to the solution producers and customers. One way to make
hacking a system more complex is to implement the security measures in hardware,
since it is much harder for most attackers to create workarounds in hardware than it
is for them to work around software security systems. This introduces a new entity
to the trust model: the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Producer. Since the security
hardware is used to offer essential security features for level 3 on-demand computing,
it is necessary that users, producers and providers trust the hardware provider that the
security hardware does what it is supposed to. However, since there are only very few
hardware producers compared to the number of other actors in the on-demand world,
it is possible to build a trust relationship to the hardware providers, either by reputation
since security hardware producers usually are well known firms such as Intel, AMD,
IBM, etc, or by a hardware audit. The Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA)
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has produced an open specification for a security chip (TPM) and related software
interfaces which is such a hardware based security system. Safford and Zohar [143]
introduce the functionality of the TPM chip. The chip offers hardware based public
key management and boot-time system integrity checks. Furthermore, it allows re-
mote run-time integrity checking of applications loaded in the TPM secured operating
system. Apart, from the secure boot process, the IBM TPM Linux [95] offers three
security modules (EVM, SLIM and IMA) which are of interest for stage 3 security.
After the secure boot operation, the unmodified TPM secured operating system is
up and running. Next, the Extended Verification Module (EVM) which is part of the
operating system can be used to check if an application which is to be loaded has been
modified in a similar fashion as the boot modification checks. The EVM module ver-
ifies that all files are authentic, unmodified, current, and not known to be malicious.
EVM does not (and cannot) determine if files are correct - that is, that given any (pos-
sibly malicious) input data, they will operate properly. The Simple Linux Integrity
Module (SLIM) deals with this issue, but since each solution producer operates within
his or her own XenU, any weaknesses within the unmodified application are his or her
concern alone and need not be checked by the resource provider. However, it does help
the solution producer to ensure that their software conforms to the requirements of the
resource provider.
The Trusted Computing Architecture facilitates remote attestation with which the
status of the remote operating system and application hosted within can be checked.
The Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) extends the TPM-based attestation
into the system runtime, the EVM provides the measurement and the SLIM identifies
all executables (programs, scripts) and all system level integrity objects (config files).
It attests the software stack and adjusts protected hardware storage slots to maintain
measurement list integrity values.
Using this remote attestation facility, it is possible for solution producers and users
to remotely check if a resource providers’ system meets their security requirements.
Possible requirements are that software is stored only in encrypted form and is only
decrypted into memory when it is being executed to reduce the risk of the resource
provider stealing the software. Using TCP enabled network devices, it will be possible
to securely transfer the keys needed to run an encrypted application directly from one
TPM to another. This gives the solution producer added security since the TPM chip
would have to be hacked by the resource provider to illegally gain access to their
software or data. Integrating this technology into the Grid environment introduced in
this thesis would enable more resources to be integrated into the Grid since resource
providers would no longer be restricted to well known and reputable organisations.
Any TPM enabled resource could be utilised without having to trust the owner. This
would significantly increase the size and versatility of the Grid.
As a final step, the TPM module in combination with virtualisation can be used to
protect the user’s system as well, as it is done in the work of Stumpf et al. [170, 169,
171].
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11.1.6 Cloud Computing
While some of the hype surrounding Cloud computing must be seen in the light of the
marketing push of big companies trying to sell a product, the strong focus on usability
and business integration are interesting topics for future research. The presented Grid
environment already fulfills the key infrastructure requirements of Cloud computing,
namely secure, on-demand and service-oriented use of compute and storage resources.
Research into pricing and billing components and business models would extend the
presented Grid infrastructure and bring it fully into the realm of Cloud computing.
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